United States of America v. John Adams

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-1975
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN ADAMS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00144-001)
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 22, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 21, 2025)
Carina Laguzzi
Laguzzi Law
P.O. Box 30095

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Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
Kelly M. Harrell
Jacqueline C. Romero
Robert A. Zauzmer
Erica Kivitz
Office of United States Attorney
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
John Adams appeals his judgment of conviction and
sentence after pleading guilty to sex trafficking and related
offenses. On appeal, he principally argues that the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 et seq. (the
Trafficking Act), does not apply to his conduct and that
Congress lacked the power to enact that statute. Adams also
contends that the District Court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We will affirm.
I

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A
In early 2020, Adams picked up two girls who ran away
from home, J.A. and S.H., and brought them to his home in
Philadelphia. In exchange for giving them a place to stay,
Adams required the girls, then aged 15 and 16, to have oral and
vaginal sex with him several times and threatened to kick them
out if they refused. Adams also directed the minors to engage
in commercial sex. He used his cellphone to advertise the
minors on the European website “megapersonals.eu” and
collected a portion of the money paid to the minors for their
sexual services. Adams instructed the minors to conceal their
ages and activities, and he directed them to delete their text
messages.
Several weeks later, J.A. and S.H. were found by law
enforcement during a traffic stop. They told Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents that they had been living with Adams and
were forced to have sex with him and others. Authorities found
inculpatory text messages between Adams and J.A. stored on
J.A.’s cellphone that corroborated the minors’ account. The
officers did not recover S.H.’s phone until several weeks later.
By that time, S.H. had deleted all sex-trafficking information
from her phone at Adams’s direction.
Hours after law enforcement found the juveniles,
Adams went to the local police station to “clear his name.”
Supp. App. 48. He wrote a false exculpatory statement but
admitted that he had taken J.A. and S.H. to his home. Days
later, Adams solicited another minor, J.B., to help him cover
up his sex-trafficking activities. With J.B.’s assistance, he
recorded a conversation with J.B., S.H., and S.H.’s brother to
exculpate himself and to blackmail S.H. if she cooperated with
law enforcement. Adams paid J.B. for her participation in the

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recording and paid S.H. and her brother to keep them quiet.
Adams later visited the FBI office in Philadelphia. He
told the FBI agents that he was “Captain Save-a-Hoe” and that
he knew J.A. and S.H. were minors. Supp. App. 50. Adams
admitted that the girls had stayed with him and claimed they
had paid him to do so. He denied “having a sexual
conversation” with J.A. and S.H. or having a Megapersonals
account, although he admitted emailing Megapersonals to ask
about posting advertisements. Supp. App. 51. Contrary to
Adams’s story, the agents discovered that Adams had a
Megapersonals account, visited its website many times, and
posted online advertisements there at least twice.
B
A grand jury returned a six-count indictment, charging
Adams with: sex trafficking of a minor and aiding and abetting
the same in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c)
(Counts One and Two); tampering with evidence in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count Three); tampering with a witness
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (Count Four); and
making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(Counts Five and Six).
Adams’s counsel moved to dismiss Counts One and
Two for failure to state an offense, arguing that the Trafficking
Act did not apply to Adams’s conduct because Congress did
not express its intent to federalize the prosecution of “local
street crime prostitution.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 59 at 5. Adams
also filed several pro se motions, including one entitled
“Motion to Invalidate the Indictment as Being Unconstitutional
As-Applied in Violation of the Treaty Clause, Tenth
Amendment, Necessary and Proper Clause, and the United

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States Constitution.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 55.
The District Court denied the pro se and counseled
motions. The Court held that the Trafficking Act criminalized
domestic sex trafficking and that Congress validly enacted the
statute using its Commerce Clause power.
Adams eventually pleaded guilty to all six charges with
a written plea agreement in which he reserved the right to
challenge whether the Trafficking Act applied to his conduct.
The Government agreed to recommend a within-Guidelines
sentence and that Adams was eligible for a two-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
Before sentencing, Adams filed a pro se motion asking
the District Court to reconsider its order denying his motion to
dismiss in part because “[t]his [sex-trafficking] statute is being
used the same way the crack laws were being used against
black people.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 161. Defense counsel also
moved to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing that Adams was
legally innocent, the Government’s witnesses were not
credible, and the Government had breached the agreement.
Counsel also contended that Adams did not voluntarily agree
to plead guilty because his prior counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by inaccurately telling him that the
Government could not ask for a sentence greater than fifteen
years.
After the District Court denied Adams’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the Government filed an amended
sentencing memorandum, arguing that Adams was no longer
eligible for the acceptance-of-responsibility downward
adjustment because he had frivolously alleged that he was
prosecuted based on his race and denigrated the credibility of

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witnesses. At sentencing, the District Court rejected the
Government’s argument, calculated the Guidelines range as
360 months’ to life imprisonment, and imposed a sentence of
300 months’ imprisonment followed by ten years’ supervised
release.
In this timely appeal, Adams challenges the denials of
his motion to dismiss Counts One and Two and his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review Adams’s statutory and constitutional arguments de
novo. United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir.
2020); United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 198–99 (3d
Cir. 2001).
III
Counts One and Two of the indictment charged Adams
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) of the Trafficking Act,
which punishes anyone who “knowingly . . . in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, advertises, [or] maintains . . . by
any means a person” while “knowing . . . that the person has
not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage
in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Adams argues
that the statute does not apply to his conduct. We disagree.
A
Relying on various references to the “international” or
“transnational” sex trade in the congressional purposes and

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findings underlying the Trafficking Act, Adams contends that
Congress intended § 1591 to apply only to foreign sex
trafficking. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b). As he sees it, his “wholly
domestic” sexual exploitation of minors lies beyond the reach
of the statute. Adams Br. 9.
Adams’s argument flouts the text of § 1591, which
punishes both foreign and domestic sex trafficking. “Because
we presume that Congress’ intent is most clearly expressed in
the text of the statute, we begin our analysis with an
examination of the plain language of the relevant provision.”
Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir.
2012) (quotation omitted). Section 1591 criminalizes sex
trafficking of minors “in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The statute does not define
“interstate,” but its ordinary meaning is “[b]etween two or
more states or residents of different states.” Interstate, Black’s
Law Dictionary 826 (7th ed. 1999); see also Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (noting that commerce is
interstate when it “concerns more States than one”). So the
statute applies domestically because it unambiguously
punishes the sex trafficking of minors affecting commerce
between two or more States.
Adams’s conduct falls within the scope of § 1591. He
created an account on a European website to advertise the
minors’ sexual services and coordinate with buyers. Adams
also used a cellphone manufactured in a foreign country to
direct the minors to engage in commercial sex acts. Those facts
satisfy the jurisdictional foreign or interstate-commerce
element of the offenses because Adams’s commercial sex
trafficking of minors contributed to the market that Congress’s
comprehensive statutory scheme seeks to eradicate. See
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (holding that

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Congress has the power to regulate individual instances of
“purely local activities” that in the aggregate frustrate the
broader regulation of interstate and foreign commerce).
B
Adams’s second statutory argument fares no better. He
contends that even if Congress intended to punish domestic sex
trafficking, we must construe § 1591 narrowly to avoid
federalizing “local crimes” that Pennsylvania law already
punishes. Adams Br. 12 (citing Bond v. United States, 572 U.S.
844 (2014)).
In Bond, the Supreme Court considered whether a
provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, reached the defendant’s
“purely local crime” of poisoning her husband’s paramour.
Bond, 572 U.S. at 848. The Court held it did not because there
was no “clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely
local crimes.” Id. at 860. The Court required such a clear
statement because reading an ambiguous statutory term as the
government suggested would “intrude[] on the police power of
the States” and “significantly change the federal-state
balance.” Id. at 859–60 (cleaned up).
Unlike the law challenged in Bond, the Trafficking Act
reflects Congress’s clear intent to exercise all its power to
regulate child sex trafficking, including “purely local” conduct,
so long as the minimal jurisdictional hook is satisfied. See
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S 105, 115 (2001) (explaining that by using the
phrase “affecting commerce,” Congress indicates its “intent to
regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce

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Clause”).1 Moreover, “the congressional findings incorporated
into the [Trafficking Act] clearly demonstrate Congress’s
intent to enact a criminal statute addressing sex trafficking at
all levels of activity.” United States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 547
(9th Cir. 2015); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(12) (finding that,
in the aggregate, sex trafficking “substantially affects interstate
and foreign commerce” and “has an impact on the nationwide
employment network and labor market”).
Section 1591 reaches Adams’s conduct, even if purely
local, so the District Court did not err when it denied Adams’s
motion to dismiss.
IV
Having rejected Adams’s statutory challenges, we turn
to his assertion that Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to enact § 1591. Adams contends that applying the
statute to interstate (rather than international) sex trafficking
would violate the Tenth Amendment, the Treaty Power, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States
Constitution. Adams’s arguments are misguided.
1 Jones v. United States, which Adams invokes in passing, is
inapt. 529 U.S. 848 (2000). There, the Supreme Court
interpreted a federal arson statute to exclude private owner-
occupied residences because the government had not shown
that the building was “currently used in commerce or in an
activity affecting commerce.” Id. at 859 (2000). But the
Court’s holding hinged on the statute’s “qualifying words
‘used in’ a commerce-affecting activity.” Id. at 854. That “key
word” is absent from the relevant part of § 1591. Id.

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First, the source of Congress’s authority to enact § 1591
derives from the Commerce Clause, not the Treaty Power. The
statute imposes criminal liability upon anyone who
“knowingly . . . in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”
causes a minor to engage in commercial sex acts. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a); see Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 115 (“The
phrase ‘affecting commerce’ indicates Congress’ intent to
regulate to the outer limits of its authority under the Commerce
Clause.”); see also Walls, 784 F.3d at 547 (“[W]hen Congress
used the language ‘in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce’ in the [Trafficking Act], it intended to exercise its
full powers under the Commerce Clause.”).
Section 1591 is a valid exercise of that power. Article I
of the Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 3, 18. Congress’s commerce
power, supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause,
includes the authority “to regulate purely local activities that
are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”2 Raich, 545 U.S. at
17. Section 1591 is “part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that criminalizes and attempts to prevent slavery,
involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial
2 For that reason, the Trafficking Act does not offend the Tenth
Amendment by punishing conduct that occurs “wholly within
a state.” Adams Br. 10. It is “well within” Congress’s power to
regulate “purely intrastate” activities that “undercut the
regulation of the interstate market,” especially here, where
Adams’s sexual exploitation of minors was commercial in
nature. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.

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gain.” Walls, 784 F.3d at 548; see Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
In enacting the Trafficking Act, Congress recognized that
human trafficking “is the largest manifestation of slavery
today.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1). Congress also found that
human trafficking substantially affects interstate and foreign
commerce. See id. § 7101(b)(12). And several of our sister
courts have concluded that there is a rational basis for that
finding. See, e.g., Walls, 784 F.3d at 548–49; United States v.
Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). Today we
conclude likewise.
For the reasons stated, we hold that Congress validly
enacted the Trafficking Act consistent with its authority under
the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court did not
err in denying Adams’s motion to dismiss.
V
We last consider Adams’s challenge to the District
Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Adams contends that the Government breached the plea
agreement by seeking an undue influence two-level
enhancement and by reneging on its stipulation that Adams had
accepted responsibility for his offense. He also claims he is
innocent. We are unpersuaded.
The Government reserved the right to “[m]ake whatever
sentencing recommendation” it “deem[ed] appropriate
provided its recommendation is within the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range,” and the parties were “free to
argue . . . the applicability of any other provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines, including offense conduct, offense

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characteristics, criminal history, adjustments, and departures.”
Supp. App. 29, 35. The Government therefore did not breach
the plea agreement by seeking the undue-influence
enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B).
Nor did the Government breach the plea agreement by
arguing against a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility in its sentencing memorandum. The parties
agreed that Adams demonstrated his acceptance of
responsibility “as of the date of th[e] agreement.” Supp. App.
36. Because Adams later attempted to withdraw his plea based
on the unsupported allegations that his victims lacked
credibility and that he was prosecuted because of his race, the
Government had a reasonable basis to change its sentencing
recommendation. See United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125,
141–42 (3d Cir. 2010).
Finally, Adams contends he has a right to withdraw his
plea because he “made a claim of innocence.” Adams Br. 14.
But that “[b]ald assertion[] of innocence” is unsupported and
falls well short of Adams’s burden. United States v. Brown,
250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d Cir. 2001). His claim of innocence
before the District Court rested on his argument that § 1591
“does not reach the charged conduct in this case.” App. 29. But
we have rejected that argument. So the District Court was
within its discretion to deny Adams’s motion to withdraw the
guilty plea.3 Brown, 250 F.3d at 815.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District
3 Adams also argues that he has a right to withdraw his plea
because of ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to

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Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
reach the merits of that claim because the record is insufficient
to determine the issue. See United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d
245, 254 (3d Cir. 2003). We do so without prejudice to
Adams’s ability to make this argument again on a collateral
attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Thornton,
327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).

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