Reinard Smith v. Alex Kershentsef

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-1278
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REINARD SMITH,
Appellant
v.
ALEX KERSHENTSEF; KEY & V AUTO SALES; VLAD (JOHN DOE); MIKE
(JOHN DOE); JANE DOE 1; JANE DOE 2; JOHN DOE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-04159)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 14, 2024
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 20, 2024)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Reinard Smith appeals pro se from the District Court’s February 2, 2024 decision
denying his motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Smith commenced this lawsuit in the District Court in 2019, suing a used car
dealership and a few of its employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“Appellees”). The lawsuit, which raised both federal and state-law claims, stemmed
from Smith’s purchase of a used Lexus from that dealership. In 2022, the District Court
referred the case to arbitration. In 2023, the arbitration panel found in favor of Smith on
two claims — an unfair-trade-practices claim and an unlawful-repossession claim. The
panel awarded Smith $300 for that first claim and $1050 for the second claim. Smith
subsequently requested a trial de novo before the District Court. Appellees then moved
to strike that request as untimely. Thereafter, in May 2023, the District Court granted
Appellees’ motion to strike1 and entered the arbitration award as the final judgment in
this case.
In December 2023, Smith moved the District Court for relief under Rule 60. The
case was then reassigned to a different District Judge, who denied that motion on its
merits on February 2, 2024. Smith then filed this appeal, challenging that denial.
1 The District Court determined that Smith had filed that request after the expiration of
the 30-day deadline set forth in its Local Rule of Civil Procedure 53.2(7).

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II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 To the extent
that Smith’s Rule 60 motion sought relief under subsection (b)(4), we exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s denial of that part of the motion. See Budget Blinds, Inc.
v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008). And to the extent that his Rule 60 motion
sought relief under subsection (d)(3), our review is for abuse of discretion. See Jackson
v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011).3
Rule 60(b)(4) “authorizes [a] court to relieve a party from a final judgment if ‘the
judgment is void.’” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270
(2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)). But a Rule 60(b)(4) motion “is not a substitute
for a timely appeal,” id., and such a motion is warranted “only in the rare instance where
a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of
due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard,” id. at 271.
Neither of those rare circumstances is present in this case.
2 Our jurisdiction here is limited to reviewing the District Court’s February 2, 2024
decision. The District Court’s May 2023 judgment is not properly before us, for
(1) Smith did not file his Rule 60 motion within 28 days of that judgment, see Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and (2) his notice of appeal is otherwise
untimely as to that judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (providing that the time to appeal is “mandatory and
jurisdictional” (citation to quoted case omitted)).
3 Smith’s Rule 60 motion also sought relief under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(6). But he
has forfeited any challenge to the denial of those parts of his Rule 60 motion by failing to
raise them in his opening brief. See Kars 4 Kids Inc. v. Am. Can!, 98 F.4th 436, 452 (3d
Cir. 2024).

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As for Rule 60(d)(3), that provision states that Rule 60 does not limit a court’s
power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). “A
court may set aside a judgment based upon its finding of fraud on the court when an
officer of the court has engaged in egregious misconduct.” In re Bressman, 874 F.3d
142, 150 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]uch a finding must be
supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence of (1) an intentional fraud;
(2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Here, Smith has not put forth evidence, let alone
clear and convincing evidence, of fraud on the court.
In view of the above, and after carefully considering the arguments raised in
Smith’s briefing, we see no reason to disturb the District Court’s February 2, 2024
decision denying his Rule 60 motion.4 Accordingly, we will affirm that judgment.5
4 Because we agree with the District Court that Smith’s Rule 60 motion lacks merit, we
need not consider Appellees’ alternative argument that the Rule 60 motion was subject to
denial under the law-of-the-case doctrine.
5 Appellees’ motion to supplement the appendix with certain documents contained in the
District Court record is granted. Smith’s request for oral argument is denied.

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