Donna Barnes v. SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE On Appeal from the United States…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-3195
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DONNA BARNES,
Appellant
v.
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:21-cv-03647)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 26, 2024
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Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 30, 2024)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Donna Barnes worked as a Lead Census Field Manager in the Philadelphia office
of the United States Census Bureau. After she was terminated from that position, Barnes
(pro se) filed suit against her former employer, raising claims of discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the ADA).1 The Government moved for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and won. Barnes timely appealed the
District Court’s judgment, which we have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Barnes’s opening brief does not identify specific errors in the District Court’s
rationale. This tracks her mistaken assertion that “[n]o reason was given” by the District
Court to support its summary judgment ruling, Br. 2, and leaves her subject to wholesale
issue forfeiture. See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d
120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). In light of Barnes’s pro se status and the general arguments
she has raised, however, we have conducted de novo review of the decision below and, in
doing so, evaluated the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Barnes.
See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
That record amply supports the District Court’s determinations that: Barnes
adduced no admissible evidence of similarly situated, non-white employees who were
1 The District Court construed Barnes’s claim under the ADA as a claim under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the RA). The ADA and the RA use the same standard for
determining liability; for a claim under either, the plaintiff “must plausibly allege three
elements: that he was disabled, was qualified for the job, and suffered discrimination
because of his disability.” Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2021).
While the two laws have different causation standards, see Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th
217, 226 (3d Cir. 2023), that difference is immaterial in this case.

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treated more favorably, nor other kinds of evidence from which a factfinder could infer
that Barnes’s firing was driven by discrimination on the basis of her race (white); there is
no evidence Barnes was ever denied a reasonable accommodation for her disabilities
(asthma, skin cancer), or that she was fired because of her disabilities; and there is no
evidence Barnes’s firing was sparked by complaints she made regarding discrimination
on the basis of race, disability, or some other protected status.2 In addition, there is no
merit to Barnes’s argument that she “establish[ed] a prima face case of hostile work
environment,” Br. 4, there being no record evidence she suffered intentional
discrimination that was severe or pervasive, and that would have detrimentally affected a
reasonable person in like circumstances. Cf. Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263
(3d Cir. 2017).3
The evidence Barnes did produce, on the other hand, all tended to show that
conflicts at the Bureau and, ultimately, Barnes’s firing were rooted in differing opinions
2 Barnes laments that she was unable to adequately oppose summary judgment because
she could not afford the cost of a transcript of her deposition. We acknowledge the
financial burden for pro se litigants proceeding in forma pauperis. That said, “[t]here is
no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs of
deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159
(3d Cir. 1993). And while district courts possess inherent equitable power to, “under
some circumstances . . . order an opposing party to pay for or to provide copies of
deposition transcripts for an indigent litigant as a condition precedent to allowing that
party to take depositions,” id., there is no indication in the record that Barnes sought such
relief in advance of the District Court’s decision.
3 The District Court declined to consider whether Barnes presented a triable claim that
she was subjected to a hostile work environment, on the ground that she had not pleaded
such a claim in her complaint. It would not have been unreasonable for the District Court
to have liberally construed Barnes’s complaint as raising a claim for hostile work
environment, especially given the relevant summary judgment briefing.

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about how to effectively manage the work, or how to appropriately interact with
colleagues. In other words, the evidence did not reveal a triable claim under Title VII or
the ADA/RA.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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