William Harold Wright, Jr. v. Cmc Allen

CLD-001 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1560
___________
WILLIAM HAROLD WRIGHT, JR.,
Appellant
v.
CMC ALLEN; COUNSELOR EZZOLO; CASE MANAGER GABRIEL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Action No. 1-22-cv-00150)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R.
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, or for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
October 3, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 29, 2024)
__________
OPINION*
__________
PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant William Harold Wright, Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding in
forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s judgment in favor of the Appellees in
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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this Bivens action. The Appellees have filed a motion for summary affirmance of the
District Court’s order. For the reasons that follow, we grant the Appellees’ motion.
I.
In 2022, Wright filed a complaint against three federal employees at FCI-McKean,
where Wright was previously incarcerated. In his operative second-amended complaint,
Wright alleged that his Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) record contains an erroneous
sex offender public safety factor (“PSF”) classification, and that the defendants have
denied his requests remove the PSF. Wright brought Bivens claims against the
defendants based on the alleged violations of BOP policy and his Fifth Amendment right
to due process. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Wright further alleged that the defendants’ conduct caused him to suffer damages
including mental distress and slander to his name.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, on many grounds, including that Wright failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. After providing notice and an opportunity to respond, see
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2018), the District Court1 granted the
motion and entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal ensued.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a
district court’s order of summary judgment.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418,
1 The term “District Court” in this case refers to the magistrate judge proceeding with the
consent of the parties.

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422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court concludes that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 422–23. We also exercise plenary
review over dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See In re Avena, 92 F.4th
473, 478 (3d Cir. 2024). We may summarily affirm a district court’s order on any basis
supported by the record if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray
v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights
suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until he has
exhausted available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement
applies to federal prisoners, like Wright, seeking relief through a Bivens action. See
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68–70 (3d Cir. 2000). Under the relevant BOP regulations,
an inmate is generally required to attempt an informal resolution with staff, then file a
formal complaint, and then file appeals to the General Counsel and Regional Director.
See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing BOP
administrative remedies under 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–.18).
Here, we agree with the District Court’s determination that Wright failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies for his Bivens claims. Wright acknowledged
that he pursued only informal resolution of the PSF issue with staff. The record shows

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that Wright received a written response to his request for informal resolution, and that he
never filed a formal complaint or appeal of the PSF issue. Wright maintains that he did
not pursue those remedies because the defendants did not remove the PSF designation
when asked. Thus, Wright argues that the BOP is unlikely to look favorably upon his
challenges to the PSF designation, and that the BOP administrative remedies are
therefore unavailable to him.
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly granted summary judgment
to the defendants because Wright failed to set forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the BOP’s administrative remedies were unavailable to him.
See Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 266 (discussing circumstances when an administrative remedy is
not “available”); Paladino, 885 F.3d at 211 (holding that vague and conclusory claims of
interference were insufficient to meet exhaustion requirement).2
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3
2 To the extent that Wright’s operative second-amended complaint can be construed as
bringing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, failure to exhaust defeats them, too.
See, e.g., Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003).
3 In light of our disposition, we deny Wright’s motion for appointment of counsel. See
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). We grant Wright’s motion to exceed
the page limit for his memorandum in support of the appeal.

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