Jasminder Singh v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-1111
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JASMINDER SINGH,
Appellant
v.
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; UR M. JADDOU, Director; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-10385)
District Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 6, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Federal prisoner Jasminder Singh appeals pro se from the District Court’s order
dismissing his complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment.
I.
It appears that, in or around September 2024, United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) lodged with Singh’s federal prison an immigration
detainer against him. Singh subsequently filed a pro se complaint in the District Court
against ICE, ICE’s Director, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and DHS’s
Secretary. The complaint took issue with the fact that the immigration-detainer form that
he received was missing the issuing immigration officer’s signature. In view of this
omission, Singh sought relief under the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), and the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”).
The District Court screened the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and, in January
2025, dismissed it with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. This timely appeal followed.1
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s decision. See Herrera v. Agents of Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 132 F.4th 248, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025). We may affirm that decision on
any basis supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam).

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II.
We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision. For one thing, Singh has
not established that the alleged omission on the immigration-detainer form, by itself,
violated his Fifth Amendment rights, especially since an immigration detainer is merely a
request to the entity housing the prisoner. See City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916
F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir.
2014) (“All Courts of Appeals to have commented on the character of ICE detainers refer
to them as ‘requests’ or as part of an ‘informal procedure.’”). Furthermore, assuming for
the sake of argument that the APA could be a viable vehicle in this context, Singh’s
attack under the APA fails because it is premised on his meritless Fifth Amendment
argument. And the DJA does not help him either, for that statute “does not . . . provide
an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction; it merely defines a remedy.” Allen
v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 444 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment.2
2 On appeal, Singh appears to claim that, because the immigration detainer has been
lodged against him, he cannot obtain relief under the First Step Act of 2018 or the Second
Chance Act of 2007. But since he did not present this claim to the District Court in the
first instance, we do not consider it here. See Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410,
416 (3d Cir. 2006).

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