Estate of John Schroeder, by and Through Dawn Tucker, Administratrix v. Port Authority Transit Corp

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24-2515
ESTATE OF JOHN SCHROEDER, BY AND THROUGH
DAWN TUCKER, ADMINISTRATRIX
Appellant
v.
PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORP; DELAWARE
RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, jointly, severally, or in the
alternative
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 1:22-cv-01208)
District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on June 12, 2025
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, and AMBRO,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 26, 2025)

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A. Michael Barker
Todd J. Gelfand
Barker Gelfand James & Sarvas
210 New Road
Linwood Greene, Suite 12
Linwood, NJ 08221
Counsel for Appellant
Gregory F. Cirillo
Silvio A. Trentalange
Dilworth Paxson
1650 Market Street
Suite 1200
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellees
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
John Schroeder was crushed to death between two train
cars while working as a technician for the Port Authority
Transit Corporation (PATCO). The administrator of his estate,
Dawn Tucker, sued PATCO and its owner, the Delaware River
Port Authority (DRPA), under the Federal Employers Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (FELA), to recover for Schroeder’s
death. FELA, however, applies only to “common carrier[s] by
railroad.” Id. § 51 (emphasis added). The District Court held
that PATCO’s railway, known as the Speed Line, is not a
railroad but an urban rapid transit system, and it dismissed

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Tucker’s FELA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
We agree that the Speed Line is not a railroad and thus affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Speed Line Provides Short-Haul Commuter
Transportation Between Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
and Lindenwold, New Jersey.
The Speed Line is a double-tracked rapid transit line
running about 14.5 miles from 16th and Locust Streets in
Philadelphia to Lindendwold, New Jersey. It began operating
in January 1969, though it evolved out of the older Bridge Line,
which connected Philadelphia and Camden as far back as 1936.
The Speed Line starts in Philadelphia and runs 1.7 miles
underground before crossing the Delaware River for 1.5 miles
on the Benjamin Franklin Bridge. It then runs underground
again in Camden for 0.6 miles before returning aboveground
for the remainder of its 10.7-mile route to Lindenwold. There
are four stops in Philadelphia and nine stops in New Jersey.
The Speed Line currently operates 24/7/365. At its
weekday-morning peak, a Philadelphia-bound train arrives at
each stop about every six to eight minutes. At peak evening
hours, Lindenwold-bound trains arrive every eight to ten
minutes. The average run time between Lindenwold and
Philadelphia is 28 minutes.
The Speed Line uses a third-rail electric system. That
means its cars cannot run on tracks built for steam or diesel-
powered trains, nor can those trains use the Speed Line’s
tracks. The Speed Line’s trackage clearance requirements—
that is, the minimum allowable distance between the tracks and
surrounding structures—are also different from those of
neighboring carriers, like the Southeastern Pennsylvania

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Transit Authority (SEPTA) and New Jersey Transit (NJT), so
those trains could not operate on the Speed Line’s tracks.
No other rail carrier uses the Speed Line’s tracks and
vice versa. It does not carry freight, pay tariffs to Pennsylvania,
or share operations or employees with any other rail carriers.
Virtually all of PATCO’s revenue comes from its Speed Line
passenger transit service.
B. PATCO Leases the Lindenwold Yard and Uses It for
Maintenance Projects.
DRPA owns a piece of property called the Lindenwold
Yard, which it leases to PATCO for transit-car maintenance or
refurbishment and similar operational projects. Near the
Lindenwold Yard is a small portion of rail track called the
Lindenwold Spur. In rail lingo, a spur is a short section of track
that branches off from a main rail line, providing access to an
industrial area. Spur Track (Commonly Called Spur), Railroad
Dictionary, CSX, https://perma.cc/R979-6524.
The Lindenwold Spur diverges from the NJT’s Atlantic
City Line to the Lindenwold Yard and a nearby DRPA right-of-
way. But no PATCO transit car or NJT train car has ever used
the Lindenwold Spur to access the Lindenwold Yard. Nor has
PATCO ever used the Lindenwold Spur to ship freight. In fact,
PATCO has used it only once, over ten years ago, to perform
maintenance on the Speed Line track between Lindenwold and

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Camden. Specifically, PATCO contractors used the NJT track
via the Lindenwold Spur to replace power poles and cables
over the Speed Line track.
C. John Schroeder Was Killed While Working for
PATCO at Lindenwold Yard and His Estate Sought
Relief Under FELA.
John Schroeder was a 76-year-old electronics technician
employed by PATCO. While working at the Lindenwold Yard
in July 2020, he tragically was crushed to death between two
transit cars. His daughter Dawn Tucker, as the administrator of
his estate, sued DRPA and PATCO in March 2022. She asserted
federal-law claims under FELA along with state-law tort
claims.
PATCO and DRPA moved to dismiss Tucker’s
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. FELA applies
only to “common carrier[s] by railroad,” 45 U.S.C. § 51, not
other kinds of railways, like light rail, street cars, or rapid
transit systems. According to PATCO and DRPA, the Speed
Line is a rapid transit system, not a railroad, and thus outside
FELA’s scope. The District Court construed the motion as a
factual challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction, so it denied
the motion without prejudice and allowed the parties to engage
in jurisdictional discovery. After discovery closed, PATCO and
DRPA renewed their motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. This time, the District Court granted their
motion. It held that the Speed Line is a rapid transit system, not
a railroad, and thus falls outside FELA’s scope. Tucker timely
appealed.

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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Tucker invoked the District Court’s federal-question
jurisdiction over her FELA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The District Court treated PATCO and DRPA’s motion
to dismiss as a factual challenge to its subject-matter
jurisdiction. “[A] factual [Rule] 12(b)(1) challenge attacks
allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the
complaint, and it allows the defendant to present competing
facts.” Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268
(3d Cir. 2016). When assessing a district court’s ruling on a
factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, we “exercise
plenary review over [its] legal conclusions, [and] … review
[its] findings of fact, including findings related to jurisdiction,
only for clear error.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346
(3d Cir. 2016).
III. RAILROADS AND TRANSIT SYSTEMS ARE
DISTINGUISHED BY THE SERVICES THEY
PROVIDE AND INFRASTRUCTURE THEY USE.
Tucker’s sole basis for invoking federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is her FELA claim.1 That statute “provides the
1 Tucker also asserted federal claims under the federal Locomo-
tive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., and the Federal
Safety Appliance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq., but those stat-
utes do not provide private rights of action. Del. & Hudson Ry.
v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc., 781 F.3d 656, 663 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“[N]either the [Locomotive Inspection Act] nor the [Safety
Appliance Act] provide for private enforcement; instead,

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exclusive source of recovery for employees of interstate
railroads injured or killed during the course of their
employment.” Felton v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 757 F. Supp.
623, 626–27 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 952 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1991).
Though FELA does not define “common carrier by
railroad,” 45 U.S.C. § 51, we have recognized “a consistent
congressional intent to distinguish between intraurban rail
transportation and interstate railroads,” which has guided our
interpretation of FELA’s coverage, Felton, 952 F.2d at 62. The
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, for example, defines
covered “employer[s]” as those who engage in “the
transportation of passengers or property by railroad,” but
exempts “any street, interurban, or suburban electric railway.”
45 U.S.C. § 351(a). The Locomotive Inspection Act similarly
defines “railroad” as including “any form of nonhighway
ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic
guideways” but excluding “rapid transit operations in an urban
area that are not connected to the general railroad system of
transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 20102(2).2
A plaintiff who seeks to recover under FELA must
therefore prove that the defendant is a “common carrier by
railroad engaged in interstate commerce” rather than a more
railroad employees can only enforce those statutes
through … FELA.”).
2 This distinction between “railroads” and less industrial, local-
ized rail-based transit systems is repeated throughout Con-
gress’s wide array of railroad legislation. See, e.g., Railroad
Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)(ii) (“[T]he term ‘em-
ployer’ shall not include … any street, interurban, or suburban
electric railway, unless such railway is operating as part of a
general diesel-railroad system of transportation ….”).

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localized “urban rapid transit system[], often referred to as
subways or street railways.” Felton, 952 F.2d at 62 (emphasis
added) (quotation omitted). The parties agree on that much:
FELA covers only railroads. They disagree, however, on how
to distinguish between a railroad and a rapid transit system, and
whether the Speed Line is the former or the latter.
The District Court ruled that “[t]he distinction between
a railroad and urban rapid transit system can be
‘explained … in terms of the functions and services
performed.’” App. 7 (ellipsis in original) (emphases added)
(quoting Strykowski v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 30 F.3d
136 (Table), 1994 WL 287395, at *6 (7th Cir. June 28, 1994)).
In its view, the Speed Line is a rapid transit system, not a
railroad, because it performs only short-haul passenger
transportation, any interstate activity is merely incidental to its
service of a single urban community, and it is not integrated
with other rail lines. PATCO endorses this approach.
Tucker for her part argues that “urban rapid transit”
refers only to “street railway and/or bus services on, over and
under the streets of a single urban area.” Appellant’s Br. 15
(capitalization omitted). Although no case expressly endorses
this formulation, she purports to synthesize it from a series of
earlier cases—Washington Railway & Electric Co. v. Scala,
244 U.S. 630 (1917); Mangum v. Capital Traction Co., 39 F.2d
286 (D.C. Cir. 1930); and Ferguson v. Philadelphia
Transportation Co., 113 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1952), aff’d,
205 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1953).
PATCO has the better argument. FELA-exempt urban
rapid transit, though it may have its origins in the traditional
street railcar system, is not as limited in scope as Tucker
suggests. Case law interpreting the term “railroad” across the
full range of federal legislation on the subject has identified

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two touchstones. First, the railway’s services: Does the railway
perform long-haul passenger routes and interstate freight
transportation?3 Or high-capacity, frequent passenger transport
for a single community? And second, its operations and
infrastructure: Is the railway integrated with other rail traffic,
including freight and intercity passenger trains? Or is it
disconnected from other rail lines? These guideposts help
identify the kinds of railways that Congress intended to
regulate: those posing special hazards associated with heavy
industry.
Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 230 U.S. 324 (1913), is an
instructive early example of the Supreme Court’s effort to
distinguish urban rapid transit from industrial railroads.4 The
factors it considered fit neatly into our two categories. As for
3 Courts have long recognized “that the length of [a rail com-
pany’s] road or its track is not [to] be considered controlling in
the determination of whether [FELA] is applicable.” Ferguson,
113 F. Supp. at 276. But we must assess this factor to determine
whether the railway “extend[s] from town to town” as a true
“channel[] of interstate commerce” or merely operates as a “lo-
cal” service for a “single community.” Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 230 U.S. 324,
336 (1913).
4 Though the Court was interpreting the meaning of “railroad”
in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, “under the in pari ma-
teria canon of statutory construction, statutes addressing the
same subject matter generally should be read ‘as if they were
one law.’” Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315–16
(2006) (quoting Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239,
243 (1972)).

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services, “railroads are channels of interstate commerce.” Id.
at 336. And “the commerce to which Congress referred was
that carried on by railroads engaged in hauling passengers or
freight.” Id. By contrast, “street railroads” are “aids to street
traffic, and for the use of a single community, even though that
community be divided by state lines, or under different
municipal control.” Id. “When these street railroads carry
passengers across a state line they are, of course, engaged in
interstate commerce, but not the commerce which Congress
had in mind when legislating ….” Id.
As for operations and infrastructure, “ordinary railroads
are constructed on the companies’ own property” with “tracks
extend[ing] from town to town,” “usually connected with other
railroads, which themselves are further connected with others.”
Id. at 335–36. “Street railroads, on the other hand, are local, are
laid in streets,” and extend “from street to street, from ward to
ward, from city to suburbs.” Id. at 336.
We have extended this framework to FELA claims. In
Ferguson—one of the cases Tucker invokes to support her
narrower definition—the district court held that the Speed
Line’s predecessor, the Bridge Line, was a “street railway,” not
a railroad. 113 F. Supp. at 276. The services it provided did not
involve the kind of interstate commerce that Omaha & Council
Bluffs told us Congress was targeting: “No freight or mail [wa]s
carried on any part of the defendant’s system.” Id.; see also
Linetskiy v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2 A.D.3d 503, 504 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (characterizing Long Island Rail Road “as a
railroad” because it “is involved in … the transportation of
freight in interstate commerce”). Nor did the Bridge Line’s
infrastructure bear much resemblance to a railroad’s. Although
the Bridge Line had stops in New Jersey, those “locations
[were] for the purposes of transportation practically part of the

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City of Philadelphia and [were] but extensions of the city
streetcar system.” Ferguson, 113 F. Supp. at 276. It was not
integrated with any other rail traffic either.
None of the cases Tucker cites support her capacious
definition of railroad, nor her claim that rapid transit systems
include only “street railway and/or bus services on, over and
under the streets of a single urban area.” Appellant’s Br. 15
(capitalization omitted). For example, she emphasizes that
Mangum involved a “street railway over the public streets and
avenues of the District [of Columbia].” 39 F.2d at 288. Maybe
so, but the considerations it deemed legally relevant were the
same ones we have outlined here: “Speaking generally, … a
street railway is local, derives its business from the streets
along which it is operated, and is in aid of the local travel upon
those streets.” Id. at 287. By contrast, a “commercial
railway”—that is, a railroad—“usually derives its business,
either directly or indirectly, through connecting roads, from a
large area of territory, and not from the travel on the streets of
those cities, either terminal or way stations, along which they
happen to be constructed and operated.” Id. The D.C. Circuit
used this framework to conclude that the railway before it was
not a railroad. True, the defendant “operate[d] a trackage
extending about a mile and a half into Maryland which is
continuous with its line within the District.” Id. at 288. But
“th[o]se lines extend[ed] into adjacent urban neighborhoods,
which for purposes of transportation are practically part of the
city, and are but extensions of the city street car systems.” Id.
The line was not a railroad, so FELA did not cover it.
Tucker also leans heavily on Scala, but that case is
likely bound to its facts. The Supreme Court there held that the
defendant was operating a railroad, not a streetcar, because it
“was incorporated as … a railway company, not a street

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railway company,” “had full powers of eminent domain,” and
extended between the District of Columbia and Maryland. 244
U.S. at 637–38. Scala’s reasoning is sparse and difficult to
harmonize with later cases distinguishing between railroads
and rapid transit systems. For example, in Felton—which we
affirmed, 952 F.2d at 66—the district court observed that Scala
“affirmed with little discussion a lower [c]ourt holding that a
carrier incorporated as an ordinary railway company … was a
‘suburban railroad common carrier of passengers’ subject
to … FELA.” 757 F. Supp. at 630 (quoting Scala, 244 U.S.
at 638). But “[o]ther authority,” like Mangum, “support[ed] a
contrary result.” Id. And in Ferguson—another case we
affirmed, 205 F.2d at 520—the district court held, despite
Scala, that the Bridge Line was a street railway, not a railroad,
even though it extended into New Jersey. 113 F. Supp. at 276.
IV. THE PATCO SPEED LINE IS A RAPID TRANSIT
SYSTEM, NOT A COMMON CARRIER BY RAILROAD.
To recap, we distinguish a railroad from other kinds of
rapid transit by looking at its services and infrastructure. If a
railway resembles the kind of industrial operation that
Congress meant to regulate, then it is a railroad. Otherwise, it
is a rapid transit system that falls outside FELA’s scope. When
we look at the Speed Line through this lens, it becomes clear
that it is a rapid transit system, not a railroad.
A. The Speed Line Performs Frequent Short-Haul
Passenger Transportation and Does Not Transport
Freight.
Services first. The Speed Line does not perform long-
haul passenger routes, nor does it transport freight. It instead
provides high-capacity, frequent passenger transportation. At
the time of our writing, it runs all day, every day. It served

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4.9 million riders along its single line in 2022. It runs often—
as frequently as every six minutes at peak commuting times.
And it serves a single metropolitan area.
Tucker resists with several unpersuasive arguments.
First, she claims that “the track connection at Lindenwold Yard
was used for freight coming into the … Yard for PATCO’s use
for maintenance in the past.” Appellant’s Br. 7. But
transporting power line equipment one time more than ten
years ago is not the kind of freight transportation Congress had
in mind. We agree with the District Court that this “single use”
is “inconsequential.” App. 9.
Second, Tucker claims that “hauling freight [versus]
passengers is not the key distinguishing feature” of a railroad.
Appellant’s Br. 21 (capitalization omitted). If she means that
whether a rail line transports freight does not alone answer our
inquiry, then we agree. But, as explained, freight transportation
is one of the hallmarks of a railroad. See Chi. Transit Auth. v.
Flohr, 570 F.2d 1305, 1308–09 (7th Cir. 1977) (repeatedly
identifying the hazards associated with transporting freight as
one of the key objects of federal railroad legislation); Omaha
& Council Bluffs, 230 U.S. at 336 (“[T]he commerce to which
Congress referred was that carried on by railroads engaged in
hauling passengers or freight ….”).
The cases Tucker cites do not suggest otherwise. The
railroad in Scala did not transport freight, but it “was
incorporated as … a railway company.” 244 U.S. at 637.
DRPA, by contrast, is charged in its certificate of incorporation
with “[t]he establishment, maintenance, rehabilitation,
construction and operation of a rapid transit system.” App. 104
(emphasis added). And while PATCO, like the railway
company in Scala, possesses powers of eminent domain and
has constructed some of its track on private rights of way, those

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characteristics alone do not outweigh PATCO’s non-industrial,
single-community-focused, rapid transit services.
Tucker also notes that the parties in Felton did not
dispute that the SEPTA Regional Division was a railroad, not a
rapid transit system. But SEPTA’s Regional Division is a
special case because it was formerly part of the much larger
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), no doubt a railroad
under FELA. See generally Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,
512 U.S. 532 (1994) (applying FELA to injured Conrail
employees). In 1981, Congress enacted the Northeast Rail
Services Act (NERSA), which “mandated the withdrawal of
Conrail from regional and interstate commuter rail service by
January 1, 1983.” Felton, 952 F.2d at 62. “Conrail’s commuter
rail properties were transferred to local transit authorities,”
including SEPTA. Id. Congress later amended the Rail
Passenger Service Act (RPSA) to clarify that NERSA did not
change the regulatory landscape for the former Conrail lines.
We observed in Felton that “[u]nder the [RPSA amendments,
45 U.S.C.] § 591, commuter authorities such as SEPTA which
assumed operation of regional lines became subject to all laws,
including … FELA, previously applicable to Conrail … with
regard to their commuter services.” 952 F.2d at 63 (quoting
Felton, 757 F. Supp. at 628) (first alteration in original); see
also 45 U.S.C. § 1104(4) (defining “[c]ommuter service” as
“short-haul rail passenger service operated in metropolitan and
suburban areas”).
B. The Speed Line Is Not Integrated with Other Rail
Traffic.
The Speed Line’s operations do not look like a railroad’s
either. Perhaps most important, it is not meaningfully
connected to any other railroads.

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Tucker argues that PATCO connects to other rail
carriers—NJT at the Lindenwold Spur and SEPTA because of
its “fare arrangement connections.” Appellant’s Br. 25. But a
“de minimis relationship to the operation of a railroad is
insufficient to trigger … FELA.” Felton, 757 F. Supp. at 631.
No PATCO transit car or NJT train car has ever used the
Lindenwold Spur to access the Lindenwold Yard. NJT and the
Speed Line also have different power and trackage-clearance
requirements, so their trains could not run on each other’s
tracks anyway.
The purported integration with SEPTA is even more
tenuous. PATCO has “fare arrangement connections with
SEPTA” and has apparently “twice offered Philadelphia
Phillies fans from South Jersey an opportunity to ride the
PATCO and … connect to the Broad Street Subway line.”
Appellant’s Br. 25. But this argument misses the point. FELA
focuses on hazards unique to industrial railroads. That PATCO
and SEPTA’s subway—not a railroad either—offered a special
promotion to sports fans two times is irrelevant to our analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The grim reality that employees can be seriously injured
by railroads and rapid transit systems alike is not lost on us. As
other courts have sensibly observed, “the liability standard
imposed by FELA in 1908” may be “an anachronism that has
long outlived its usefulness.” Greene v. Long Island R. Co., 99
F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). But “until Congress acts
to amend FELA,” we “must apply the statute as written by
Congress and interpreted by the Supreme Court.” Id. That
means distinguishing between railroads and rapid transit
systems. The services and infrastructure of the Speed Line bear
little resemblance to the former, and thus it falls outside
FELA’s scope. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed.

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