Eric Johnson v. David A. Mazie; Adam M. Slater; Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman LLC

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 24-1946, 24-2056
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ERIC JOHNSON; VANESSA WILLIAMS, individually and
as executor of the estate of Gladys Williams, deceased;
MCARTHUR JONES, individually and as executor of the
estate of Janet Jones, deceased; HENRIETTA WILLIAMS;
ELIZABETH LAMPKIN; ROBERT DELOACH,
individually and as executor of the estate of Carolyn Lindsey,
deceased; CARMEN MORENO; ROSA MOENO;
THERESA NIX; DEBORAH HENSLEY; LORETTA G.
ROBINSON; GREGORY H. HEMPHIL; DELORES
HOWARD; MAGGIE CURRY; JEAN FIEBELKORN;
ELVINA GALLOW; ANGELA MILLER; GLORIA
MCCASTER; CAROLYN SILL; JENNIFER DAVIS;
KATRINA HARRY,
Appellants in No. 24-1946
v.
DAVID A. MAZIE; ADAM M. SLATER; MAZIE SLATER
KATZ & FREEMAN LLC,
Appellants in No. 24-2056

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____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1:23-cv-03420)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________
Argued on April 9, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: July 11, 2025)
Bruce H. Nagel [Argued]
Robert H. Solomon
Nagel Rice
103 Eisenhower Parkway
Roseland, NJ 07068
Counsel for Appellants in No. 24-1946 & Cross-
Appellees in No. 24-2056
David A. Mazie
Adam M. Slater [Argued]
Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman
103 Eisenhower Parkway
Suite 207
Roseland, NJ 07068
Counsel for Appellees in No. 24-1946 & Cross-
Appellants in No. 24-2056

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___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
The question presented in this appeal is whether
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction confers “original
jurisdiction” sufficient to permit removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). We hold that it does not.
I
A
In 2015, product liability cases concerning the blood-
pressure medication Olmesartan were consolidated into a
multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. Adam Slater was co-lead
counsel of the MDL, and his law firm, Mazie Slater Katz &
Freeman, LLC, represented more than 200 plaintiffs. The case
settled for over $300 million, and the firm collected contingent
fees as agreed to by its clients. The firm also received
compensation and reimbursement of expenses from the
settlement’s common-benefit fund.
After the MDL settled, one of the plaintiffs in that case,
Anthony Martino, filed a putative class action in New Jersey
state court against his former lawyers, David Mazie, Adam
Slater, and Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC (collectively,
Defendants). Martino alleged that Defendants received
contingent fees in violation of various New Jersey court rules
made applicable to litigation in federal court under the District

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of New Jersey’s local rules. On behalf of the putative class of
individuals represented by Defendants during the MDL,
Martino asserted claims for legal malpractice, conversion, and
unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. A panel of this Court
affirmed that dismissal order in a nonprecedential opinion,
holding that Martino failed to plausibly allege a violation of
New Jersey’s rules. See Martino v. Mazie, 2023 WL 1990306
(3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2023).
B
Soon after our opinion was filed, twenty-one
individuals that Defendants had represented in the MDL filed
this action in New Jersey state court. Plaintiffs are citizens of
various states other than New Jersey, and Defendants are
citizens of New Jersey. Plaintiffs alleged—just as Martino had
before—that Defendants collected attorney’s fees from the
MDL settlement in violation of New Jersey’s court rules. They
asserted claims for breach of contract, legal malpractice,
conversion, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs requested
compensatory and punitive damages and averred that the
“amount in controversy for each Plaintiff[] is less than
$75,000.00, exclusive of interest.” App. 44.
Citing diversity and federal-question jurisdiction,
Defendants removed this case to the District Court before
service of process was effectuated. In response, Plaintiffs
moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the
District Court lacked federal-question jurisdiction as well as
diversity jurisdiction because none of Plaintiffs’ claims
exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Defendants
opposed the motion, presenting evidence that Plaintiff Eric

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Johnson’s gross monetary recovery was $327,018.51 and that
his counsel received $105,534.23 in attorney’s fees for
representing him. Defendants also moved for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a
violation of New Jersey’s rules.
While those motions were pending, Plaintiffs filed an
affidavit of merit, as required for professional malpractice
actions under New Jersey law. Attorney Robert Borteck signed
the affidavit, attesting “that there exists a reasonable
probability that the conduct of the defendants” “fell outside of
the acceptable professional standards with regard to the
representations and professional services they provided to the
plaintiffs.” App. 259. In response, David Mazie sent Borteck a
letter stating that the affidavit of merit was sanctionable under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
(1) Mazie did not represent Plaintiffs during the MDL and
(2) Plaintiffs’ allegations were identical to Martino’s, which
were dismissed. Mazie said he would move for sanctions
unless Borteck withdrew his affidavit within twenty-one days.
Neither Borteck nor Plaintiffs acted to withdraw the
affidavit. Instead, Plaintiffs moved for sanctions against
Defendants under N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-41(f) for sending the
Rule 11 notice letter. See N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-41(f) (providing
that an “individual or entity who threatens to take or takes
adverse action against a person” for “executing an affidavit” of
merit relating “to that person’s employment, accreditation,
certification, credentialing or licensure, shall be liable to a civil
penalty not to exceed $10,000 and other damages incurred”).
Undeterred, Defendants filed two motions for sanctions
in response. They first moved to sanction Plaintiffs’ counsel,
Bruce Nagel, and his law firm, Nagel Rice LLP, under Rule 11

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that
Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings contained frivolous arguments and that the litigation
was intended to harass them. Defendants also moved to
sanction Borteck under Rule 11 and the Court’s inherent
authority for signing an allegedly frivolous affidavit of merit.
The District Court denied the motion to remand, holding
sua sponte that it had ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over
the matter because Plaintiffs challenged attorney’s fees
awarded from the MDL settlement. The Court later granted
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying
issue preclusion sua sponte. The Court also dismissed the
parties’ motions for sanctions as moot. Plaintiffs appealed, and
Defendants cross-appealed.
II
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The
parties dispute whether this case was properly removed to the
District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). We review de novo
the District Court’s order denying the motion to remand for
lack of jurisdiction. See Avenatti v. Fox News Network LLC, 41
F.4th 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2022).
III
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed.” Because the
“right of removal is entirely a creature of statute,” “a suit
commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is
shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta
Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (citation

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omitted). “The party seeking removal has the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction and we interpret the removal
statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff’s
choice of forum in state court.” Avenatti, 41 F.4th at 130.
According to Defendants, the District Court properly
denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand because it had (1) ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction, (2) federal-question jurisdiction, and
(3) diversity jurisdiction. We address each argument in turn.
A
The parties focus their arguments on whether the
District Court, in holding that it had ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction, correctly evaluated the scope of Plaintiffs’
challenge to the attorney’s fees awarded from an MDL.
Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is “a creature of necessity”
that gives “federal courts the power to enforce their judgments
and” ensure “that they are not dependent on state courts to
enforce their decrees.” Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647
F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), as amended
(Sept. 29, 2011). Because a “district court acquires jurisdiction
over a case or controversy in its entirety,” it may exercise
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction “to decide other matters
raised by the case over which it would not have jurisdiction
were they independently presented.” Butt v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 999 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). In this appeal, we need not consider the
scope of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, however. Even if
the District Court were correct in that regard, ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction does not confer the original
jurisdiction required to remove a case from state court. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. v. Henson is on point. 537 U.S. at 34. There,
the parties settled a federal case and agreed that the plaintiff’s
claims pending in a state-court case would be dismissed. Id. at
30. Contrary to the settlement, the plaintiff continued litigating
the state-court case. Id. So the defendant removed the case to
federal court, arguing that “the All Writs Act and the doctrine
of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction support[ed] the removal.”
Id. at 33. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that “the
plain terms of § 1441(a)” required the defendant to
“demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the
federal courts.” Id. Although the federal court retained
jurisdiction over the settlement, that did not “authorize[]
removal” because the “invocation of ancillary [enforcement]
jurisdiction” did not “dispense with the need for compliance
with statutory requirements.” Id. at 34.
Consistent with Syngenta, we hold that ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction
sufficient to support removal. Accord Industria Lechera De
Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Beiró, 989 F.3d 116, 122 (1st Cir. 2021)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has squarely rejected the notion that
ancillary [enforcement] jurisdiction can support removal under
§ 1441 absent an independent basis for original jurisdiction.”
(citing Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34)). So the District Court erred
by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
B
We now turn to whether the District Court had federal-
question jurisdiction, which, unlike ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction, does confer “original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1331. Even though Plaintiffs assert state-law claims,
Defendants argue that the District Court had federal-question
jurisdiction because Plaintiffs challenge “the District Court’s
Orders granting [common-benefit fund] awards” “in the
context of the MDL,” which implicates “the Court’s inherent
powers to effectively manage federal litigation.” Defs.’ Br. 26.
We disagree.
District courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case can arise under
federal law in two ways. First, a “case arises under federal law
when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Gunn v.
Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). Second, “federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:
(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and
(4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Id. at 258. But
only a “special and small category” of cases with state-law
claims arise under federal law. Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006); see,
e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005) (holding that a quiet-title action
under state law conferred federal-question jurisdiction because
it raised important questions of federal tax law).
Applying this test, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims do not
arise under federal law. It is true that Plaintiffs challenged
Defendants’ collection of attorney’s fees awarded by the
federal court in an MDL. But their claims do not necessarily
raise a federal issue, let alone one that is actually disputed and
substantial. “For a federal issue to be necessarily raised,
vindication of a right under state law must necessarily turn on
some construction of federal law.” Manning v. Merrill Lynch

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Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2014)
(cleaned up), aff’d, 578 U.S. 374 (2016); see, e.g., Grable, 545
U.S. at 315 (stating that a federal issue was necessarily raised
by a quiet-title action because whether the plaintiff “was given
notice within the meaning of the federal statute” was “an
essential element” of the quiet-title claim). “Because we
conclude that no federal issue has been necessarily raised here,
we need not decide whether the other three Grable
requirements are met.” Manning, 772 F.3d at 163. We
therefore hold that federal-question jurisdiction does not
provide a basis for removal in this case.
C
Next, we consider whether removal was proper on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. District courts “have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between” “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1).
The parties are completely diverse, so diversity
jurisdiction exists if the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000.1 The parties contest the applicable standard of proof
for determining whether the amount-in-controversy
requirement is satisfied. According to Plaintiffs, their
allegation that the amount in controversy is below $75,000
controls because Defendants have failed to show to a legal
1 “In general, the distinct claims of separate plaintiffs cannot
be aggregated when determining the amount in controversy.”
Auto-Owners Ins. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 395
(3d Cir. 2016). We express no opinion as to whether the anti-
aggregation rule applies here.

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certainty that it exceeds that amount. Defendants respond that
diversity jurisdiction exists because a preponderance of the
evidence shows that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000.
Ordinarily, “[i]f removal of a civil action is sought on
the basis of” diversity jurisdiction, “the sum demanded in good
faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in
controversy.” Id. § 1446(c)(2). But the amount alleged in the
complaint does not always control. The “notice of removal
may assert the amount in controversy” if the initial pleading
seeks either (1) “nonmonetary relief;” or (2) “a money
judgment, but the State practice either does not permit demand
for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of
the amount demanded.” Id. § 1446(c)(2)(A). If one of these
exceptions applies, then removal based on diversity
jurisdiction is proper if “the district court finds, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
exceeds” $75,000. Id. § 1446(c)(2)(B); see also Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014)
(explaining that “when a defendant’s assertion of the amount
in controversy is challenged,” “both sides submit proof and the
court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the
amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied”).
The District Court did not consider whether either
exception within § 1446(c)(2)(A) applies, and the parties did
not brief these issues on appeal. And even if an exception
applies, the District Court made no finding as to whether the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. So the present record
does not enable us to determine whether this case was properly
removed from state court based on diversity jurisdiction. We
will therefore vacate the judgment and remand for the District
Court to consider the relevant issues of New Jersey law to

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determine whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
IV
We conclude by considering the motions for sanctions.
Both parties contend that the District Court erred by dismissing
their respective motions as moot. We agree that the motions
were not moot, and the District Court was obligated to rule on
the merits before entering final judgment.
Even when a district court is later determined to be
without jurisdiction, it may impose sanctions under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because that decision “is
not a judgment on the merits of an action.” Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)). Rather, deciding
whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions “requires the
determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has
abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be
appropriate.” Cooter, 496 U.S. at 396; see also In re
Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152,
156 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that a court may use its inherent
power to impose sanctions even when it lacks jurisdiction). So
adjudicating a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 “does not
raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the merits of a
‘case or controversy’ over which it lacks jurisdiction.” Willy,
503 U.S. at 138. And under our precedent, “district courts must
resolve any issues about imposition of sanctions prior to, or
contemporaneously with, entering final judgment.” Gary v.
Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 2008).
The parties’ motions for sanctions remained a live issue,

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so the District Court erred by dismissing them as moot.2 See
Willy, 503 U.S. at 137–38; In re Orthopedic, 132 F.3d at 156.
Because motions for sanctions “must be decided in the first
instance by the trial court absent extraordinary circumstances,”
we will not consider the merits of each motion. Gary, 517 F.3d
at 202–03. Instead, we will vacate the District Court’s order
dismissing the motions for sanctions as moot and remand for
the District Court to consider the merits of each motion.
* * *
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s
judgment, its order denying the motion to remand, and its order
dismissing the motions for sanctions as moot. We remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2 Plaintiffs’ motion is founded on state law, so we express no
opinion as to how—or even whether—the District Court
should adjudicate the merits of that motion.

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