ELIZABETH PETER, Beneficiary for the Estate of Elizabeth Peter v. Attorney General New Jersey

CLD-017 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-1263
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ELIZABETH PETER, Beneficiary for the Estate of Elizabeth Peter,
Appellant
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; JUDGE LOUIS BELASCO; OFFICER
CANNON, #126, Hamilton Township Police Department; SGT. CLAYTON, Hamilton
Township Police Department; SGT. JODY D. LONDON, Egg Harbor Township Police
Department; PROSECUTOR JENNA M. COOK, Central Municipal Court; ASSISTANT
PROSECUTOR ZACHARY SCLAR, Central Municipal Court; PROSECUTOR ADAM
E. BARKER; JUDGE W. TODD MILLER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Action No. 1:23-cv-03337)
District Judge: Renee M. Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 24, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 6, 2024)
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OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Elizabeth Peter, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s
order dismissing her amended complaint. Because this appeal does not present a
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
This case originated from a traffic stop. A police officer issued Peter four traffic
tickets, and Peter was indicted for refusing to comply with officers and eluding an officer
while operating a motor vehicle. Following the indictment, Peter filed a complaint in the
District Court against the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, police officers,
prosecutors, and judges involved in the state-court criminal case. Peter sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights and due process violations, and she also cited the Tucker
Acts and the Administrative Procedure Act. She alleged, inter alia, that: the police
officers performed an illegal traffic stop, were negligent, and violated the separation of
powers and Administrative Procedure Act when they signed the summons for Peter to
appear in court; the defendants violated due process by enforcing court rules and
procedures; the court participants had conflicts of interest; and that the local traffic laws
Peter allegedly violated are invalid. She also attached a “notice” to her complaint
purporting to remove the state-court criminal proceeding to the District Court, and she
sought temporary restraining orders, discovery, a judge’s recusal, and default judgment.
Many defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The
District Court dismissed Peter’s amended complaint with prejudice for lack of subject

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matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, because Peter failed to satisfy pleading standards.1
Just as in another case that Peter filed in the District Court, the Court warned Peter that
she would face sanctions if she continued to submit frivolous filings. Peter moved for
reconsideration, arguing that Judge Bumb was biased and should recuse herself. The
Court denied the motion. Peter appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
dismissal of the complaint de novo. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 275
(3d Cir. 2007). We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any grounds supported
by the record. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege sufficient
facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Although we construe a pro se litigant’s claims liberally, see Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182,
185 (3d Cir. 2021), mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In her amended complaint, Peter broadly claimed that the police
and court procedures she faced because of her traffic violations were illegal for various
reasons. But Peter offered neither a plausible legal theory nor the factual details
1 The District Court also terminated all pending motions in the case.

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necessary to survive dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the District
Court properly dismissed2 her complaint with prejudice.3
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. To the extent Peter seeks
other relief on appeal, it is denied.
2 In support of her appeal, Peter argues that the District Court was biased because the
Judge receives financial compensation from New Jersey and should have recused herself
under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Peter did not provide any support for these allegations below, nor
does she offer any support for them now. See United States v. Martorano, 866 F.2d 62,
68 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that motions to recuse cannot rest on “possibilities” and
“unsubstantiated allegations”).
3 Based on her filings in the District Court and in our Court, we agree with the District
Court that allowing Peter to further amend her complaint would be futile. See Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

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