United States of America v. Jamal Gwaltney

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-3280
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMAL GWALTNEY,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:21-cr-00180-001)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 5, 2025
Before: PHIPPS, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 5, 2026)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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ROTH, Circuit Judge
Jamal Gwaltney pleaded guilty to one count of robbery involving controlled
substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2118(a), and one count of possession of a firearm
in furtherance of robbery involving controlled substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). The District Court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment. Gwaltney now
appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred by imposing a four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). He also challenges his sentence as
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We will affirm the judgment of sentence.
I.1
On the evening of December 21, 2020, Gwaltney entered a Rite Aid in
Shrewsbury, Pennsylvania, pointed a gun at two cashiers behind the store’s front counter,
forced them to move toward the pharmacy area at the other end of the store, and made
them lie face down on the ground once there. Gwaltney then ordered the pharmacist to
open the pharmacy’s safe and fill a bag with Oxycodone and other medications from the
pharmacy’s shelves. He ultimately fled through the store’s front door after he was unable
to open the rear door.2
The Shrewsbury robbery was one of several pharmacy robberies committed in
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland between November 2019 and
1 We write primarily for the parties, so we recite only the facts essential to our decision.
2 The government contends that Gwaltney forced the pharmacist to the store’s rear door
before discovering the employee could not open it. Gwaltney denies forcing the
pharmacist to the back door with him. Because the parties’ factual dispute does not
resolve the issues before us, we need not resolve it.

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December 2020. Gwaltney and five co-conspirators were charged with multiple offenses
related to the robberies.3 After Gwaltney pleaded guilty, the District Court sentenced him
to 120 months’ imprisonment on the robbery count, plus a consecutive 84-month term on
the firearm charge, for an aggregate sentence of 204 months. The District Court rejected
the government’s request for an upward departure but assessed a 49-month upward
variance pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In calculating the
advisory Guidelines range for the robbery count, the court applied a four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) based on Gwaltney’s movement of the
Rite Aid employees during the robbery.
II.4
On appeal, Gwaltney first challenges the factual findings underlying the District
Court’s application of the abduction enhancement to his sentence because, in his view, he
did not force the robbery victims to move to a new location. Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) of
the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a four-level enhancement in robbery offenses
during which “any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to
facilitate escape.”5 We exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal
3 The government charged Gwaltney with Conspiracy to Commit Robbery Involving
Controlled Substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2118(d) (Count 1); Robbery Involving
Controlled Substances in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2118(a) (Counts 2, 3, and 5);
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Robbery Involving Controlled Substances in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 4 and 6); and Possession of a Firearm by a
Prohibited Person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 7). Counts 1-4 and Count
7 were dismissed pursuant to Gwaltney’s plea agreement.
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
5 U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4).

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interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, but review its supporting factual findings for
clear error.6 With regard to applying the abduction enhancement, we leave “the degree of
distance or definition of location . . . to the sound discretion of the District Court.”7
In United States v. Reynos, we held that the District Court did not err by applying
the abduction enhancement to defendants who, while robbing a pizza store, forced
employees to move thirty-four feet from the bathroom area to the cash register to further
the robbery.8 Reynos set forth three predicate conditions for an abduction:
First, the robbery victims must be forced to move from their original
position; such force being sufficient to permit a reasonable person an
inference that he or she is not at liberty to refuse. Second, the victims must
accompany the offender to that new location. Third, the relocation of the
robbery victims must have been to further either the commission of the crime
or the offender’s escape.9
Applying those predicates here, the District Court did not clearly err in imposing
the enhancement. Surveillance footage shows Gwaltney forcing the cashiers at gunpoint
from behind the store’s front counter to the opposite end of the store. Although the
pharmacy was located within the same building, the court reasonably viewed it as a
distinct location. Indeed, the court explained that the distance traveled by the victims
“significantly exceed[ed] the distance of the victims in Reynos,” and “include[d] the
movement of more than one victim across [a] physical barrier, namely, the store’s front
counter.”10 The court was thorough in making its findings, having “carefully” reviewed
6 United States v. Reynos, 680 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2012).
7 Id. at 287.
8 Id. at 290–91.
9 Id. at 286–87 (emphases added).
10 Appx 24.

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the videos of the incident.11 We accordingly discern no error in the District Court’s
determination.
Next, Gwaltney contends that his 204-month sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. He argues the District Court provided insufficient reasoning
for varying upward, effectively “double-counted” his criminal history, and improperly
considered the leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. We disagree.
We ordinarily review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence
for abuse of discretion.12 But because Gwaltney did not preserve his procedural
objections after the sentence was pronounced, we review those claims for plain error.13
“Absent significant procedural error, ‘we will affirm the sentence as substantively
reasonable unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence
on the particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.’”14
Here, the District Court properly calculated the appropriate Guidelines range,
considered and rejected the government’s request for an upward departure, and expressly
considered the § 3553(a) factors. In imposing the upward variance, the court emphasized
the seriousness of Gwaltney’s offenses, the terror inflicted on the victims, Gwaltney’s
extensive criminal history, and his participation in a series of similar pharmacy
11 Appx 14.
12 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).
13 See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[W]e
now hold that a defendant must raise any procedural objection to his sentence at the time
the procedural error is made . . . .”).
14 United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d
at 568) (cleaned up).

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robberies.15 Nor does the court’s isolated remark that Gwaltney was “clearly in a
leadership role in the conspiracy” show procedural error.16 The court did not apply a
leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1 to Gwaltney’s sentence, and its reference to
Gwaltney’s leadership was brief, forming only one part of a broader sentencing analysis
that focused on numerous aggravating circumstances independently supporting the
variance.
Gwaltney’s substantive challenge fares no better. The District Court properly
grounded its decision in factors it was entitled to consider under § 3553(a), provided a
well-reasoned explanation for varying upward, and imposed a sentence below the one
requested by the government. We therefore conclude that Gwaltney’s sentence is
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
sentence.
15 See also Tomko, 562 F.3d at 571 (upholding a variance where the district court
considered the defendant’s criminal history).
16 Appx 40.

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