Raymond Stephen Zaborowski v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY On Appeal from the United States District Court for…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 23-2637
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RAYMOND STEPHEN ZABOROWSKI,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01130)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Carol S. Wells
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on July 8, 2024
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit
Judges
(Filed: September 18, 2024)
F. Michael Friedman
821 Terwood Road
P.O. Box 467
Drexel Hill, PA 19028

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Counsel for Appellant
David E. Somers III
SOCIAL SECURITY A DMINISTRATION
O FFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL – O FFICE 3
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
When weighing medical opinions in Social Security mat-
ters, administrative law judges must consider a range of fac-
tors, but all they must explain are the reasons for their deci-
sions. Raymond Zaborowski served in the U.S. Army for 5½
years, including during both Gulf Wars. As a result, he suffers
from anxiety and PTSD. Because those conditions have
stopped him from working since 2014, he claimed Social Se-
curity disability benefits.
The administrative judge denied Zaborowski’s claim, ex-
plaining that the available medical evidence showed that he
could still do light work. At the District Court, Zaborowski
consented to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, who denied
review.

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Zaborowski now appeals. He claims that (1) the regulation
that specifies how administrative judges must explain their
decisions violates the Social Security Act, (2) the administra-
tive judge did not explain how supportable and consistent each
medical opinion was, and (3) the administrative judge’s find-
ings of supportability and consistency were not supported by
substantial evidence. We review all legal issues, including the
regulation’s validity, de novo. Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). We review the administra-
tive judge’s findings of fact and her ultimate decision to deny
benefits deferentially for substantial evidence. Id.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
First, Zaborowski argues that the regulation violates the
Act. The statute, he notes, requires administrative judges to
state the “reasons upon which [a denial of benefits] is based.”
42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). And the implementing regulation tells
claimants: “We will consider [a list of] factors when we con-
sider the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical
finding(s) in your case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Yet that
regulation requires administrative judges to explain only two
of these factors: whether medical opinions were (1) based on
“objective medical evidence and supporting explanations” and
(2) consistent with other medical opinions in the record. Id.; 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). We call these two factors supporta-
bility and consistency for short.
Like any other regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c must fol-
low the statute that authorizes it, which is 42 U.S.C. § 405(a).
It does. Zaborowski conflates the authorizing statute’s require-
ment to give reasons with the regulation’s list of factors. A
judge may consider many factors yet base a decision on just

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one or two. And those one or two are the “reasons upon which
[the denial of benefits] is based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). The
statute requires administrative judges to explain only the dis-
positive reasons for their decisions, not everything else that
they considered.
The regulation complies with the statute by requiring admin-
istrative judges to explain their dispositive reasons. Administra-
tive judges must always discuss the two most important factors:
supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
But if opposing medical opinions are equally well-supported
and consistent, then supportability and consistency are not dis-
positive. If so, the administrative judge must “articulate how
[she] considered the other most persuasive factors.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(3). So under the regulation, administrative
judges must always explain the reasons for their decisions. But
that does not mean always explaining all the factors.
Second, Zaborowski objects that the administrative judge
did not articulate how supportable and consistent the various
doctors’ opinions were. Not so. To satisfy this requirement, a
judge need not reiterate the magic words “support” and “con-
sistent” for each doctor. And the administrative judge did
weave supportability and consistency throughout her analysis
of which doctors were persuasive. AR 31–33. As she explained,
the first psychologist based her opinion on her review of the
record, and it fit with the other evidence of Zaborowski’s con-
dition and treatability. Another psychologist based his opinion
on his examination of Zaborowski, and the administrative
judge found it “persuasive because it is consistent with the rec-
ord.” AR 32. By contrast, the opinion of Zaborowski’s treating
psychiatrist was “not consistent with the record that shows that

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the claimant has social avoidance issues, but he is able to cope
within his limits.” Id. at 33. Last, Zaborowski’s other psychologist
did not address “any specific functional work-related limita-
tions or restrictions.” Id. at 32. There was no need to say more
than that.
Third, there was substantial evidence to support the admin-
istrative judge’s decision about how much weight to give each
medical opinion, as shown by her explanations discussed
above. And after she weighed the opinions, there was substan-
tial evidence for her conclusion that Zaborowski could still
work. The first and second psychologists’ opinions, plus the
record evidence that he could live alone and help his mother
with chores and medical appointments, was enough to clear
that low threshold. So we will affirm.

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