United States of America v. Jakob Gucu

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-2444
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAKOB GUCU,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:20-cr-00122-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 28, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 27, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jakob Gucu appeals the District Court’s refusal to modify his sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We will affirm.1
Gucu contends “[t]he District Court . . . abused its discretion by failing to direct
the parties to address [his] post-sentencing conduct” in fuller briefing on the application
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Opening Br. 11. When evaluating whether to modify
a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), a district court “shall consider the nature and seriousness
of the danger to any person or the community,” and it “may consider post-sentencing
conduct of the defendant.” United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526, 529 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(ii)–(iii)). The procedures it employs to conduct
that analysis, though, are a matter of discretion. See United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151,
154 (3d Cir. 2009).
As the original sentencing court, the District Court already “was familiar with the
facts of [Gucu’s] case” and was therefore “in the best position to determine whether”
additional briefing was needed. Id. Because it had already considered the § 3553(a)
factors at sentencing and opted not to rely on post-sentencing conduct, the Court was
within its discretion to decide Gucu’s § 3582(c)(2) motion without additional briefing on
those same factors. See id.; cf. United States v. Young, 555 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, we will affirm.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a motion to modify a sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527,
531 (3d Cir. 2012).

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