D.o. Daniel A. Salvatierra v. Lake Erie College of Osteopathic Medicine, also known as LECOM On Appeal from the…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-2552
__________
D.O. DANIEL A. SALVATIERRA,
Appellant
v.
LAKE ERIE COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE,
also known as LECOM
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00152)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 20, 2024
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 13, 2025)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Pro se Appellant Daniel A. Salvatierra appeals the District Court’s July 29, 2024
order reentering its dismissal of his complaint against Appellee Lake Erie College of
Osteopathic Medicine (“LECOM”) for failure to prosecute. On a prior appeal, we found
the District Court’s initial order dismissing the case deficient because it merely cited
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), without
analysis or explanation. See Salvatierra v. Lake Erie Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 24-
1274, 2024 WL 3518304, at *1 (3d Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam). We remanded the
matter to the District Court and instructed it to explicitly consider the Poulis factors. See
id. On remand, the District Court considered the six factors and concluded that dismissal
under Poulis was warranted. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s order.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review a District Court’s
order dismissing a suit under Poulis for an abuse of discretion. Hildebrand v. Allegheny
County, 923 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2019). The factors a District Court must weigh under
Poulis before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute are: “(1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim.” 747 F.2d at 868. Although not every Poulis factor needs
to be satisfied to warrant dismissal of the suit, “we have always required consideration
and balancing of all six of the factors and have recommended the resolution of any

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doubts in favor of adjudication on the merits.” United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S.
Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original).
We do not have any “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to use when
determining whether a District Court abused its discretion by its balancing of Poulis
factors and its dismissal of a plaintiff’s case. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d
Cir. 1992). However, as the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he question, of course, is
not . . . whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the
action; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing.” Nat’l Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).
Although we may have viewed some of the factors differently, the District Court’s
amended order provided an analysis of the Poulis factors as we directed, and we cannot
say that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Salvatierra’s complaint for
failure to prosecute.1 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
1 Because the District Court did not rule on LECOM’s motion to dismiss, we will not
consider LECOM’s alternative argument that affirmance is warranted for failure to state a
claim.

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