United States of America v. Roman Murray

BLD-083 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-3175
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROMAN MURRAY,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:17-cr-00342-006)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
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Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 7, 2024
Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2024)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Roman Murray, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction and compassionate release. The
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

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Government has moved to summarily affirm. For the reasons that follow, we grant the
Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
In 2020, Murray pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute cocaine base and heroin. Murray qualified as a career offender under the
Sentencing Guidelines. His Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months in prison. The
District Court granted a variance and imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.
Murray filed a motion for compassionate release in 2021 based on health risks
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The District Court ruled that Murray had not shown
extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release and that the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not support that relief.1 The District Court denied Murray’s motion
for reconsideration, and we summarily affirmed both orders. See C.A. No. 22-2351.
In 2023, Murray filed another motion for compassionate release. He asserted that
amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 – the policy statement applicable to sentence reductions
and compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) – expanded the definition of
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release. Murray stated that his release was
warranted based on, among other things, his good conduct and rehabilitative efforts in
1 The District Court also rejected Murray’s contention that relief was due because
he no longer qualified as a career offender under United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144 (3d
Cir. 2020) (en banc), vacated, 142 S. Ct. 56 (2021), remanded to, 17 F.4th 459 (3d Cir.
2021) (en banc). It stated that Murray would not have received a comparable variance if
he had a lower Guidelines range.

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prison, a need to care for his ill grandmother, and the disparity between his sentence and
the sentences of his co-defendants.2
The District Court again ruled that Murray had not shown extraordinary and
compelling circumstances. It recognized his rehabilitation efforts and good conduct but
stated that they did not warrant a sentence reduction. The District Court also decided that
the § 3553(a) factors supported maintaining his original sentence. As in its order denying
Murray’s prior motion, the District Court noted (1) the seriousness of his conduct involving
the distribution of heroin and crack cocaine; (2) his lengthy criminal history, which
included felonies and connections to two street gangs; (3) that his offense carried a
mandatory minimum term of 10 years and his advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327
months in prison; and (4) that he received a substantial variance and was sentenced to 180
months in prison. It also stated that Murray had served less than half of his sentence. The
District Court concluded that his continued incarceration was needed for deterrence and to
protect the public. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th
255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021). Under this standard, “we will not disturb the court’s determination
unless we are left with ‘a definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of
2 Murray brought his motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), which is
“simply a gateway provision that refers to whichever statute ‘expressly permit[s]’ the
sentencing modification.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 497 n.5 (2022)
(quoting § 3582(c)(1)(B)). Murray sought to be released based on “extraordinary and
compelling reasons,” which are grounds for a reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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judgment in the conclusion it reached.’” Id. (citations omitted). We may summarily affirm
if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6.
A district court may grant a motion for compassionate release if it finds that
(1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction; (2) the applicable
factors in § 3553(a) do not counsel against a reduction; and (3) a reduction would be
consistent with applicable policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States
v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 329 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2020).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the § 3553(a) factors
supported Murray’s continued incarceration. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (affirming
denial of relief on this basis). The District Court considered the seriousness of Murray’s
offense, his criminal history, the fact that he had served less than half of his sentence, and
the need for deterrence and to protect the public. See id. at 330-31 (noting § 3553(a) factors
and holding a district court may consider the time left on a sentence). And the District
Court previously denied, because of Murray’s career offender status and the drug quantity
in his case, his post-judgment motion asserting that a shorter sentence was warranted based
on the sentences received by his co-defendants. The District Court did not commit a clear
error of judgment in denying Murray’s motion.3
3 Murray did not re-assert that he would no longer be a career offender under Nasir.
But even if he had, he maintained in his prior motion that his Guidelines range would be
130 to 162 months in prison, well above the time served when he filed his present motion.

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Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the
Government’s motion, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

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