Gnana M. Chinniah, also known as Gnanachandra M. Chinniah; SUGANTHINI CHINNIAH v. East Pennsboro Township

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2639
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GNANA M. CHINNIAH, also known as Gnanachandra M. Chinniah;
SUGANTHINI CHINNIAH,
Appellants
v.
EAST PENNSBORO TOWNSHIP; JEFFREY S. SHULTZ; KAREN DUNKLE;
JAMES HERZLER; JOHN KUNTZELMAN; CHRISTOPHER S. UNDERHILL;
LAW OFFICES OF HARTMAN UNDERHILL & BRUBAKER; JOSHUA AUTRY;
JEFFREY CONRAD; LAW OFFICES OF CLYMER MUSSER & CONRAD;
CUMBERLAND COUNTY TAX BUREAU
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-02240)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 2, 2024
___________
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 5, 2024)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

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PER CURIAM
Gnana and Suganthini Chinniah (“Appellants”) appeal pro se from the District
Court’s decision dismissing their civil-rights action with prejudice for failure to prosecute
and failure to comply with a court order. We will affirm that judgment.
I.
Appellants commenced this lawsuit in the District Court in 2015, seeking relief
against numerous defendants. Appellants’ amended complaint, filed in 2016, raised both
federal and state-law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss that pleading pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A United States Magistrate Judge
subsequently issued a report recommending that the District Court grant those motions,
dismiss the federal claims with prejudice, and dismiss the state-law claims without
prejudice. In making that recommendation, the Magistrate Judge explained that, since all
of Appellants’ federal claims failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the District
Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. On appeal,
we affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all but three of Appellants’ federal claims.
See Chinniah v. E. Pennsboro Twp., 761 F. App’x 112, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2019) (per
curiam). Because we decided to vacate and remand with respect to those three federal
claims — claims over which the District Court had original jurisdiction — we also
constitute binding precedent.

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“vacate[d] and remand[ed] the District Court’s order as to supplemental jurisdiction [over
the state-law claims].” Id. at 118.
On remand, the Magistrate Judge issued another report, this time addressing
whether the state-law claims should be dismissed on their merits. The report
recommended that a subset of Appellants’ state-law claims be dismissed, and that
Appellants be granted leave to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) “that is
complete in all respects and cures the pleading deficiencies [relating to some of the
dismissed state-law claims].” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 142, at 22. In January 2021, the District
Court largely adopted this recommendation,1 gave Appellants 30 days to file a SAC, and
stated that the SAC “must be filed as a single, stand-alone document that does not
reference prior court filings.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 150, at 2.
Appellants moved the District Court to reconsider that January 2021 order. In
June 2021, the District Court denied reconsideration. A few days later, the Magistrate
Judge directed Appellants to file a SAC within 14 days. Appellants appealed from those
June 2021 orders, but we dismissed that appeal in October 2021 for lack of appellate
jurisdiction because there was no final, appealable order before us. See C.A. No. 21-
2191.
About a week after we dismissed that appeal, the Magistrate Judge again directed
Appellants to file a SAC within 14 days. Appellants responded by moving to (1) stay the
District Court proceedings pending this Court’s resolution of a petition for rehearing that
1 The District Court declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of one claim, and
that court also modified another part of the report.

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Appellants had filed in C.A. No. 21-2191, and (2) recuse the Magistrate Judge and the
presiding District Judge. In December 2021, the Magistrate Judge denied the request to
stay and declined to recuse herself from Appellants’ case. The next day, we denied
rehearing in C.A. No. 21-2191. And the day after that, the presiding District Judge
declined to recuse herself from Appellants’ case. Appellants appealed from the District
Court’s order denying recusal, but we dismissed that appeal in April 2022 for lack of
appellate jurisdiction (for the same reason that warranted dismissal in C.A. No. 21-2191).
See C.A. No. 22-1043.
Next, in January 2023, the Magistrate Judge again directed Appellants to file a
SAC within 14 days. Appellants did not respond. As a result, in March 2023, the
Magistrate Judge directed Appellants to show cause, within 21 days, why they had failed
to file a SAC. The show-cause order explained that “[u]nless good cause is shown, this
action may be DISMISSED.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 170 (bolded emphasis omitted). Once
again, Appellants did not respond. Accordingly, in May 2023, the Magistrate Judge
issued a report recommending that the District Court dismiss the case with prejudice for
failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order. In support of that
recommendation, the Magistrate Judge examined each of the six factors set forth in
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), and concluded
that a balancing of those factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal.
Appellants did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s May 2023 report. In August
2023, the District Court adopted that report, dismissed the case with prejudice, and

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directed the District Court Clerk to close the case. Appellants then timely filed this
appeal, challenging that dismissal order.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review
dismissals for failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order for abuse of
discretion.” Davis v. Samuels, 962 F.3d 105, 116 n.13 (3d Cir. 2020). To determine
whether a district court acted within its discretion in entering such a dismissal, “we
review the manner in which it balanced the [Poulis factors].” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2013). Those factors are as follows:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders . . .; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of alternative sanctions other than dismissal; and
(6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). “[W]e do not have a magic formula or mechanical
calculation to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a
plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “None of the Poulis factors is alone dispositive, and it is also true that
not all of the factors need to be satisfied to justify dismissal . . . .” Hildebrand v.
Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019).
In this case, the Magistrate Judge’s May 2023 report concluded that five of the six
Poulis factors (all but the last factor) weighed against Appellants, and that a balancing of
all six factors weighed in favor of dismissal. The District Court then adopted that Poulis

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analysis. But on appeal, Appellants’ briefing does not discuss that analysis. See Kars 4
Kids Inc. v. Am. Can!, 98 F.4th 436, 452 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[A]rguments not raised in a
party’s opening brief are generally deemed forfeited.”). And even if this issue were
preserved for appellate review, there would be no reason for us to disturb the District
Court’s decision to dismiss. For substantially the reasons set forth in the Magistrate
Judge’s May 2023 report, see Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 172, at 8-14, we cannot hold that the
District Court abused its discretion in concluding that a balancing of the Poulis factors
weighed in favor of dismissing Appellants’ case.2 Despite being afforded numerous
chances to file a SAC over the course of roughly two years, Appellants failed to do so.3
And when the Magistrate Judge’s March 2023 show-cause order directed them to explain
their failure to file a SAC, they did nothing.4
2 Although the Magistrate Judge’s May 2023 report mistakenly stated that Appellants
failed to file a third amended complaint (rather than a SAC), that misstatement was
harmless.
3 In October 2021, Appellants initiated a new civil action in the District Court against
(a) some of the defendants from this case and (b) several new defendants. See Dist. Ct.
Civ. No. 1:21-cv-01815. That complaint stated that all the claims in that new case arose
after Appellants filed this case. In April 2023, the District Court dismissed that new case
without prejudice for failure to effect service. Appellants have taken no further action in
that case.
Appellants do not argue that the complaint in that new case was intended to serve
as the SAC in this case. To the extent that Appellants nevertheless ask us to “exercise
jurisdiction” over that case, that request is denied, for that case is not properly before us.
4 The District Court, in its December 2021 order denying Appellants’ motion to recuse
the presiding District Judge, indicated that the SAC represents an opportunity for
Appellants “to correct the defects with their pleading such that they might pursue the[]
[dismissed] claims further, if they so choose. [Appellants] are not obligated to file [a
SAC].” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 162, at 4-5 (emphasis added). Accordingly, instead of filing a

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We have considered the various arguments raised in Appellants’ briefing and
conclude that none has merit.5 Accordingly, and in view of the above, we will affirm the
District Court’s judgment. Appellants’ motion to impose sanctions against certain
appellees is denied.
SAC, Appellants could have told the District Court that they wished to abandon the
dismissed (but potentially curable claims) and proceed solely on the claims in the first
amended complaint that had survived dismissal. But Appellants did not do so, and, aside
from filing an improper interlocutory appeal, they took no action in the District Court in
the approximately 20 months between the entry of that December 2021 order and the
District Court’s dismissal of the case in August 2023. Furthermore, Appellants do not
aver in their briefing here that they wanted to abandon the dismissed claims and proceed
solely on what remained of their first amended complaint.
5 To the extent that Appellants allege that the presiding District Judge was biased against
them, we see no evidence of any basis. See Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset
Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that “adverse rulings . . . are
not in themselves proof of prejudice or bias”). And to the extent that Appellants
challenge the District Court’s December 2021 order denying their motion to recuse the
District Judge, we see no reason to disturb that order. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc.
v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a
party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal . . . .”);
see also United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 717 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (reviewing
district court’s denial of recusal motion for abuse of discretion).

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