Rashar Brandon Williams v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-3103
__________
RASHAR BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A207-667-018)
Immigration Judge Tamar H. Wilson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 21, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2025)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Rashar Brandon Williams, a Jamaican citizen, married a United States citizen and,
in 2015, was granted permanent-resident status on a conditional basis pursuant to 8
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). His permanent resident status was terminated two years later
because Williams and his spouse did not file the requisite joint petition to remove the
conditions on his residence under § 1186a(c)(1)(A). As a result, Williams was charged
with removability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). Williams then requested that the
requirement for the filing of a joint petition be waived under § 1186a(c)(4)(B), which
permits the Attorney General to waive the requirement as a matter of discretion if the
marriage was entered into in good faith but subsequently terminated through divorce or
annulment. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the
petition. In Immigration Court, Williams renewed his request for a good-faith marriage
waiver. Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request solely in the
exercise of discretion.1 Upon de novo review, the BIA likewise concluded that Williams
did not merit a good-faith marriage waiver and dismissed the appeal. Williams petitioned
for review.
Williams raises two issues in his brief, both of which relate to drug-trafficking and
firearms charges that were pending against him in Massachusetts at the time of the
agency hearings. First, he contends that the agency erred by initiating removal
proceedings against him before his criminal charges were resolved. Williams cites no
1 Williams also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
against Torture (CAT). The IJ denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) dismissed the appeal. Williams does not challenge these rulings in his opening
brief. Therefore, they are forfeited. See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch.
Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).

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authority for this contention, and we generally lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
decision to commence removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
Second, Williams contends that the agency erred by considering the non-final
criminal charges in weighing the equities as to his waiver request. To the extent that
Williams is challenging the weight the agency attached to the police report, we lack
jurisdiction to review its exercise of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Urena–
Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). To the extent that Williams’s
argument can be construed as raising a question of law, we have jurisdiction to consider
it, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), but we conclude that it is meritless. Consistent with
agency precedent, the BIA gave “little weight” to the uncorroborated, non-final criminal
charges. See In re Arreguin De Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38, 42 (BIA 1995) (holding
that that arrest reports are entitled to “little weight” “absent a conviction or corroborating
evidence of the allegations contained therein”).
For these reasons, we will dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

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