Jose Montanez v. PAULA PRICE, Health Care Administrator SCI-Huntingdon

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 23-2669
_______________
JOSE MONTANEZ,
Appellant
v.
PAULA PRICE, Health Care Administrator SCI-Huntingdon;
RAJINDER MAHLI, SCI-Huntingdon; GABRIELLE
NALLEY, Physician’s Assistant SCI-Huntingdon;
NURSE MEL; DR. VERNON PRESTON, SCI-Rockview;
RICHARD ELLERS, Healthcare Administrator
SCI-Rockview; DR. DAVID EDWARDS, SCI-Smithfield;
MARY PATTON, SCI-Smithfield; C. WAKEFIELD,
Superintendent SCI-Smithfield; N. DAVIS, Registered
Nursing Supervisor SCI-Huntingdon; JOHN RIVELLO;
WELLPATH CARE; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01267)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
________________
Argued on September 24, 2024

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Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 8, 2025)
Samuel Weiss
Lilian Novak [ARGUED]
Rights Behind Bars
1800 M Street NW
Front 1 #33821
Washington, DC 20033
Counsel for Appellant
Samuel H. Foreman
Keanna A. Seabrooks [ARGUED]
Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby
6 PPG Place, Suite 1130
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Medical Appellees/Appellees Rajinder
Mahli, Gabrielle Nalley, Dr. Vernon Preston, Dr.
David Edwards, Wellpath Care
Jacob A. Frasch [ARGUED]
Sean A. Kirkpatrick
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Claudia M. Tesoro
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street

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Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Commonwealth Appellees/Appellees
Paula Price, Nurse Mel, Richard Ellers, Mary Patton,
C. Wakefield, N. Davis, John Rivello, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania
________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
The protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,
do not stop at the prison gates. So when an inmate, whether
counseled or pro se, claims that prison officials ignored his
serious medical needs and failed to accommodate his
disability, the courthouse doors must be open for a fair hearing.
That was not the case for Appellant Jose Montanez, whose
claims were dismissed with prejudice even though his
complaint, liberally construed, states an Eighth Amendment
claim against several defendants in their individual capacities,
a claim under the RA against Wellpath Care LLC, and a claim
under both the ADA and RA against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. As to his other claims, Montanez’s pleading
was insufficient, but his briefs in opposition to the defendants’
motions to dismiss make clear that amendment would not have

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been futile, so the District Court erred by not granting him
leave to amend. We will therefore affirm the District Court in
part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to allow
Montanez to amend his complaint in accordance with this
opinion.
I. Factual and Procedural History1
On August 28, 2021, Jose Montanez stood up in his cell
at SCI-Huntingdon and suddenly collapsed, his body numb
from the chest down. Lying on the cell floor, Montanez alerted
a nearby guard to his condition, and the guard soon returned
with another prison officer. Montanez was then forced to “drag
his body over to the cell door” before he was eventually taken
to the medical unit in a wheelchair by Appellee Nurse Melanie
Wagman. App. 37.
Once in the medical unit, Nurse Wagman took
Montanez’s vitals and felt around his legs. She then phoned
Appellee Dr. Rajinder Mahli, who instructed her to move
Montanez from his third-floor cell to a cell on the first floor
and said he would evaluate Montanez the next day. When
Montanez—still paralyzed from the waist down—learned that
he would not be evaluated or treated until the next day, he
1 Evidence adduced in discovery may not support or may
affirmatively disprove the allegations in Montanez’s
complaint. In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint,
however, we must accept the allegations as true. Stringer v.
Cnty. of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2025). We
therefore recount the facts below as set forth in the complaint,
drawing all reasonable inferences in Montanez’s favor, as
required at this stage. Id.

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asked to be taken to the hospital, but Nurse Wagman
responded, “you’re not going to the hospital,” and laughed at
the request. App. 38. Nurse Wagman then wheeled Montanez
to the door of his new cell, where she ordered him to “get out
of the wheelchair,” offering him no assistance, forcing him to
drag his limp body “across [his] cell to the bed,” and leaving
him “exhausted and in so much pain.” App. 38.
The next day, Dr. Mahli came to examine Montanez, but
he, too, did not enter the cell, and ordered Montanez to “walk
for him.” App. 38. Montanez was still unable to stand, let
alone walk, so he again dragged his paralyzed body across the
cell floor as Dr. Mahli watched. And when Montanez informed
Dr. Mahli that he was also involuntarily urinating on himself,
Dr. Mahli simply “nodded” and “walked off,” doing nothing to
help Montanez with his sudden paralysis or incontinence. App
38-39.
Montanez was then left alone in his cell in this
condition—paralyzed from his chest to his feet and
uncontrollably urinating on himself—for another three days
before receiving medical attention. At that point, Montanez
was finally given an MRI that revealed spinal cord stenosis and
spinal cord edema, requiring expedited back surgery in
September 2021. Following surgery, Montanez was
transferred to a private rehabilitation facility.
A mere two weeks into rehabilitation and still unable to
stand, Montanez was returned to detention, this time to the
infirmary of a different Pennsylvania state prison,
SCI-Rockview. There, he continued his recovery until he took
a serious fall that caused him intense pain in his spine.
Nonetheless, the doctor on staff, Appellee Dr. Vernon Preston,

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refused to give him adequate pain medication. An x-ray
revealed that Montanez had herniated a disc in his back in the
fall, but SCI-Rockview’s Healthcare Administrator, Appellee
Richard Ellers, “lied” to his doctor “about the results of the
x-ray” to delay his treatment. App. 39.
Two months later, Montanez was transferred back to
SCI-Huntingdon, where he continued to suffer mobility issues
and intense discomfort from his recent spinal surgery and
subsequent spinal injury. So he requested certain
accommodations, including a double mattress to control his
back pain while sleeping, a cane or crutches to facilitate
walking, stronger medication for pain management, and access
to physical therapy. Those requests were repeatedly denied by
prison personnel.
Eventually, Montanez looked to the courts for relief,
filing a pro se complaint2 in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania that sought compensatory
and injunctive relief. The Complaint asserted claims under the
Eighth Amendment, Title II of the ADA (Title II), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132, and Section 504 of the RA (Section 504), 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. The defendants fell into two categories: (1) the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and seven of its employees
(collectively, the Commonwealth Defendants),3 and
2 Montanez filed an initial complaint in August 2022 and an
amended complaint, removing one defendant and adding
another, in January 2023. For ease of reference, we will refer
to the second filing as the “Complaint.”
3 The Commonwealth Defendants include the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (Commonwealth) and (1) Paula

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(2) Wellpath Care LLC (Wellpath), a private company
contracted by the Commonwealth to provide medical services
in its prisons, and four Wellpath employees (collectively, the
Medical Defendants).4
What Montanez was permitted to say about these
defendants and the facts supporting his claims, however, was
Price, the Health Care Administrator at SCI-Huntingdon;
(2) Melanie Wagman, a nurse at SCI-Huntingdon;
(3) SCI-Rockview Healthcare Administrator Richard Ellers;
(4) Mary Patton, an employee at SCI-Smithfield;
(5) SCI-Smithfield Superintendent C. Wakefield; (6) N. Davis,
the registered nurse supervisor at SCI-Huntingdon; and (7)
SCI-Huntingdon Superintendent John Rivello (collectively,
the Individual Commonwealth Defendants).
4 The Medical Defendants include Wellpath and (1) Dr.
Rajinder Mahli; (2) Physician Assistant (PA) Gabrielle Nalley;
(3) Dr. Vernon Preston; and (4) Dr. David Edwards
(collectively, the Individual Medical Defendants). Although
the Individual Medical Defendants are private contractors
employed by a large, for-profit company, their work within the
state prison system makes them state actors subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55
(1988). Unlike the Individual Commonwealth Defendants,
however, the Individual Medical Defendants cannot assert
qualified immunity. Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 467 &
n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that Wellpath employees working
in state facilities are “categorically ineligible for qualified
immunity”); Tanner v. McMurray, 989 F.3d 860, 862 n.1, 870
(10th Cir. 2021) (same); Davis v. Buchanan Cnty., 11 F.4th
604, 622 (8th Cir. 2021) (similar); Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d
544, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2017) (similar).

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strictly limited. At the time, the Middle District required pro
se prisoners bringing civil rights claims to file their actions
using a specific, court-issued complaint form. That document,
entitled “FORM TO BE USED BY A PRISONER IN FILING
A CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA,” directed the filer, under the “statement of
claim” section, to “[d]escribe how each defendant is involved,
including dates and places,” and to do so “as briefly as
possible.” App. 33, 36. And by “briefly,” it meant within the
twelve lines provided, or, if prisoners needed to say more, they
could “[a]ttach no more than three extra sheets.” Id. at 36.
Montanez complied, filling out all twelve lines and writing out
exactly three additional pages of allegations.
Not surprisingly, both the Commonwealth Defendants
and the Medical Defendants then moved to dismiss the
Complaint, arguing the allegations were insufficient to state a
claim. Montanez’s briefs in opposition to those motions
included over 50 pages with new factual allegations about the
ordeal he allegedly endured at SCI-Huntingdon,
SCI-Rockview, and SCI-Smithfield since becoming paralyzed
in 2021. But to no avail. The District Court granted the
Commonwealth and Medical Defendants’ motions to dismiss
in full. Limiting its consideration to the “facts . . . expressly
set forth in the . . . [C]omplaint,” the Court concluded that
Montanez failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because
he did not “allege facts from which it can reasonably be
inferred that” any defendant “exhibited a deliberate
indifference to his medical needs.” App. 8 n.3, 22. It also
dismissed Montanez’s disability law claims on the grounds that
Montanez failed to plausibly allege (1) that he was denied
access to a covered program, service, or activity, as required to

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state a claim under Title II or Section 504, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794; or (2) that any defendant acted with
deliberate indifference toward his right to be free from
disability discrimination, as required to claim compensatory
damages under those statutes. Finally, the District Court
denied Montanez’s request for leave to amend, concluding that
amendment “would be futile based on the factual and legal
defects identified in” the Complaint. App. 29.
Montanez timely appealed and is now represented by
counsel.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo,
meaning we “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Kedra v.
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.
2008)). Because Montanez’s Complaint was filed pro se, we
also must construe it “liberally” and hold it to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Finally, we review a
district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion
and its determination of futility de novo. U.S. ex rel. Schumann
v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).

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III. Discussion
Montanez raises three claims on appeal. He contends
that the District Court erred by: (1) dismissing his Eighth
Amendment claims; (2) dismissing his disability law claims
under Title II and Section 504; and (3) dismissing the
Complaint with prejudice rather than granting him leave to
amend. We address each claim in turn.
A. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide
humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and—as relevant to this appeal—medical
care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Estelle,
429 U.S. at 104. An Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care has both objective and subjective elements: A
prisoner “must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or
omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
As for the first element, a medical need is sufficiently
serious if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro
(MCCII), 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation
omitted). As for the second, a prison official acts with
“deliberate indifference” if he knows of the serious medical
need yet disregards it by failing to act reasonably. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837. That knowledge can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, including the obviousness of the

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serious health need, id. at 842, and we have found deliberate
indifference in various contexts, “including where (1) prison
authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2)
knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the
intentional refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical
treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison
authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended
treatment for serious medical needs,” Pearson v. Prison Health
Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir. 2017).
Mere negligence, however—even if it constitutes
medical malpractice—falls short of deliberate indifference.
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). So does
mere disagreement between the prisoner and medical
personnel over the proper course of treatment. Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis and edema
(which caused paralysis requiring surgery), his sudden
incontinence, and the herniated disc he suffered after falling at
SCI-Rockview easily qualify as serious medical needs. See,
e.g., Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2023)
(lumbar stenosis is a serious medical need); Spruill, 372 F.3d
at 236 (back condition that caused both “excruciating pain” and
multiple falls was serious medical need); McDaniel v. Syed,
115 F.4th 805, 816, 832-33 (7th Cir. 2024) (prisoner with
“spine and incontinence issues, resulting in significant back
pain and difficulty controlling urination,” had serious medical
needs). Thus, Montanez’s ability to state a claim for
inadequate medical care turns on whether he has sufficiently
pleaded deliberate indifference to any of these serious medical
needs.

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i. The Medical Defendants
a) The Individual Medical
Defendants
The District Court concluded that Montanez did not
plausibly allege that any Individual Medical Defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his health needs. That
determination, at least as it pertains to Dr. Mahli, was simply
incorrect.
According to the Complaint, Dr. Mahli, despite
knowing that Montanez was suddenly paralyzed and
uncontrollably urinating on himself, provided no medical
treatment and instead abandoned Montanez in this state for
three days. Taken as true, these allegations do not represent
mere disagreement with Dr. Mahli’s “medical judgment” or a
particular “course of treatment.” Montanez v. Price, No.
3:22-CV-1267, 2023 WL 5435616, at *9-*10 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
23, 2023). Rather, where “knowledge of the need for medical
care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide that
care,” as alleged here, “the deliberate indifference standard has
been met.” MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346 (citation modified). That
standard can also be met by a defendant abandoning a prisoner
in a condition that unreasonably exposes him to “the threat of
tangible residual injury,” as may be inferred from the
allegations in the Complaint against Dr. Mahli. Spruill, 372
F.3d at 235 (quoting MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346).
On top of stating an Eighth Amendment claim against
Dr. Mahli for inadequate medical care, the Complaint
adequately pleads a second type of Eighth Amendment
violation. Construing Montanez’s pro se Complaint “liberally,

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as we must,” Durham, 82 F.4th at 230, the facts alleged against
Dr. Mahli—deserting Montanez in his cell with nothing to do
but drag his urine-soaked, paralyzed body around his cell floor
for three days before help arrived—are also sufficient to make
out an unsanitary conditions-of-confinement claim, see Taylor
v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020) (per curiam) (forcing prisoner
to live in his excrement for six days obviously violated the
Eighth Amendment); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 365 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“It would be an abomination of the Constitution to
force a prisoner to live in his own excrement for four
days . . . .”).
Yet while the Complaint states an Eighth Amendment
claim against Mahli, it fails to state such a claim, even when
liberally construed, against the remaining Individual Medical
Defendants—namely, Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards, and PA Nalley.
As to these defendants, the Complaint alleges (1) that Dr.
Preston denied Montanez “proper or adequate pain
medication” after he fell and herniated his disc; (2) that PA
Nalley refused to give him a double mattress (which Montanez
believed would help his back pain), denied him “stronger pain
medication,” “lied to [him]” about being referred to physical
therapy, and allowed him to “walk around without a cane or
crutches”; and (3) that Dr. Edwards denied his requests for
“stronger pain medication and a double mattress,” and refused
to order an MRI for Montanez’s left hip. App. 39-40. But
those allegations reflect differences in judgment between
Montanez and these medical personnel about appropriate
medical treatment, or at most amount to medical malpractice,
neither of which is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235.

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b) Wellpath
The District Court correctly determined that Montanez
failed to state a claim under § 1983 against Wellpath. The
Complaint mentions Wellpath once, alleging merely that it is
the “entity contracting the medical staff who is also in this
case.” App. 40. But Wellpath cannot be held vicariously liable
for the acts of its employees—Dr. Mahli, Dr. Preston, Dr.
Edwards, and PA Nalley—under a theory of respondeat
superior. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84. Rather, like
municipalities, private corporations under contract to provide
prison health services are liable only if their policies or
customs caused the constitutional violation. See id.; Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because
Montanez does not tie any of the alleged Eighth Amendment
violations back to Wellpath’s policies or customs, he has failed
to state a claim against that entity.
* * *
In sum, the District Court erred by dismissing
Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Mahli.
While it correctly determined that Montanez’s
three-and-a-half-page, handwritten Complaint failed to state
Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Preston, Dr. Edwards,
PA Nalley, and Wellpath, the District Court erred in dismissing
those claims with prejudice. Instead, as discussed further
below, Montanez should have been granted an opportunity to
amend. See infra Section III.C.

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ii. The Commonwealth Defendants
The District Court properly dismissed Montanez’s
Eighth Amendment claims insofar as Montanez sought
damages against the Commonwealth and the Individual
Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacities. See
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). It erred,
however, in its treatment of the Individual Commonwealth
Defendants in their personal capacities.
a) Nurse Wagman
The District Court dismissed Montanez’s Eighth
Amendment claim against Nurse Wagman, reasoning that the
allegations against her “amount[] to a mere disagreement with
[the] medical treatment” she provided. Montanez, 2023 WL
5435616, at *7. Not so.
After Montanez collapsed and lost sensation from the
chest down, Nurse Wagman allegedly provided no medical
treatment other than briefly feeling around Montanez’s legs.
Nor did she try to diagnose Montanez’s sudden paralysis.
Instead, according to the Complaint, she laughed at his request
to go to the hospital and, after transporting him to his new
first-floor cell, did not help him into his cell and bed. As even
the Commonwealth acknowledged at oral argument, assuming
the truth of Montanez’s allegations, Nurse Wagman simply
“dumped him in [his] cell,” leaving Montanez to drag his limp
body as he crawled across his cell floor. Oral Arg. Transcript
35:18. The Commonwealth itself “[could]n’t defend [that]
decision to make him crawl,” Oral Arg. Transcript 37:3-4,
which unnecessarily exposed Montanez “to the possible risks

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of a permanent disability or . . . serious injury,” Spruill, 372
F.3d at 237.
That is textbook deliberate indifference. Such conduct,
as described, “entails the obduracy and wantonness that is
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment” and is thus sufficient to
state a claim against Nurse Wagman. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537,
541 (holding that a prisoner’s claim that a nurse forced him “to
crawl to a wheelchair despite indicating that he was unable to
walk” created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the nurse
“acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s serious
medical needs).
b) Non-Medical Prison Officials
Non-medical personnel generally will not be found
deliberately indifferent for purposes of an Eighth Amendment
inadequate-medical-care claim unless they have “a reason to
believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their
assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill,
372 F.3d at 236. Put differently, when a “prisoner is under the
care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will
generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable
hands.” Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Ellers, Price, Rivello,
Wakefield, and Patton are not medical personnel, and that
Montanez was under the care of medical professionals during
his time at FCI-Huntingdon and FCI-Rockview. So to sustain
his Eighth Amendment claims against those five individuals,
Montanez had to allege that they had “reason to believe or
(actual knowledge)” that the medical staff were “mistreating
(or not treating)” him. Id. Even Montanez concedes that he

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failed to make such allegations as to four of the five, namely,
Price, Rivello, Patton, and Wakefield.5
Ellers is a different story. According to the Complaint,
although Montanez’s x-ray after the fall showed that he had
herniated a disc in his back, Ellers knew and “lied about the
results of the x-ray,” misinforming Montanez’s doctors that the
results were negative and thus preventing Montanez from
receiving timely treatment. App. 39. Those allegations, taken
as true, are sufficient to show that Ellers had “actual knowledge
. . . that prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or
not treating)” Montanez’s serious medical need. Spruill, 372
F.3d at 236; see also Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (deliberate
indifference sufficiently pleaded where defendant knew of
plaintiff-prisoner’s “need for medical treatment” and prevented
him “from receiving [that] treatment” for “a non-medical
reason”).
The District Court thus erred in dismissing the Eighth
Amendment claims against Wagman and Ellers. And although
it correctly determined that Montanez had failed to state claims
against the other Individual Commonwealth Defendants, those
claims, too, should not have been dismissed with prejudice.
See infra Section III.C.
B. Disability Law Claims
For decades, the ADA and the RA have served as “twin
pillars of federal disability discrimination law,” working in
5 Similarly, although Davis is a medical professional at
SCI-Huntingdon, Montanez concedes that he failed to include
any specific allegations as to Davis in the Complaint.

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tandem to “secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to
independence and full inclusion in American society.”
Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104,
109-10 (3d Cir. 2018). Functionally, the ADA and the RA
impose the “same prohibition,” but they cover different
entities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 159
(2017). Along with proscribing discriminatory animus, both
statutes also impose on covered entities an affirmative
obligation to make “reasonable accommodations” for persons
with disabilities so that they can meaningfully access their
programs, services, and activities. Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 (1985); see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
532-33 (2004). As then-Judge Jackson has observed, this duty
is at its apex in the prison context “because inmates necessarily
rely totally upon [prisons] for all of their needs while in
custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such services
(or the accommodations that permit them to access those
services) elsewhere.” Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.
Supp. 3d 250, 269 (D.D.C. 2015).
i. Who Can Be Sued Under Title II and
Section 504
Here, the District Court dismissed Montanez’s Title II
and Section 504 claims against all of the defendants—the
Individual Commonwealth Defendants, the Individual Medical
Defendants, the Commonwealth, and Wellpath. In reviewing
that decision, we consider first which defendants, if any, are
subject to suit under either statute.
As relevant here, Title II of the ADA prohibits a “public
entity” from discriminating against disabled people, including
by denying them equal access to their “services, programs, or

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activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Public entity” includes “(A)
any State or local government; (B) any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.” Id.
§ 12131(1).
Section 504, in contrast, reaches only recipients of
“[f]ederal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This
“covers those who receive the aid” directly from the federal
government or indirectly through another recipient of that aid.
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S.
597, 606-07 (1986); see 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(e) (“Recipient
means any . . . public or private entity . . . to which Federal
financial assistance is extended directly or through another
recipient . . . .”). “[F]ederal financial assistance,” in turn,
includes federal grants, loans, non-procurement contracts, and
“reimbursement through Medicare and Medicaid.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 217 (2022);
see 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(f) (defining “Federal financial
assistance” as “any grant, cooperative agreement, loan,
contract (other than a direct Federal procurement contract or a
contract of insurance or guaranty), . . . or any other
arrangement by which” the recipient receives federal funds,
services, or property); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(h) (similar); 45
C.F.R. § 84.10 (similar). And the purpose for which that
financial assistance was intended is irrelevant because a
recipient of federal financial assistance must comply with
Section 504 in “all of [their] operations,” not just the program
or activity receiving the funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)
(emphasis added); see Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 4, 102 Stat. 28, 29-30 (1988).

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20
Given these limitations, the Individual Commonwealth
and Individual Medical Defendants are not subject to suit in
their personal capacities.6 Neither state employees nor
contractors are “public entities,” so they cannot be sued under
Title II. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (dicta); see also Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015);
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.
2001). And because “the individual defendants do not receive
federal aid,” they also cannot be liable under Section 504.
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is a public
entity and receives federal funds, so it is a proper defendant
under both Title II and Section 504. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (“State prisons fall squarely
within the statutory definition of ‘public entity.’”); Furgess v.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288-93 (3d Cir. 2019)
(allowing Title II and Section 504 claims against the
Commonwealth to proceed).
As for Wellpath, the results are mixed. There is no
question that it cannot be sued under Title II. Even though
Wellpath contracts with the Commonwealth to perform a
traditional government function—providing medical services
to state prisoners—that alone is not enough to transform a
private corporation into an “instrumentality of a State.” 42
6 Although individuals can be sued for damages in their official
capacities under Section 504 and Title II, these claims are
simply treated as if they are against the public entity or
recipient of federal funds that employs the individual. Durham
v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 n.11, 227 & n.33 (3d Cir. 2023).

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21
U.S.C. § 12131(1); see Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307,
1309-10 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a private prison
management corporation operating a state prison is not a public
entity); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-79 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that a private hospital providing services
pursuant to a municipal contract is not a public entity). So the
ADA claim against Wellpath was properly dismissed.
But unless and until discovery establishes otherwise,
Wellpath remains a proper defendant on the Section 504 claim.
Montanez’s Complaint alleges that, on “information and belief,
SCI-Huntingdon [and the] Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections receive[] federal funding,” App. 44, and that
Wellpath is the “Medical Contractor at SCI-Huntingdon,” App.
35. Thus, liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that
Wellpath is an indirect recipient of federal funds. See Smith v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 266 F.3d 152, 161 & n.7 (3d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that “an entity may receive federal
financial assistance indirectly and still be considered a
recipient for purposes of Title IX,” which “prohibits
discrimination based on disability in substantially the same
terms” as Section 504). Wellpath disputes this point, but that
cannot be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage, where we

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22
must accept the allegations as true.7 See Stringer v. Cnty. of
Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2025). As it currently
stands, Wellpath is a proper defendant under Section 504. See
29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring a “corporation . . . or
other private organization . . . which is principally engaged in
the business of providing . . . health care” to refrain from
disability discrimination in “all of [its] operations” if it directly
or indirectly receives any “Federal financial assistance”).
7 On the one hand, in its answering brief, Wellpath represented
that it does not “receive federal funds.” Medical Appellees’
Answering Br. 20 n.2. On the other hand, that statement
conflicts with court filings and government websites that
indicate Wellpath directly receives federal financial assistance.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Distance Learning &
Telemedicine Grants FY 2023, at 4, https://perma.cc/5Y5S-
54A5 (awarding “Wellpath, LLC” a federal grant); see also
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir.
2017) (explaining that we can take judicial notice of “publicly
available [information] on government websites”). In advance
of oral argument, this Court advised the parties to be prepared
to address this issue. But oral argument did not bring clarity.
Instead, Wellpath’s counsel, after initially representing that
Wellpath has never directly or indirectly received federal funds
of any kind, then acknowledged that she could not explain the
public documents to the contrary and that she had not, in fact,
investigated the matter. And after representing that she would
follow up with her client and submit supplemental briefing, she
failed to do so, requiring us, two weeks later, to formally order
Wellpath to submit that briefing. What Wellpath then provided
also failed to engage, much less resolve, the conflict between
its blanket denials and the public records.

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23
ii. Montanez States Disability Law Claims
Against the Commonwealth and Wellpath
Except for causation, the substantive standards for
determining liability under Section 504 and Title II are
identical, and the same remedies are available under both
Acts.8 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 275
(3d Cir. 2014); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (authorizing injunctive relief
and money damages) 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (same). To state a
claim for disability-based discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3)
who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or other activities for which a public
entity is responsible, or was otherwise subjected to
discrimination by a public entity; (4) by reason of his disability.
Harberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018). In this
case, the District Court erred in dismissing the disability law
claims against the Commonwealth and Wellpath because the
Complaint establishes a prima facie case of disability
discrimination.
We agree with the District Court that the first two
elements are satisfied. Montanez, like all state prisoners, is a
qualified individual covered by Title II and Section 504.
Durham, 82 F.4th at 225. And a “disability” is any “physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), which
8 “[U]nder the RA, the disability must be the sole cause of the
discriminatory action, while the ADA only requires but-for
causation.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 226. This distinction is
irrelevant here, however, because the Complaint establishes
causation under either standard.

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24
includes, among other things, “caring for oneself, . . . sleeping,
walking, standing,” id. § 12102(2)(A), and “the operation of a
major bodily function,” such as “functions of the . . . bladder,”
id. § 12102(2)(B). So Montanez’s spinal cord stenosis, spinal
edema, incontinence, and herniated disc undoubtedly qualify
as disabilities. See Durham, 82 F.4th at 225 (“lumbar stenosis”
is a disability).
As to the third element, however, we cannot agree with
the District Court’s conclusion that Montanez “wholly fails to
allege that he was denied or excluded from any services,
programs, or activities.” Montanez, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11.
The phrases “service, program, or activity” under Title II and
“program or activity” under Section 504 are “extremely broad
in scope and include[] anything a public entity does.” Furgess,
933 F.3d at 289 (quoting Disability Rts. N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r,
N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2015));
see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A) (defining “program or
activity” under Section 504 as “all of the operations of . . . a
department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State”).
Under this “all-encompassing” definition, Yeskey v. Com. of
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d sub
nom. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, the Complaint plausibly alleges
that Montanez was denied equal access to at least three
different programs or services.
First, health care is a quintessential service prisons must
provide to prisoners. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. True, as the
Commonwealth points out, failure to provide adequate medical
care to a disabled inmate does not, on its own, give rise to

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25
liability under the ADA or RA.9 Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d
246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [ADA] would not be violated
by a prison’s simply failing to attend to the medical needs of
its disabled prisoners. . . . The ADA does not create a remedy
for medical malpractice.”). But Montanez alleges not merely
that he was denied specific medical care for his disabilities.
Rather, according to the Complaint, Montanez had to drag his
paralyzed body on two different occasions to get access to
medical care—once to get access to the medical unit on the day
he became paralyzed, and again the next day to reach Dr.
Mahli, who refused to enter his cell to examine him. Put
differently, Montanez alleges he was denied meaningful access
to “medical care” because of his disabilities, which is
cognizable under Section 504 and Title II. See United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).
Second, the necessities for hygiene, including, showers,
sinks, and toilets, are basic services prisons must provide. See
id. at 155, 157; Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289-90. According to
Montanez’s Complaint, he was abandoned in his cell for at
least three days, paralyzed and urinating on himself, neither
able to reach a toilet nor given an alternative way to relieve
himself with dignity. This is a textbook example of a disabled
prisoner being denied access to fundamental prison service.
9 Of course, because Title II gives disabled individuals a cause
of action whenever they are denied equal access to “the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity” because of
their disability or “subjected to discrimination by any such
entity,” if a prison’s failure to provide treatment was fueled by
discriminatory animus toward a prisoner’s disability, that
would give rise to liability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

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26
See McDaniel, 115 F.4th at 823 (“In a prison, qualifying
programs and activities include meals, medical care, showers,
toilets, and the like.”); Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th
Cir. 2022) (“We have no difficulty concluding that a
handicapped-accessible toilet for disabled prisoners amounts
to a service, the denial of which could establish a claim under
either statute.”).
Third, given that all people need sleep, providing
prisoners with accessible beds and “appropriate and adequate
bedding . . . are ‘services’ of” a prison. Pierce v. Cnty. of
Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1224 n.44 (9th Cir. 2008); see Hall v.
Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1181 (8th Cir. 2023) (“[A j]ail’s
toilets, beds, and medical care are a ‘service’ under the
ADA.”). Here, Montanez alleges that, on the first day of his
paralysis, Nurse Wagman, rather than helping him to his bed
or providing him with a handicap-accessible sleeping
arrangement, simply dumped him in his cell and forced him to
drag his paralyzed body across the floor and into his bed. And
when he returned to SCI-Huntingdon after herniating a disc
while recovering from major back surgery, his back
condition—coupled with the lack of adequate pain
medication—caused significant pain whenever he lay on his
single mattress. That, in turn, interfered with his ability to
sleep. But his requests for an accommodation, such as a double
mattress, were repeatedly denied. So construing the Complaint
liberally, Montanez adequately pleaded that he could not
access a bed on the same basis as “able-bodied inmates” and
was denied a reasonable accommodation necessary for him to
sleep without significant pain—“just like able-bodied inmates”
could. Furgess, 933 F.3d at 291.

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27
A plaintiff can meet the fourth element of a prima facie
case—discrimination “by reason of his disability”—by
showing invidious discrimination or a failure to provide
reasonable accommodations. Harberle, 885 F.3d at 179-80.
Montanez proceeds down the second path, arguing
persuasively that the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an
obligation to reasonably accommodate his disabilities and that
its repeated failure to do so was the reason he could not
meaningfully access various prison services.
The duty to accommodate is triggered when a disabled
person’s need for an accommodation becomes known, either
because (1) he requests an accommodation or (2) his disability
and concomitant need for an accommodation are open and
apparent. See Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 330 (3d
Cir. 2001); Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500
F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Here,
once Montanez suddenly became paralyzed, his disability and
resulting limitations were obvious to prison staff, including Dr.
Mahli and Nurse Wagman. And during his second stint at
FCI-Huntingdon, his accommodation requests, including for
mobility aids and a double mattress or other bedding
accommodations, “were repeatedly refused.” Durham, 82
F.4th at 226. So the Commonwealth and Wellpath had an
affirmative duty to accommodate Montanez, and its failure to
do so was “tantamount to denying [him] access” to those prison
services “on the same basis as other inmates.” Id.
In sum, a prison’s “toilets, beds, and medical care are a
‘service’” or program under Title II and Section 504, and
Montanez has adequately pleaded that he was denied access to
all three by reason of his disability. Hall, 77 F.4th at 1181. The
Complaint therefore states a Title II and Section 504 claim

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28
against the Commonwealth and a Section 504 claim against
Wellpath, and the dismissal of those claims was error.
iii. Montanez Has Pleaded Entitlement to
Compensatory Damages
To recover compensatory damages for a Section 504 or
Title II violation, a plaintiff must plead, in addition to the
elements of a prima facie case, that the discrimination was
“intentional” in the sense that it was more than mere disparate
impact. S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729
F.3d 248, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference
satisfies this requirement, which, in the disability law context,
consists of (1) knowledge that the plaintiff’s federally
protected right to be free from disability discrimination was
likely to be violated, and (2) “failure to act despite that
knowledge.” Id. at 263-65 (emphasis omitted); see also
Furgess, 933 F.3d at 292.
Montanez’s Complaint sufficiently pleads that various
prison and medical staff had the requisite knowledge yet failed
to act. According to the Complaint, for instance, Nurse
Wagman knew Montanez was paralyzed but abandoned him
on the floor of his cell, and Dr. Mahli—despite knowing that
Montanez could neither stand nor walk and was involuntarily
urinating on himself—took no steps to assist or accommodate
Montanez. Likewise, Price, PA Nalley, and Dr. Edwards
allegedly knew of Montanez’s disabilities but denied his
requests for accommodations and did not provide him with any
alternatives. These allegations, if proven, amount to deliberate
indifference. See Durham, 82 F.4th at 226 (prisoner with
“lumbar stenosis” pleaded deliberate indifference by alleging
that “[h]e made numerous prison officials aware that he . . .

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29
needed a cane to walk[] and was in severe pain without it” but
“was continuously denied his cane and shower
accommodations”); Furgess, 933 F.3d at 292 (prisoner
successfully pleaded Commonwealth was deliberately
indifferent by alleging medical and prison staff “knew that [he]
required a handicapped-accessible shower” and they “did not
provide him with any accommodation that would allow him to
shower” for months).
The Commonwealth contends that it cannot be liable for
any Title II and Section 504 violations of the Medical
Defendants because they are contractors, not government
employees. But that misapprehends the reach of those
remedial statutes. As our sister circuits have consistently
recognized and as we hold today,10 both their text and purpose
confirm the Commonwealth’s obligation to ensure compliance
10 See, e.g., Marks v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 976 F.3d 1087,
1097-98 (10th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the state prison
“farm[ing] out operations to others . . . would not prevent
liability” under the ADA or RA); Armstrong v.
Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1065-67, 1074 (9th Cir.
2010) (concluding that “even in the absence of a regulation
explicitly saying so,” the “fairest reading” of Title II and
Section 504 required state defendants to ensure private and
local prison operators complied with both statutes because “a
State cannot avoid its obligations under [either Act] by
contracting with a third party to perform its functions”);
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286-87 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding that Section 504 imposes “supervisory
liability” on states accepting federal funds to “guarantee that
those it delegates to carry out its programs . . . compl[y] with”
the RA).

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30
with Title II and Section 504 even when it contracts out the
operation of their programs, services, or activities to third
parties.
We start with the text.11 Title II’s and Section 504’s
broad language—covering all public-entity “services,
programs, or activities” and “any” federally funded “program
or activity”—contains no exception when such programs,
services, or activities are administered through contractors.
Said differently, Congress wanted to give people with
disabilities an affirmative right to access all covered programs
and services no matter how or through whom the government
or federally funded entity elects to deliver them. Regardless of
the medium of delivery, those programs and services must be
accessible to people with disabilities.
Congress’s use of the “passive voice (‘no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded . . .’) only reinforces that conclusion.” A. J. T. v.
Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S. 335, 358
(2025) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
11 Title II states: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Section 504 likewise provides, in relevant part: “No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

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31
§ 12132). Here, both statutes “focus[] on an event” that
constitutes a type of prohibited disability discrimination—a
disabled person being excluded from participating in or being
denied the benefits of a covered program, service, or activity
because of their disability—“without respect to a specific
actor.” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009). This
linguistic choice to “pull[] the actor off the stage” reflects
Congress’s “agnosticism” as to who does the excluding or
denial of benefits—be they government employees or
government contractors. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S.
69, 75-76 (2023).
The second clause of Title II, which goes on to
separately protect people from being “subjected to [disability]
discrimination by any” public entity, 42 U.S.C. § 12132,
demonstrates that “Congress knew how to write . . . a law” that
cabined liability in the way the Commonwealth proposes and
deliberately “did not do so” in the first clause of Title II.
Marietta Mem’l Hosp. Emp. Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita
Inc., 596 U.S. 880, 887 (2022). Thus, as we recently observed
as to Title II, covered entities “may not, directly or through
contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods
of administration that have the effect of . . . discriminating on
the basis of disability.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
117 F.4th 503, 548 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation modified); see also
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (prohibiting a public entity under
Title II from discriminating on the basis of disability “directly
or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements”); 28
C.F.R. §§ 41.51(b)(1), 42.503(b)(1) (same for federal funding
recipients under Section 504).
Finally, the Commonwealth’s attempt to evade the
language of the statutes would also undermine their goals. As

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32
“a remedial statute, meant to bring an end to discrimination
against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of American
life,” the ADA “must be construed with all the liberality
necessary to achieve [its] purpose[].” Disabled in Action of Pa.
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 635 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011).12
Section 504, which we interpret in lockstep, must likewise be
broadly construed to effectuate its remedial purpose of
eliminating disability discrimination wherever federal funds
are involved. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(c); see Yeskey, 118 F.3d at
170 (“Congress has directed that Title II of the ADA be
interpreted in a manner consistent with Section 504 . . . .”).
And state prisons are quintessential covered entities under both
statues: only the states—public entities that receive federal
funds—have the power to incarcerate people in prisons within
their borders.
Yet, as this case illustrates, states often contract with
private companies to provide prison services and programs,
including medical and mental health care, pharmaceutical
services, drug treatment and substance abuse programs,
transportation services, facility operations, vocational
programs, food services, and security. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,
App. A (effective Mar. 11, 2011). So if states could evade their
statutory duties merely by outsourcing the operation of such
programs, Title II and Section 504 would become dead letter
within state prisons—an outcome antithetical to Congress’s
“unmistakabl[e]” intent to “include[] State prisons and
prisoners within” the statutes’ coverage. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at
12 See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (explaining that the ADA’s
“purpose” is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities”).

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33
209. And the Commonwealth’s interpretation is not limited to
the prison context. Under the Commonwealth’s reading, a
state could avoid complying with either statute and
simultaneously insulate itself from liability simply by
contracting out the operation of all its programs, services, and
activities and burying its head in the sand. But as the statutory
text and case law make clear, “Congress did not design the
ADA or the RA so that a public entity could forever prevent a
qualified individual with a disability from utilizing a service,
program, or activity.” Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d
1093, 1107 (10th Cir. 2019).
* * *
In short, whether or not they use contractors, states
remain responsible for ensuring that disabled prisoners can
access their prisons’ services, programs, and activities on the
same basis as non-disabled prisoners. See Williams, 117 F.4th
at 548.13 And as applied here, that means the Commonwealth
was “obligated to ensure that [Wellpath and its employees]—
like all other State contractors—complie[d] with federal laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.” Castle v.
Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2013). It was
therefore error for the District Court to dismiss the ADA and
13 See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(a) (Title II applies to “public
entities that are responsible for the operation or management
of . . . correctional facilities . . . either directly or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with public or
private entities, in whole or in part . . . .”); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,
App. A (“If a prison is occupied by State prisoners and is
inaccessible, the State is responsible under title II of the
ADA.”).

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34
RA claims against the Commonwealth and the RA claim
against Wellpath. Those claims, including Montanez’s request
for compensatory damages, survive the motions to dismiss.
C. Leave to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs courts
to grant motions for leave to amend “when justice so requires.”
So leave to amend should be liberally given unless amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,
400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And because
courts have a special obligation to be “more forgiving of pro
se litigants,” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d
Cir. 2019), this Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing
pro se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the court
rules upon defendants’ motions to dismiss,” Roman v. Jeffes,
904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases).
Despite correctly reciting this standard, the District
Court nonetheless denied Montanez’s request for leave to
amend, concluding that amendment “would be futile based on
the factual and legal defects” in Montanez’s Complaint.
Montanez, 2023 WL 5435616, at *11. This was an abuse of
discretion for two reasons.
First, the inadequacies in Montanez’s pleading largely
stemmed from the Middle District’s own procedures.
Montanez was required to file his complaint on the “FORM
TO BE USED BY A PRISONER IN FILING A CIVIL
RIGHTS COMPLAINT IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA.” App. 33. And at the time, that form
instructed pro se prisoners to state “as briefly as possible the

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35
facts of your case,” provided twelve lines on the form in which
to do so, and warned that the prisoner could “[a]ttach no more
than three extra sheets if necessary” to detail his allegations.
App. 36-37. That constraint was particularly problematic for
plaintiffs like Montanez, who were attempting to assert
complex constitutional and statutory civil rights claims against
numerous defendants based on conduct that occurred in
different facilities.
Perhaps recognizing the due process implications of
such a restriction, the Middle District has since eliminated the
page limit.14 But that change was too little, too late, for
Montanez. By forcing him to state his claims in under four
handwritten pages, the Court itself set him up for failure at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, so Montanez should have the chance
to amend as to any potentially viable claims. See Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 15(a)(2).
Second, this is not a situation where amendment would
be futile.15 Leave to amend is futile if “the complaint, as
amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2000). But as we explained above, even Montanez’s
14 The form now instructs prisoners to include “all the facts you
consider important” and permits them to attach as many
“additional pages [as] needed.” U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle
Dist. Pa., Instructions for Filing a Complaint Pro Se, at 8,
https://perma.cc/3T8W-DWTQ.
15 The District Court’s failure to provide any substantive
analysis supporting its futility conclusion also borders on an
abuse of discretion. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).

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36
artificially truncated Complaint stated cognizable claims under
Title II, Section 504, and the Eighth Amendment against some
defendants. Thus, granting him leave to amend to bolster these
claims would not have been futile. See Geness v. Cox, 902
F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018) (no futility if plaintiff has already
stated a claim).
Plus, Montanez’s briefs in opposition to the motions to
dismiss included over 50 pages with additional factual
allegations in support of his claims against all named
defendants, including those defendants whom Montanez could
not adequately discuss in his Complaint due to the page limit.
Although these briefs cannot amend the Complaint directly,
see McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 1992),
they function, in effect, as a proffer of the additional allegations
Montanez could make if permitted, see Gordon v. Kartri Sales
Co., No. 3:17-CV-00320, 2018 WL 1123704, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 1, 2018) (collecting cases where courts “granted leave to
amend a pro se plaintiff’s complaint whe[n] the plaintiff has
introduced new facts in his opposition papers” that might be
helpful for stating a claim). And that proffer makes clear that
amendment would not be futile. Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d
22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Pro se plaintiffs should be given an
opportunity to amend their complaints unless it clearly appears
that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.”).
Accordingly, denying Montanez leave to amend was an
abuse of discretion and should be corrected on remand.
IV. Conclusion
Pro se complaints—however inartfully pleaded—must
be carefully considered, for while prisoners surrender many

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liberties upon conviction, the right to access the courts and seek
redress for constitutional and statutory violations is not one of
them. We will therefore (1) reverse the District Court’s
dismissal of Montanez’s Eighth Amendment claims against
Dr. Mahli, Nurse Wagman, and Administrator Ellers, the Title
II and Section 504 claims against the Commonwealth, and the
Section 504 claim against Wellpath; (2) affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against the
Commonwealth and Individual Commonwealth Defendants in
their official capacities, the disability law claims against the
Individual Commonwealth and Medical Defendants, and the
ADA claim against Wellpath; and (3) remand with instructions
to permit Montanez to amend his Complaint.

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