Lisa M. Davenport v. Secretary Department of the Navy

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2621
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LISA M. DAVENPORT,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1:16-cv-00494)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 18, 2025
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Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, BIBAS and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: February 19, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.

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CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
Lisa Davenport was employed by the United States Navy as a Supervisory
Security Specialist. After the Navy terminated her employment, Davenport filed a
lawsuit alleging that the Navy committed disability discrimination in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”). The District
Court granted summary judgment in the Navy’s favor. Davenport thereafter filed a
motion for relief from the court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which the court denied. Davenport appeals the denial of her motion for post-judgment
relief. Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davenport’s
motion, we will affirm the court’s order.
I.
We write for the benefit of the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to
our decision. Davenport began work with the Navy in 2006 as a Security Specialist and
was promoted to serve as a Supervisory Security Specialist in 2011. Several months after
her promotion, Davenport received notice that her position was eligible for situational
telework according to the policy of her then-existing command organization. In October
of 2012, however, the Navy reassigned Davenport’s job function to a different command
organization that did not approve telework for Supervisory Security Specialists. At about
this time, Davenport experienced worsening symptoms of a chronic medical condition.
She requested that the Navy accommodate her disability in part by allowing her to
telework on an occasional basis. Davenport’s supervisor concluded that Davenport could

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not perform the essential functions of her job as a Supervisory Security Specialist while
teleworking and denied her accommodation request.
Beginning on March 1, 2013, Davenport was unable to report to work. On March
10, 2013, she requested reconsideration of the denial of her accommodation request. At
about this time, in a letter apparently submitted to the Navy in support of Davenport’s
request for reconsideration, Davenport’s doctor stated that Davenport was “experiencing
severe exacerbation of her symptoms and [was] unable to perform her job description.”
Davenport v. Mabus et al., No. 16-cv-00494-JPW, ECF 93-1 at 44. On April 5, 2013, a
supervisor denied Davenport’s request for reconsideration on the basis that there was no
possible accommodation that would allow Davenport to perform the essential functions
of her job or any other job available within her command organization. The Navy
terminated Davenport’s employment on September 27, 2013, after she was continuously
unable to report to work for more than six months.
Davenport filed this lawsuit after an unsuccessful appeal of her termination to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”).1 She alleges that the Navy violated the Rehabilitation Act by
discharging her because of her disability and by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation. The District Court determined that Davenport had not established a
prima facie case of disability discrimination or failure to accommodate and granted
summary judgment in the Navy’s favor. Davenport thereafter filed a motion for post-
1 An employee may petition the EEOC to review the decision of the MSPB in a
matter involving alleged discrimination. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1).

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judgment relief under Rules 60(b)(3) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
alleging that the Navy had failed to disclose pertinent legal authority to the District Court.
The District Court denied the motion. Davenport timely appealed the court’s order
denying her motion for post-judgment relief.2
II.3
Our review of a district court’s denial of a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is for
abuse of discretion. Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). A court’s decision
is an abuse of discretion if it rests on “a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (citing Morris v. Horn,
187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Rule 60(b)(3) provides for post-judgment relief in case of “fraud . . .,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” A court may grant relief under
Rule 60(b)(3) only if the movant “establish[es] that the adverse party engaged in fraud or
other misconduct, and that this conduct prevented the moving party from fully and fairly
presenting his case.” Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). Davenport
also sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6), “a catch-all provision that authorizes a court to
grant relief from a final judgment for ‘any . . . reason’ other than those listed elsewhere in
2 Davenport has not appealed the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment in the Navy’s favor. Because “an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does
not bring up the underlying judgment for review,” our review is confined to the District
Court’s order denying post-judgment relief. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.
257, 263 n.7 (1978).
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our Court has
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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the Rule.” Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)). Relief under Rule
60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy dispensed only in “extraordinary circumstances.”
See id.
The gravamen of Davenport’s request for relief is that the Navy did not disclose to
the District Court four authorities that, in Davenport’s view, were adverse to the Navy’s
defense of her claims: an executive order issued on July 26, 2000, titled “Requiring
Federal Agencies To Establish Procedures to Facilitate the Provision of Reasonable
Accommodation,” see Exec. Order No. 13164, 65 Fed. Reg. 46565 (July 28, 2000);
policy guidance issued by the EEOC interpreting the executive order of July 26, 2000,
see EEOC, Policy Guidance on Executive Order 13164: Establishing Procedures to
Facilitate the Provision of Reasonable Accommodation (October 20, 2000); and two
documents setting forth the Navy’s policy regarding accommodations for people with
disabilities, see Deputy Chief Mgmt. Officer of Dep’t of Def., Administrative Instruction
(Oct. 24, 2013); Dep’t of the Navy, Program Manual for Reasonable Accommodation
(March 2022). Davenport suggests that disclosure of these policy statements would have
helped her establish that her approval for situational telework in 2011 was, in fact, a grant
of a reasonable accommodation.
Davenport has provided no basis for concluding that the Navy’s purported failure
to disclose these policy statements prevented her from fully and fairly presenting her
case. Nor has she presented any basis for the extraordinary remedy allowed by Rule
60(b)(6). The policy statements Davenport identifies have no discernible relevance to the
issue the District Court considered dispositive — whether she was fit to perform the

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essential functions of her job as a Supervisory Security Specialist — or to any other
element of her prima facie cases of disability discrimination and failure to accommodate.
We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Davenport’s motion for post-judgment relief.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying
Davenport’s motion for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b).

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