United States of America v. Julio Polanco Suarez, aka Sandy

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-2419
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JULIO POLANCO SUAREZ, aka Sandy,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 3:18-cr-00121-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 20, 2025
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Before: PHIPPS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 24, 2025)
Frederick W. Ulrich
Office of Federal Public Defender

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100 Chestnut Street
Suite 306
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Appellant
Carlo D. Marchioli
Office of United States Attorney
1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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CHUNG, Circuit Judge.
Julio Suarez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the
government and aggravated identity theft in connection with a
scheme to file false federal income tax returns. The District
Court sentenced Suarez to seventy months in prison, a term of
imprisonment at the top of his Guidelines range. During the
pendency of Suarez’s sentence, the Guidelines were amended
in a way that provided for a lower Guidelines range. Suarez
subsequently moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), which the District Court denied. On appeal,
Suarez asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in
various ways when denying his motion. We disagree and will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

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From March 2009 to September 2016, Suarez
participated in a scheme to file false federal income tax returns
to obtain refund checks. Suarez’s role in the conspiracy was to
negotiate the sale of the refund checks to check-cashing
businesses and to provide the checks to his co-conspirators. In
April 2018, Suarez was charged with conspiracy to defraud the
government, theft of government money, and aggravated
identity theft. In August 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement
with the government, Suarez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 286, and
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.
The District Court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months on the conspiracy
count based in part on Suarez’s zero criminal history points.
The aggravated identity theft count carried a two-year
consecutive term of imprisonment. Thus, Suarez’s total
Guidelines range term of imprisonment was sixty-one to
seventy months. In April 2021, after assessing the Section
3553(a) factors, the District Court sentenced Suarez to a total
term of imprisonment of seventy months, including a sentence
at the top of the Guidelines range for the conspiracy count.
In December 2023, Suarez filed a pro se motion for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on a
2023 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, which altered
the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to offenders with
zero criminal history points.1 In his motion, Suarez requested
1 The District Court later appointed the Federal Public
Defender’s Office to represent Suarez. Appointed counsel
filed a new motion for a sentence reduction and a supporting

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that the District Court reduce his sentence to fifty-four months,
the bottom of his new Guidelines range. In response, the
government acknowledged Suarez’s eligibility for a reduction
but recommended a sentence of sixty-one months, a sentence
at the top of the amended Guidelines range.
Although the District Court concluded that Suarez was
eligible for a reduction, it declined to alter his sentence. The
District Court reiterated its reasoning from Suarez’s original
sentencing and emphasized “a clear need…to impose a
sentence that reflects the seriousness of [the] offense and
promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment.”
App. at 8. It also “acknowledge[d] [Suarez’s] … commitment
to positive behavior and participation in prison programs” but
determined that his post-sentencing “activities [did not]
diminish [Suarez’s] extensive and harmful criminal conduct.”
App. at 9 (cleaned up).
Suarez timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION2
brief. When we refer to Suarez’s motion, we refer to the
counseled motion.
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(2). This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s decision
to deny a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154
(3d Cir. 2009).

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Usually, federal courts “may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
Congress provided an exception to that rule “in the case of a
defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). In
those circumstances, Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a court to
“reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors
set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
In determining whether to grant a sentence reduction
under Section 3582(c)(2), a district court must undertake a
“two-step inquiry.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826
(2010). First, a district court must determine the defendant’s
eligibility for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.
Id. at 827. Second, the district court must determine, in its
discretion, whether to grant a reduction in view of the Section
3553(a) factors and any applicable policies issued by the
Sentencing Commission. Id.; United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d
151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The determination as to whether a
reduction is warranted…is committed to the discretion of the
district court.”).
In this case, it is undisputed that Suarez is eligible for a
sentence reduction at step one. On appeal, Suarez challenges
the District Court’s decision to deny his motion at step two. He
makes two arguments in support. He first asserts that the
District Court abused its discretion by improperly applying the
Section 3553(a) factors. Second, he contends that the District
Court abused its discretion when it failed to justify an upward

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variance from the amended Sentencing Guidelines. We are not
persuaded by either argument.
A. The District Court’s Consideration of the Section
3553(a) Factors
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
applying the Section 3553(a) factors. In denying Suarez’s
motion, the District Court reconsidered and incorporated its
original analysis and demonstrated that it considered all
required factors under Section 3553(a). See generally App. at
7-9, 68-69; see also United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411
(3d Cir. 2012) (“The district court need not … make explicit
findings as to each sentencing factor if the record makes clear
that the court took all the factors into account.”).3 This
includes considering “the nature and circumstances of the
offense[s]” of conviction, § 3553(a)(1), under which the
District Court noted that Suarez’s “criminal conduct was
extensive,” continued over a period of seven years, involved
“deliberate dishonesty and fraudulent intent … throughout the
entire course of…conduct,” and cost the United States at least
$1.5 million. App. at 8. Moreover, the District Court
highlighted “[t]he need to maintain the sentence imposed ‘to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.’” App. at
9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)). Finally, the District
Court also “considered the need to ‘protect the public from
further crimes [by Suarez]’” by denying the motion and
3 Although Begin is a sentencing appeal rather than an
appeal from a resentencing, in both instances, the court need
not make explicit findings if the record is clear that the court
took all sentencing factors into account.

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concluding that a sentence that was at the top of the original
Guidelines range was appropriate. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(C)).
Suarez argues that the District Court abused its
discretion by failing to account for his rehabilitative efforts
while incarcerated and by failing to adequately consider the
aims of U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. Contrary to Suarez’s assertion, the
District Court expressly “acknowledge[d] [Suarez’s] …
commitment to positive behavior and participation in prison
programs.” Id. (cleaned up). The District Court determined,
however, that Suarez’s activities while incarcerated did not
“diminish [his] extensive and harmful criminal conduct” such
that a sentence reduction was warranted. App. at 9. Suarez’s
disagreement lies only with the weight that the District Court
afforded his rehabilitative efforts. That disagreement, though,
is no basis to vacate the District Court’s order. See Styer, 573
F.3d at 155 (a resentencing court’s “weighing and
consideration of multiple factors, [is] expressly left to a court’s
discretion, [and] is exactly the type of reasoned appraisal to
which we defer on review.” (internal quotations omitted)).
This is especially so where, as here, the “petitioner’s request
for a sentence modification” is before “the same judge who had
sentenced [the] petitioner originally.” Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 585 U.S. 109, 118 (2018).
The same is true for Suarez’s argument that the District
Court disregarded U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1’s recognition that zero-
point offenders pose little risk of recidivism. The District
Court expressly considered the Sentencing Commission’s
reasons for passing U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 but concluded that
Suarez’s circumstances were sufficiently distinct “from the
cases which prompted the addition of U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1.” As

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is also clear from the order on review, the District Court did
not “focus[] on the need to protect the public to the exclusion
of facts showing that the public is not at risk from” Suarez. Br.
at 12. Accordingly, we detect no abuse of discretion in the
District Court’s thorough and holistic application of the
Section 3553(a) factors.
B. Suarez’s Sentence is not an Upward Variance
“Where a court varies, and a party has raised cogent
objections with legal merit that the variance is unjustified by
the record, we require the court to explain why the variance is
justified, with explanations of the relevant sentencing factors
that go beyond mere formalism.” United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d
136, 154 (3d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up); see also United States v.
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). Suarez argues that
his seventy-month sentence is now effectively an upward
variance from the amended Guidelines range, thereby
requiring the District Court “to provide an explanation
different from the one it reiterated from the earlier sentencing.”
Br. at 14. We disagree. Suarez misunderstands the nature of
Section 3582(c)(2) proceedings: a district court’s decision not
to reduce a petitioner’s sentence does not constitute an upward
variance from the amended Guidelines. This is because “a
district court proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) does not impose a
new sentence in the usual sense.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. Nor
does such a proceeding amount to “a do-over of an original
sentencing proceeding where a defendant is cloaked in rights
mandated by statutory law and the Constitution.” Styer, 573
F.3d at 154 (quoting United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946,
949 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3)
(“[P]roceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy
statement do not constitute a full resentencing of the

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defendant.”). Rather, a district court fulfills its obligations
under Section 3582(c)(2) when it “consider[s] any applicable
§ 3553(a) factors and determine[s] whether, in its
discretion…the reduction authorized…is warranted in whole
or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.”
Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. While the calculation of an amended
Guidelines range is a necessary part of this process, see §
3553(a)(4), such a calculation does not transform the
previously imposed, procedurally-sound sentence into an
upward variance. So long as a district court appropriately
considers the Section 3553(a) factors, it need not re-justify its
original sentence as if it were imposed anew under the
amended Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. (“The
authorization of such a discretionary reduction does not
otherwise affect the lawfulness of a previously imposed
sentence.”).4 Because the District Court adequately considered
4 This is not to say that we may “never…require a more
detailed explanation” from a district court if it denies a
petitioner’s motion in full or chooses a sentence reduction that
is not “proportional” to the decrease in the petitioner’s
recommended sentence under the amended Guidelines range.
Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 116, 119 (emphasis in the original).
This is because the amount of explanation required
“depends…upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id.
at 116. In some circumstances, for example, a “district court’s
use of a barebones form order in response to a motion like
petitioner’s would be inadequate.” Id. at 119. But those
circumstances are not before us. As explained above, the
District Court’s Opinion reflects that it considered the Section
3553(a) factors and expressly accounted for Suarez’s
post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts.

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the Section 3553(a) factors, we discern no abuse of discretion
in its denial of Suarez’s motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.

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