Jalina Fluellen v. DAVID KRASN, President/Officer of Boyd Gaming Corporation a/k/a Valley Forge Casino

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-3083
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JALINA FLUELLEN,
Appellant
v.
DAVID KRASN, President/Officer of Boyd Gaming Corporation a/k/a Valley Forge
Casino and Resort; VALLEY FORGE CONVENTION CENTER PARTNERS, L.P.;
MICHAEL SADOWSKI, Pennsylvania State Trooper, (Troop-T); JOSEPH
MEADOWCROFT, Pennsylvania State Trooper, (Troop-T); TABETHA A. DAVIS;
RODNEY E. FRYE, JR.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00570)
District Judge: Mia R. Perez
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 3, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2025)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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Jalina Fluellen appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying her motion
for a preliminary injunction and granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss because her
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We will affirm the District Court’s order
and judgment, with one slight modification.
I.
The procedural history of this case and the details of Fluellen’s claims are well
known to the parties and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Fluellen filed her
instant, pro se action on February 5, 2024, based on an altercation that occurred on
December 29, 2018, at the Valley Forge Casino. Fluellen alleged that defendants
Tabetha Davis and Rodney Frye assaulted her while she was playing roulette. After this
assault, she was wrongfully branded the aggressor and arrested by Pennsylvania State
Police (“PSP”) Troopers Michael Sadowski and Joseph Meadowcroft. She further
claimed that Valley Forge Casino violated her rights by failing to protect her from this
assault. The District Court also construed Fluellen’s complaint as asserting a claim for
malicious prosecution. The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that all of her
claims were outside of their relevant statutes of limitations. After a flurry of additional
filings, Fluellen then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which alleged that the
Clerk of the Eastern District had violated her rights in relation to a “Constitutional
Challenge of Rule 26.1,” without providing specific details. The District Court then
dismissed the motion for an injunction without a hearing and granted defendants’ motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.

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II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
“We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim, “accept[ing] all factual allegations as true
and constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Curry v.
Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be
appropriate where an affirmative defense—the relevant statute of limitations, for
example—is apparent on the face of the complaint. See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d
152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Meanwhile, we review a district court's ultimate decision to
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but we exercise plenary review
over legal conclusions and review findings of fact for clear error. Miller v. Mitchell, 598
F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010).
III.
On appeal, Fluellen argues that the District Court erred in concluding that her
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.1 She is, however, mistaken. All events
giving rise to Fluellen’s complaint occurred on or around December 29, 2018. Fluellen
did not file her complaint until over five years later, in February 2024. Because Fluellen’s
claims for violations of her constitutional rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 arose in
1 Fluellen’s brief raises several additional arguments, but none are relevant to the District
Court’s dispositive ruling concerning the statute of limitations, and thus need not be
addressed here.

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Pennsylvania, they are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5524(2); see also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189–90 (3d Cir. 1993). Her state tort
claims likewise have, at most, two-year statutes of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5524. Fluellen’s claims accrued, and the relevant statutes of limitation began to run, at
the time of the incident on or around December 29, 2018. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
387-88 (2007); Dubose v. Quinlan, 643 Pa. 244, 258 (Pa. 2017).
Fluellen, therefore, filed her complaint more than five years after the events giving
rise to these claims, and well beyond the two-year limitations period. Fluellen has not
argued, and nor can we discern from the record, any reason for equitable tolling to apply
in this instance. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639-45 (3d Cir. 2009). As a result, with one
exception discussed below, Fluellen’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as her state
tort claims, are manifestly untimely, and the District Court correctly granted the
Defendant’s motions to dismiss as to those claims. And, in these circumstances, we are
satisfied that amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court construed Fluellen’s complaint as raising a claim for malicious
prosecution, which it dismissed under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. To
the extent that Fluellen truly intended to raise such a claim, dismissal pursuant to the
statute of limitations is not proper at this time, because Fluellen’s cause of action for this
claim would not accrue until her underlying criminal conviction is terminated in her
favor. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994); see also Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th
346, 354 (3d Cir. 2022). That said, dismissal of Fluellen’s malicious prosecution claim

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was nevertheless proper based on the alternative conclusion that the claim is Heck-
barred, as success on her malicious prosecution claim would necessarily imply the
invalidity of her underlying conviction.2 Coello, 43 F.4th at 354. As a result, the District
Court’s October 23, 2024 order dismissing her malicious prosecution claim is modified to
be without prejudice. Curry, 835 F.3d at 379.
The District Court also correctly denied Fluellen’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, because her submission did not contain any facts or argument which would
suggest that she would suffer irreparable harm or that she would ultimately succeed on
the merits of her claims. Bradley v. Pittsburg Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (3d
Cir. 1990). Fluellen’s motion for an injunction appeared to allege that two members of
the District Court’s Clerk’s Office had violated her rights in their application of Local
Rule 26.1 but does not contain any factual allegations or legal arguments beyond broad
allusions to constitutional rights.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as modified. Fluellen’s
motion to file a supplemental brief is granted.
2 The Heck bar applies “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief).”
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).

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