Bette Eakin; Dscc; Dccc; Aft Pennsylvania v. Adams County Board of Elections

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 25-1644
_______________________
BETTE EAKIN; DSCC; DCCC; AFT PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
ALLEGHENY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
BEAVER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BEDFORD
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BERKS COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; BRADFORD COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; BUCKS COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; CAMBRIA COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS;
CAMERON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CENTRE
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CHESTER COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CLARION COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS; CLEARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; CLINTON COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF

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ELECTIONS; DAUPHIN COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; ELK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
FAYETTE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
FOREST COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FRANKLIN
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FULTON COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; HUNTINGDON COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; INDIANA COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS; JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS;
JUNIATA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LACKAWANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LAWRENCE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LEBANON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LEHIGH
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LUZERNE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
LYCOMING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
MCKEAN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MERCER
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MIFFLIN COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MONROE COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS;
MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
MONTOUR COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; PERRY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
POTTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SNYDER
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SOMERSET
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SULLIVAN

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COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; TIOGA COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; UNION COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; VENANGO COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; WESTMORELAND COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; WYOMING COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
YORK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
ARMSTRONG COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE;
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEE;
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
(Intervenors in District Court)
Appellants
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 1:22-cv-00340)
District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter
__________________________

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Argued July 1, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and SMITH, Circuit
Judges
(Filed: August 26, 2025)
Brett Graham [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street
Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Daniel B. Mullen
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1251 Waterfront Place
Mezzanine Level
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Intervenor Appellant
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Louis J. Capozzi III
E. Stewart Crosland
Benjamin Daus
John M. Gore [ARGUED]
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thomas E. Breth
Thomas W. King, III

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Dillon McCandless King Coulter & Graham
128 W. Cunningham Street
Butler, PA 16001
Kathleen A. Gallagher, Esq.
Gallagher Firm
436 Seventh Avenue
30th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Intervenor Defendant Appellants
Republican National Committee, National
Republican Congressional Committee,
Republican Party of Pennsylvania
Zachary M. Wallen
Chalmers Adams Backer & Kaufman
301 S Hills Village Drive
Suite LL200-420
Pittsburgh, PA 15241
Counsel for Amicus Appellants
Representative Jesse Topper, Kim Ward, Joe Pittman
Omeed Alerasool
Daniel J. Cohen
Richard A. Medina
Uzoma N. Nkwonta [ARGUED]
Jacob D. Shelly
Nicole E. Wittstein
Elias Law Group
250 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Suite 400

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Washington, DC 20001
Adam C. Bonin
Suite 400
121 S. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Plaintiff Appellees
Bette Eakin, AFT Pennsylvania,
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
Molly R. Mudd
Adams County Office of Solicitor
117 Baltimore Street
Gettysburg, PA 17325
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Adams County Board of Elections
Frances M. Liebenguth
Rosalyn Guy-McCorkle
Lisa G. Michel
Virginia S. Scott
Allegheny County Law Department
445 Fort Pitt Boulevard
3rd Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Allegheny County Board of Elections
Dara Burns
Amy Fitzpatrick

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Bucks County Law Department
55 E. Court Street
5th Floor
Doylestown, PA 18901
Jessica L. Vanderkam
Stuckert & Yates
2 N State Street
P.O. Box 70
Newtown, PA 18940
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Bucks County Board of Elections
Faith Mattox-Baldini
Colleen M. Frens
Office of Solicitor of Chester County
313 W. Market Street
Suite 6702
West Chester, PA 19380
Timothy J. Ford
Dilworth Paxson
1650 Market Street
Suite 1200
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Chester County Board of Elections
Maureen E. Calder
John Marlatt

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Montgomery County Office of Solicitor
One Montgomery Plaza, Suite 800
P.O. Box 311
Norristown, PA 19404
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Montgomery County Board of Elections
Melissa A. Guiddy
Suite 103
2 N Main Street
Greensburg, PA 15601
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Westmoreland County Board of Elections
Brian H. Benjet
Ilana H. Eisenstein
DLA Piper
1650 Market Street
One Liberty Place, Suite 5000
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Ben C. Fabens-Lassen
2000 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 400, North Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Michael W. Pfautz
Alison L. Stohr
Zachary G. Strassburger

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City of Philadelphia
Law Department
1515 Arch Street
15th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Defendant Appellee
Philadelphia County Board of Elections
Jacob B. Boyer [ARGUED]
Office of General Counsel
30 North Third Street
Suite 200
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Counsel for Amicus Appellee
Pennsylvania Department of State, Al Schmidt
Ari J. Savitzky
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Counsel for Amicus Appellees
Black Political Empowerment Project, Common Cause
Pennsylvania, League of Women Voters of
Pennsylvania, Power Interfaith, Pennsylvania State
Conference of the NAACP
__________________________

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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge
I. Introduction
The ballot is a building block of our democracy. Perhaps
no civic act has greater importance—or consequences—than a
citizen’s casting of a ballot. Our Constitution calls upon the
States to regulate the mechanics of how its citizens cast their
ballots so that those citizens may meaningfully express their
voices in what George Washington once called “the last great
experiment [in] promoting human happiness.”1 But our
Constitution also calls upon the Courts to scrutinize such
regulations to ensure they do not unduly burden voters’ voices.
This inquiry is often a difficult one. It requires a court to
balance the State’s constitutionally mandated duty against its
citizens’ constitutionally protected right. But “there is ‘no
substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.’”
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789–90 (1983) (quoting
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
This appeal asks us to make one such hard judgment. We
must determine if the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s
requirement that mail-in ballots that arrive in undated or
misdated return envelopes be discarded complies with our
1 Letter from George Washington to Catharine Sawbridge
Macaulay Graham (Jan. 9, 1790) (on file with the National
Archives).

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Constitution. Weighing the burden that practice imposes on
Pennsylvanians’ constitutional right to vote against the State’s
interest in the practice, the balance of the scales leads us to hold
that it does not comply with our Constitution. We therefore
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
II. Facts
a. History of Mail-in Voting in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania
Voting by mail first became a component of Pennsylvania’s
electoral system when the General Assembly adopted the
Commonwealth’s Election Code in 1937. Act of June 3, 1937,
Pub. L. 1333, No. 320. The Code permitted some members of
the military to vote by absentee ballot. Id. §§ 1301, 1327–30.2
Per the Code, military absentee ballots were timely so long as
a voter completed his absentee ballot on or before Election
Day, regardless of when a county board of elections (“county
2 Specifically, Pennsylvania provided for what were called
“Detached Soldier’s Ballots” for qualified Pennsylvanians
serving in the military who were “members of companies of
another state or territory” or were separated from their proper
unit in such a manner “as shall render it probable that they will
be unable to rejoin their proper unit or to be present at their
proper place of election on or before the day of any election.”
Id. §§ 1327–28. A soldier would complete a Detached
Soldier’s Ballot and place it into an envelope printed with “the
affidavit of the [voter], together with the jurat of the officer in
whose presence the ballot is marked and before whom the
affidavit is made.” Id. § 1328. The Code did not require that
either the affidavit or the jurat contain a date. See id. § 1329.

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election board”)3 received the ballot. Id. § 1329.4 To give
county election boards a means to determine when a voter
completed an absentee ballot, Pennsylvania amended the
Election Code in 1945 to require that the return envelopes
containing absentee ballots be dated upon completion. Act of
Mar. 9, 1945, Pub. L. 29, No. 17, § 10 (amending § 1306).5 A
3 The Act of June 3, 1937 required each county of the
Commonwealth to establish a “county board of elections” that
would “have jurisdiction over the conduct of primaries and
elections in such county.” Id. § 301(a) (codified today at 25
P.S. § 2641(a)). These boards remain responsible for
administering many aspects of Pennsylvania’s elections today,
including accepting applications for mail-in and absentee
ballots, sending mail-in and absentee ballots to voters, and
receiving and canvassing mail-in and absentee ballots. E.g., 25
P.S. §§ 3146.2(a), 3146.6(a), 3150.12a(a), 3150.15,
3150.16(a).
4 If any member of the military voted in the election,
Pennsylvania’s Election Code required county election boards
to delay final vote tallies until the third Friday after an election
“within which period all returns of votes cast by electors of the
county in military service . . . shall be added . . . and included.”
Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. 1333, No. 320, § 1317.
5 From 1941 to 1945, county election boards relied on the
postmark of return envelopes to determine timeliness. See Act
of August 1, 1941, Pub. L. 672, No. 273, § 4 (requiring county
election boards to examine return envelopes containing
military ballots and “set aside unopened all such envelopes
which bear a postmark later than the date of the particular
election day involved”) (amending § 1307).

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ballot was timely if its return envelope bore a date on or before
Election Day, and untimely if the return envelope bore a date
which fell after Election Day. See id. (amending § 1307).
Consistent with that design, the Election Code directed county
election boards to “set aside,” i.e., not count, those ballots
contained within return envelopes bearing a date later than that
of the election. Id.
Absentee voting was extended to the broader public in
certain enumerated circumstances in 1963. Act of Aug. 13,
1963, Pub. L. 707, No. 379, § 20.6 Pennsylvania then changed
its criteria for determining an absentee ballot’s timeliness in
1968, making an absentee ballot’s timeliness hinge on whether
a county election board received it by Election Day instead of
whether a voter had completed it by Election Day. Act of Dec.
11, 1968 (“1968 Act”), Pub. L. 1183, No. 375, § 8 (amending
§ 1308(a)). The amended Election Code required that voters
place their absentee ballots inside a return envelope which bore
a declaration that included a date and signature field. Id.
(amending § 1304). It further instructed that an “elector shall
6 Section 20 of the 1963 amendment established categories of
“qualified absentee electors” who could vote by mail. This
included any qualified elector who was absent from his or her
state or county of residence and was a spouse or dependent of
a person in the military, a qualified elector who was part of a
religious or welfare group attached to the armed forces and was
absent from his or her state or county of residence, or any
qualified elector who was unable to make it to the polls due to
illness or physical disability, to name a few examples. Id.
(amending § 1301(a)–(l)).

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. . . fill out, date[,] and sign the declaration.” Id. (amending §
1306). Notably, the General Assembly removed the explicit
requirement that county election boards “set aside” ballots with
missing or incorrect dates. Compare Act of Aug. 13, 1963,
Pub. L. 707, No. 379, § 24 (including in § 1308(c) of Election
Code the requirement that county election boards set aside
envelopes bearing a date after an election); with 1968 Act § 8
(amending § 1308(c) to remove the requirement that county
election boards set aside envelopes bearing a date after an
election). Consistent with that amendment, county election
boards counted absentee ballots with missing or incorrect dates
for the next half-century. That practice changed, however,
soon after the General Assembly passed the Act of Oct. 31,
2019, Pub. L. 552, No. 77, commonly referred to as “Act 77.”
b. Act 77
Act 77 was the product of a bipartisan majority7 that
enacted universal mail-in voting for the first time in
Pennsylvania’s history. 25 P.S. § 3150.11(a). As part of the
enactment, Act 77 included robust anti-fraud measures,
prescribed a comprehensive process for Pennsylvanians to
7 House Roll Call Vote Summary, Details for RCS No. 781, PA.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.palegis.us/house/roll-
calls/summary?sessYr=2019&sessInd=0&rcNum=781
[https://perma.cc/D4QP-LB3V]; Senate Roll Call Vote
Summary, Details for RCS No. 311, PA. STATE SENATE (Oct.
29, 2019), https://www.palegis.us/senate/roll-
calls/summary?sessYr=2019&sessInd=0&rcNum=311
[https://perma.cc/8S6H-CHWA].

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apply to vote by mail, and tasked the Secretary of State with
designing a declaration form that would appear on all return
envelopes. E.g., 25 P.S. §§ 3150.12, 3150.14(b), 3150.15.
Pennsylvania’s election code maintained its provisions
allowing certain individuals to vote by absentee ballot, which
also contained anti-fraud measures, outlined a specific process
for absentee voters to submit their ballots, and tasked the
Secretary of State with designing the declaration form on
return envelopes. E.g., id. §§ 3146.2, 3146.4, 3146.5.8
Measures aimed at safeguarding the integrity of elections
include verification of voter IDs that accompany mail-in ballot
applications, 25 P.S. §§ 3146.2b(c), 3150.12b(c); criminal
penalties for false registration, 25 P.S. § 3552; a challenge
process to dispute a voter’s qualifications to vote by mail, 25
PA. CONST. STAT. § 1329; voter roll maintenance procedures,
25 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1222; timely-return deadlines, 25 P.S.
§§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a); a requirement that county election
boards maintain and make public records concerning electors
who apply for a mail-in ballot, 25 P.S. §§ 3146.9, 3150.17; and
post-election audits, 25 P.S. § 3031.17.
Additionally, Act 77 established a comprehensive process
for voting by mail. A voter must first apply to the county
election board, submitting a copy of a photo ID together with
his or her name, address, date of birth, and length of residency
in the voting district, among other information. 25 P.S. §§
3146.2, 3150.12(b). By law, the application for a mail-in ballot
must inform voters that they may not vote in person if they
8 For purposes of this opinion, we refer to absentee and mail-
in ballots or voters collectively as “mail-in” ballots or voters.

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have applied to vote by mail unless they bring with them to the
polling place their mail-in ballots and remit them. 25 P.S. §§
3146.2(i)(1), 3150.12(f).
Upon receipt, a county election board determines if the
voter meets the four eligibility criteria to vote in Pennsylvania,
requiring that the voter be: (1) at least 18 years old on Election
Day; (2) a U.S. citizen for at least one month before Election
Day; (3) a resident of his or her election district for at least 30
days; and (4) not currently incarcerated for a felony conviction.
PA. CONST. ART. VII § 1; 25 P.S. § 2811. To determine
eligibility, county election boards compare the application to
vote by mail against the voter’s registration data in the
Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (“SURE”) system—a
database of registered voters.9 25 P.S. §§ 3146.2b, 3150.12b;
25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1222.
If a mail-in voter application is approved, the county
election board provides the applicant with a mail ballot, a
9 More specifically, the SURE system is “[t]he integrated voter
registration system of all registered electors in [the]
Commonwealth.” 25 P.S. § 3150.1. In addition to including a
database of all registered voters, the SURE system permits the
auditing of registered voters’ registration records, identifies the
district to which a voter should be assigned, identifies duplicate
voter registrations on a countywide and Statewide basis,
identifies voters who have been issued a mail-in ballot,
identifies electors who voted and the means by which they
voted, and allows election officials to obtain a copy of a wallet-
sized identification card submitted by the voter. 25 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1222(c)(1), (11), (15), (17), (19)–(21).

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secrecy envelope, and a larger, pre-addressed return envelope.
25 P.S. §§ 3146.4, 3150.14. The voter then marks the ballot,
seals it within the secrecy envelope, and places the secrecy
envelope within the return envelope. 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a),
3150.16(a). Each return envelope contains a SURE system
barcode that is unique to each voter and each election year.
Additionally, the return envelope includes a declaration that
the voter is qualified to vote and has not already voted, along
with spaces for the voter to sign and date the declaration. As a
voter’s final step before mailing in the completed ballot, the
voter must sign and date the declaration on the spaces provided
on the return envelope. The date should represent the date on
which the voter actually completed the declaration. 25 P.S. §§
3146.6(a), 3150.16(a).
By Pennsylvania law, a ballot is timely only if the county
election board receives it before 8 p.m. on Election Day. 25
P.S. §§ 3146.6(c), 3150.16(c). Hence, the Election Code
requires county election boards to record the date and time they
receive each mail-in ballot. 25 P.S. §§ 3146.9(b)(5),
3150.17(b)(5). Upon receipt, county election boards date
stamp or otherwise physically notate the time of receipt on the
return envelope provided by the county election board. County
election boards then scan the barcode on the return envelope,
thereby entering the time it was received into the SURE
system. Appellees Phila., Allegheny, Bucks, Chester, and
Montg. Cnty. Election Bds. Br. (“Counties Br.”) at 6.
Additionally, county election boards often physically
segregate timely ballots from untimely ballots.
c. The Date Requirement

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Act 77 retained language from the Election Code which
required that voters shall “fill out, date and sign” the
declaration on return envelopes. 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a);
3150.16(a). Construing this language as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
determined that it requires county election boards to discard
return envelopes (and the ballots contained therein) with a
missing or incorrect date. In re Canvass of Absentee and Mail-
in Ballots of November 3, 2020 General Election (“2020
General Election”), 241 A.3d 1058, 1079, 1090 (Pa. 2020);
Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 1, 21–22 (Pa. 2023).10 Pursuant
to this “date requirement,” if a return envelope’s date field
contains a mistaken additional digit, a stray pen mark, or
missing information (including a year) then the ballot
contained within that envelope may not be counted. Ball, 289
10 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has seven justices. In
2020 General Election, the three-justice Opinion Announcing
the Judgment of the Court stated that county election boards
could count ballots contained in return envelopes that lacked
dates. 241 A.3d at 1076, 1078. Nevertheless, four justices
filed or joined concurring and dissenting opinions stating that
county election boards could not count ballots contained in
return envelopes with missing dates. Id. at 1079 (Wecht, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 1090 (Dougherty, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Chapman, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that “an
undeniable majority” of the court in 2020 General Election had
determined “that undated ballots would not be counted.” 289
A.3d at 21. Chapman also held that ballots in incorrectly dated
return envelopes could not be counted, either. Id. at 23.

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A.3d at 21–23; see, e.g., Supp. App. 175–84; Amicus Pa. State
Conf. of the NAACP et al. Br., at 9, 17–21 (providing examples
of ballots rejected due to the date requirement).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that county election boards need not provide notice to a mail-
in voter that her ballot has been rejected because it did not
conform to the date requirement. Pa. Democratic Party v.
Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 374 (Pa. 2020). Nor is that voter
entitled to cure the date deficiency. Id. Some, but not all, of
Pennsylvania’s county election boards provide no notice to
voters if their ballots have been rejected due to having failed to
meet the date requirement. E.g., Supp. App. 73–74; Eakin Br.
at 36. This inconsistent practice of notifying voters when they
have submitted a noncompliant envelope results in some voters
being able to resubmit a ballot, while others do not have their
votes counted due to this technicality.
d. Ramifications of the Date Requirement
Failure to conform with the date requirement caused over
10,000 ballots to be discarded in the 2022 General Election.
Responding to that more-than-negligible figure, Governor Josh
Shapiro’s administration redesigned the return envelope
format. Shapiro Administration Announces 57% Decrease in
Mail Ballots Rejected in 2024 General Election (“Shapiro
Administration”), COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (Jan.
24, 2025),
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/newsroom/shapiro-
administration-announces-57--decrease-in-mail-ballots-re
[perma.cc/QV2Q-NXVL]. The redesigned return envelope
was used for the first time in 2024 with notable results. Id. It

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culminated in a 57% drop in the rejection of mail ballots. Id.
Overall, only 23% of rejected mail-in ballots, or 0.064% of
total votes cast, were rejected due to some failure to meet the
date requirement. Id. That still means that roughly 4,500
eligible Pennsylvania voters who made the effort to vote by
mail in 2024 had their ballots discarded due to a missing or
incorrect date. Id.
e. Procedural History
Plaintiff-appellee Bette Eakin is a Pennsylvania resident
who had her mail-in ballot rejected during the 2022 general
election after she failed to write a date on her return envelope.
Joined by various entities affiliated with the Democratic
party11 and a federation of teachers,12 Eakin filed suit against
the county election boards of all 67 Pennsylvania counties,
alleging the date requirement violated the Materiality
Provision of the Civil Rights Act13 and the First and Fourteenth
11 Those entities included the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee (“DSCC”) and the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (“DCCC”).
12 AFT Pennsylvania “is the Pennsylvania affiliate of the
American Federation of Teachers and a union of professionals
representing approximately 25,117 members in 55 local
affiliates across Pennsylvania.” Supp. App. 7.
13 Codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B), the “Materiality
Provision” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits any person
acting under color of law from denying another’s right to vote
because of an “error or omission” on paperwork that relates “to
any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting” if

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Amendments of the Constitution. The lawsuit was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The District Court granted leave to intervene to a group of
Republican party entities: the Republican National Committee,
the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the
Republican Party of Pennsylvania (collectively the “RNC”).
Dist. Ct. Dkt., ECF 165 (Jan. 6, 2023). The District Court also
notified the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of the lawsuit in
June of 2024, but the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney
General opted not to intervene. Dist. Ct. Dkt., ECF No. 383
(June 18, 2024). Although Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit by
naming as defendants the county election boards of all 67
counties that comprise the Commonwealth, only two defendant
county election boards defended the date requirement: Berks
County and Lancaster County. The case proceeded to
discovery, producing voluminous pages of interrogatories,
depositions, and other documents. The parties then filed cross
motions for summary judgment.
Addressing the dispositive motions, the District Court first
determined that Eakin’s argument under the Materiality
Provision was foreclosed by our decision in Pennsylvania State
Conference of NAACP Branches v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“NAACP”), 97 F.4th 120 (3d
Cir. 2024). There, we determined that the Materiality
Provision of the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B),
“is triggered when conduct or laws restrict who may vote” but
leaves “to the States to decide how qualified voters must cast a
the error or omission is “not material in determining whether
[an] individual is qualified” to vote.

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valid ballot.” NAACP, 97 F.4th at 130. Because the date
requirement is embedded in the act of casting a ballot, we
determined that it falls outside the Materiality Provision’s
scope. Id. at 135.
Second, the District Court held that the date requirement
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on our
decision in Mazo v. New Jersey Secretary of State, 54 F.4th
124 (3d Cir. 2022), the District Court reasoned that the
Anderson-Burdick framework (“Anderson-Burdick”) applied
because the date requirement burdened the right to vote and
primarily regulated the mechanics of the electoral process. The
District Court next proceeded to weigh the burden imposed by
the date requirement against the justifications for it advanced
by the RNC and Berks County.14 In applying Anderson-
Burdick, the District Court concluded that the date requirement
imposed a minimal burden on Pennsylvanians’ right to vote,
reasoning that it is easy to date an envelope and that the
requirement is non-discriminatory. Yet the District Court
concluded that none of the proffered State interests advanced
to support the date requirement—enhancing election
efficiency, promoting solemnity, or preventing voter fraud—
justified the burden the date requirement imposed. The District
Court highlighted that the RNC and Berks County had failed
to adduce any evidence in support of the asserted interests in
enhancing election efficiency or promoting solemnity.
14 Although the Lancaster County Election Board opposed
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, its motion for summary judgment did not
identify interests that purported to justify the date requirement.
ECF No. 280 (Apr. 21, 2023).

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23
The District Court also emphasized that the RNC had
produced only a single criminal case of voting fraud which
involved a mail-in ballot: Commonwealth v. Mihaliak, No. MJ-
2202-CR-126-22 (Pa. Mag. Dist. Ct. 2022). In that criminal
prosecution, a woman was convicted on charges relating to her
having completed and mailed her recently deceased mother’s
ballot to the county election board of Lancaster County. The
fraud was easily detected because, by the time the county
received the ballot, it had already removed the decedent from
the voter rolls. The county election board discounted the ballot
after scanning the barcode on the return envelope, causing the
SURE system to flag the ballot as invalid because the
registered voter was deceased. Thus, the District Court
determined that Mihaliak did not support the RNC’s position.
Notably, the SURE system, and not the date on the return
envelope, is what alerted the County to the fraud. The District
Court then highlighted that the Lancaster County Board of
Election’s Chief Clerk, Christa Miller, had admitted in a
deposition that “an outer envelope that is missing a hand-
written date is no reason to suspect voter fraud.”
Concluding that none of the proffered State interests
justified the burden the date requirement imposed, the District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Eakin and
enjoined Pennsylvania’s county election boards from
discarding ballots contained in return envelopes with missing
or incorrect dates. Important to a full understanding of this
case, nothing in the District Court’s order prevents the
Commonwealth or county election boards from including a
date field in the declaration on return envelopes. The order
merely prevents county election boards from discarding mail-

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24
in ballots based on how a voter fills in the date field on the
return envelope’s declaration.
The RNC timely appealed the District Court’s order
granting Eakin’s motion for summary judgment. No county
election board has joined this appeal on the side of the RNC.
After the RNC appealed, the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth sought to intervene to defend the date
requirement.15 We granted that motion.
III. Standard of Review
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. N.J.
Bankers Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 49 F.4th 849, 854 (3d Cir.
2022). Summary judgment “is appropriate where ‘there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)).
IV. Jurisdiction
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Eakin’s claim arose out of a federal
statute and the U.S. Constitution. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the District Court’s
final judgment.
15 Pennsylvania voters elected a new attorney general in
November of 2024. Angela Couloumbis, Republican Dave
Sunday Wins Attorney General Race in Pennsylvania, Beating
Eugene DePasquale, SPOTLIGHT PA (Nov. 6, 2024).

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V. Discussion
This appeal asks us to determine whether Pennsylvania’s
requirement that county election boards discard mail-in ballots
sent to them in return envelopes with missing or incorrect dates
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We agree with
the District Court that it does, and we will affirm.
a. An Overview of Anderson-Burdick
Voting rights cases sit at the juncture of two competing
interests. First, “voting is of the most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure.” Ill. State Bd. Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). The
general right to vote is “implicit in our constitutional system.”
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78
(1973). And the courts afford special protections for this
“precious” and “fundamental” right. Harper v. Va. State Bd.
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
Yet secondly, the right to vote in any manner is not absolute.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). The Constitution
establishes the States’ prerogative to prescribe the “Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Furthermore,
“[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the
conclusion that . . . ‘as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at
433 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).

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26
Because of these important—yet sometimes conflicting—
interests at stake in voting rights cases, the Supreme Court
developed the Anderson-Burdick framework (also called the
Anderson-Burdick balancing test or simply “Anderson-
Burdick”), which derives from the cases Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428 (1992). The test requires a weighing of the burden
imposed on a voter’s constitutional rights by a voting law or
regulation against the State’s legitimate interest in the law,
thereby allowing a court to factor in both interests before
reaching a final determination. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
The test proceeds in two steps. At step one, a court
determines the nature and extent of the burden that a
challenged voting law imposes on a constitutional right,
weighing “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at
789. Burdick acknowledges that an election law “invariably”
places some burden on the right to vote. Burdick, 504 U.S. at
433. And precedent clarifies several factors that we consider
in assessing a law’s burden.16
At step two, a court weighs the burden against “the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). A court applying Anderson-
Burdick “must not only determine the legitimacy and strength
of [the State’s] interests; it also must consider the extent to
16 See infra Pt. V(c).

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27
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
The touchstone of this analysis “is its flexibility in
weighing competing interests.” Ohio Democratic Party v.
Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016). A more burdensome
law invites a proportionally more searching scrutiny.17 But
Anderson-Burdick is not without clear guideposts. A law that
imposes a “severe” burden on voting rights must meet strict
scrutiny. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351, 358 (1997). “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less
exacting review, and a State’s ‘important regulatory interests’
will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.’” Id. (quoting Burdick, 504
U.S. at 434).
Our precedent instructs that we apply Anderson-Burdick to
evaluate voting laws that both burden a “relevant constitutional
right” and “primarily regulate the mechanics of the electoral
process.”18 Mazo, 54 F.4th at 138; see also Crawford v. Marion
17 See Fish v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1124 (10th Cir. 2020);
Ariz. Green Party v. Reagan, 838 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2016);
Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 592
(6th Cir. 2012).
18 The Commonwealth, as Intervenor, alleges that Anderson-
Burdick does not apply to claims that do not implicate “the
ability to express oneself nor the ability to associate.”
Commonwealth Opening Br. at 13. Mazo forecloses this
argument. 54 F.4th at 140 (recognizing that Anderson-Burdick
applies broadly to claims implicating many different

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28
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (plurality opinion) (stating that we use Anderson-
Burdick to evaluate laws respecting the right to vote, “whether
it governs voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the
voting process”).19 The relevant burden need not be severe.
Numerous cases analyzing election laws—including Mazo—
have applied Anderson-Burdick to voting laws that imposed
constitutional rights and “is not limited to laws that burden free
association”).
19 Here, the date requirement meets the two elements identified
in Mazo. First, Mazo squarely holds that the “right to vote” is
a “relevant constitutional right” to which Anderson-Burdick
applies. Mazo, 54 F.4th at 138. The date requirement burdens
this right by requiring county election boards to discard ballots
in envelopes with missing dates or those containing even minor
errors in the handwritten date. See, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for the
Homeless v. Husted (“NEOH”), 837 F.3d 612, 632 (6th Cir.
2016) (applying Anderson-Burdick to evaluate law mandating
“technical precision in the address and birthdate fields of the
absentee-ballot identification envelope”), abrogated on other
grounds recognized by Tenn. Conf. of Nat’l Ass’n for
Advancement of Colored People v. Lee, 139 F.4th 557, 563
(6th Cir. 2025); Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee
(“Lee”), 915 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying
Anderson-Burdick to evaluate policy of rejecting ballots based
on how a voter wrote his or her signature). Second, the date
requirement primarily regulates “mechanics of the electoral
process,” by requiring voters to include certain information
with their ballots for their votes to be counted. See Mazo, 54
F.4th at 140–41.

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29
only a minimal burden on voting rights. See, e.g., Crawford,
553 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that a law
was constitutional because the State’s interests were “sufficient
to sustain [the law’s] minimal burden” (emphasis added));
Mazo, 54 F.4th at 153 (determining a law’s burden was
minimal and proceeding to step two of Anderson-Burdick).
Moreover, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Crawford
instructed that “[h]owever slight [a] burden may appear . . ., it
must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests.”
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, as
Mazo instructed, Anderson-Burdick does not apply to voting
laws that impose only a de minimis burden on constitutional
rights. 54 F.4th at 138–39.
With this background in mind, we first address Appellants’
argument that Anderson-Burdick does not apply to the matter
at hand.
b. Anderson-Burdick Can Apply to Regulations of
Mail-in Voting
Appellants argue that Anderson-Burdick is inapplicable to
this case because the right to vote does not extend to voting by
mail. Their argument relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). There, the Supreme Court
denied a claim by pre-trial detainees that the State’s refusal to
grant them absentee ballots violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 Id. at 803, 811. The
20 Prior to Anderson-Burdick, courts addressed voting rights
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. If a litigant could

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30
Court reasoned that the detainees had not introduced evidence
showing that the State would not bring them to the polls on
Election Day, leading the Court to comment that “[i]t is thus
not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to
receive absentee ballots.” Id. at 807–08.21 Relying on
show that an election law either invidiously discriminated or
infringed the fundamental right to vote, then strict scrutiny
applied. Harper v. Va. State Bd. Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–
67, 670 (1966) (determining a law invidiously discriminated
and applying strict scrutiny); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964) (“[A]ny alleged infringement of the right of citizens
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”); see
also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7 (discussing the
“fundamental rights” strand of equal protection analysis).
Otherwise, rational basis review applied. McDonald, 394 U.S.
at 807–09. Some courts continue to apply Anderson-Burdick
to challenges to state laws on Equal Protection grounds. E.g.,
Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2012)
(applying Anderson-Burdick in Equal Protection Clause
lawsuit, noting, “when a state regulation is found to treat voters
differently in a way that burdens the fundamental right to vote,
the Anderson–Burdick standard applies”).
21 Later Supreme Court cases construed McDonald as
“rest[ing] on failure of proof.” O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524, 529 (1974). In another case with facts similar to those in
McDonald, the Court determined that a State’s failure to
provide pre-trial detainees absentee ballots did violate the
Constitution because the inmates showed the State would not
provide them alternative means of voting. Goosby v. Osser,
409 U.S. 512, 521–22 (1973).

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31
McDonald, Appellants argue that a State does not deny the
right to vote by limiting or regulating mail-in voting so long as
a State preserves the right to vote in person.22 Because
Pennsylvanians who fail to comply with the date requirement
may vote in person, they argue, the date requirement cannot
operate to deny the right to vote. Accordingly, they contend,
Anderson-Burdick does not apply here. We reject that
argument.
The fact that Pennsylvanians may not have a constitutional
right to vote by mail is not dispositive of whether the date
requirement violates the Constitution. Supreme Court
precedent has recognized that, even if its citizens did not have
a right to a franchise in the first place, a State may not grant a
franchise in such a way that violates the Constitution. For
example, there is no First Amendment right to vote for
members of a school board, so a state entity may appoint school
board members without an election. Sailors v. Bd. of Ed. of
Kent Cnty., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967). Nevertheless, a
State violates the right to vote by providing for popular election
of school board members while at the same time providing that
some “bona fide residents” may vote while others may not.
22 At one point in its brief, the RNC argues that “a rule cannot
impose a severe burden on the right to vote where the State
makes available another method of voting exempt from the
rule.” RNC Opening Br. at 43. We decline here to summon
up the range of hypothetical regulations that might severely
burden the mail-in voter were courts to indulge States in the
broad exercise of discretion that Appellants seem willing to
grant them.

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32
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969). There is likewise no First Amendment right to a ballot
initiative. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988). Yet a
State violates the First Amendment by permitting ballot
initiatives to be held but only in a manner that unduly burdens
associational rights. Id. at 424–25, 428 (striking down a law
prohibiting citizens from paying someone to circulate a ballot
initiative and rejecting the argument that “because the power
of the initiative is a state-created right, it is free to impose [any]
limitations on the exercise of that right”); Buckley v. Am. Const.
L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186, 204–05 (1999) (striking
down several conditions a State placed on the ballot-initiative
process); Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir.
2009) (noting that, “as the Supreme Court has recognized, if a
[S]tate chooses to confer the right of referendum to its citizens,
it is ‘obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the
Constitution’” (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420)).
So too here. Even if no First Amendment right to vote by
mail exists, we still must scrutinize Pennsylvania’s mail-in
voting regime to ensure that it complies with the Constitution.
As the Supreme Court has instructed in the Equal Protection
context, “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the . . .
Fourteenth Amendment.” Harper, 383 U.S. at 665.
Any other rule would have severe ramifications for the
democratic process. A State could induce its citizens to vote
by mail, yet proceed to discard countless ballots for any
number of reasons unrelated to a voter’s qualifications or the
State’s legitimate interests. Especially as mail-in voting
becomes increasingly popular throughout our nation, see, e.g.,

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33
Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs, 18 F.4th 1179, 1181 (9th
Cir. 2021), we do not think the Constitution countenances such
an outcome.23
Constitutional scrutiny applies for the independent reason
that a Pennsylvanian who fails to comply with the date
requirement cannot vote in person. Pennsylvania law provides
that a voter who receives a mail-in ballot may not vote at the
polls unless he or she brings the mail-in ballot to the polls and
remits it. 25 P.S. §§ 3146.2(i)(1), 3150.12(f). A voter loses
that option once that voter mails in a ballot. It is false to claim,
23 This conclusion finds support in the Second, Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, which have all applied Anderson-
Burdick to mail-voting regulations. Democratic Exec. Comm.
of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2019);
Hobbs, 18 F.4th at 1186–87 (9th Cir.); NEOH, 837 F.3d at
631–34; Price v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d
101, 107–09 (2d Cir. 2008). The Eighth Circuit noted that the
right to vote does not extend to voting by mail but still
proceeded to apply Anderson-Burdick to a challenge
concerning a mail-voting regulation. Org. for Black Struggle
v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 607–09 (8th Cir. 2020). And the
Fifth Circuit expressly disavowed whether it was deciding if
Anderson-Burdick should apply to a challenge concerning
mail-in voting based on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Tex.
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 194 (5th Cir. 2020).
The Seventh Circuit held that Anderson-Burdick did not apply
to a challenge to a law imposing a deadline to receive absentee
ballots. Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 977 F.3d 663, 664
(7th Cir. 2020) (applying rational basis review).

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34
then, that a Pennsylvanian who has chosen to vote by mail may
simply vote in person if he or she fails to comply with the date
requirement. Instead, that person’s ballot will be discounted—
potentially without notice or any opportunity to correct the
ballot. See Boockvar, 238 A.3d at 374.
We will, therefore, apply Anderson-Burdick and must look
to its first step by assessing the character and extent of the
burden that the date requirement imposes on a Pennsylvania
voter’s constitutional rights.
c. The Date Requirement Imposes a Minimal
Burden on Voting Rights
At Anderson-Burdick’s first step, we examine the nature
and extent of the burden the date requirement imposes on First
and Fourteenth Amendment protected rights. Precedent has
delineated several, non-exhaustive considerations that bear on
this inquiry. They include: (1) can voters comply with a voting
law with ease;24 (2) does the law disproportionately limit
political participation “by an identifiable political group whose
members share a particular viewpoint, associational
preference, or economic status”;25 (3) are there alternative
24 Hobbs, 18 F.4th at 1189 (defining the burden of signing an
affidavit that accompanies a mail-in ballot as “the small burden
of signing the affidavit or, if the voter fails to sign, of correcting
the missing signature by election day”).
25 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793; see id. at 793–94 (“A burden that
falls unequally on new or small political parties or on
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on
associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It

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35
means for affected voters to vindicate the interest burdened by
a challenged law;26 (4) have the challengers provided evidence
of specific unconstitutional applications of the law, including
data of voters affected by a law;27 and (5) what are the impacts
of the voting law?28
Weighing these factors, we hold that the date requirement
imposes a minimal burden on voting rights. Although it may
seem easy to place a date on a return envelope—and there is
no evidence that the date requirement disproportionately limits
political participation by a defined political group—the date
discriminates against those candidates and—of particular
importance—against those voters whose political preferences
lie outside the existing political parties.”).
26 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363 (holding that a law that prevented
independent parties from listing a major party candidate as
their candidate reduced an independent party’s ability to
convey support for major candidates, but that the burden was
reduced because the “party retains great latitude in its ability to
communicate ideas to voters and candidates through its
participation in the campaign” process); see also Burdick, 504
U.S. at 435–36 (reasoning that a Hawaii law prohibiting write-
in ballots was less burdensome because Hawaii provided
multiple mechanisms for candidates to appear on the ballot).
27 Mazo, 54 F.4th at 152 (“Evidence is key to the balancing of
interests at the heart of the Anderson-Burdick framework.”).
28 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790 (looking at impact of law in
assessing its burden); Fish, 957 F.3d at 1127–28 (considering
the number of applicants that were prevented from registering
to vote when assessing burden).

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36
requirement caused county election boards to discard over
10,000 ballots in the 2022 general election. Appellants
highlight that this number dropped in the 2024 election after
the Shapiro Administration revised the declaration form that
appears on return envelopes, and that “only 0.064% percent
[sic] of all ballots cast were rejected under the date requirement
[in 2024].” RNC Opening Br. at 34. But that still amounts to
4,500 ballots rejected due to some failure to meet the date
requirement. See Shapiro Administration, supra; Presidential
Election (Official Returns), COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA (Nov. 5, 2024),
https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/VoteByMethod?
officeId=1&districtId=1&ElectionID=105&ElectionType=G
&IsActive=0&isRetention=0 [https://perma.cc/3M66-
UGCA].
Moreover, in its Motion to Expedite, the RNC contended
that a district court’s enjoining county election boards from
discarding ballots contained in return envelopes that did not
comply with the date requirement in 2022 caused “a
Republican incumbent [to lose] his office because undated
mail ballots were counted.”29 Hence, despite its argument that
a low percentage of ballots were rejected due to the date
requirement, the RNC itself acknowledges that the date
requirement can result in the rejection of a number of ballots
29 App. Dkt., No. 35 (Apr. 17, 2025), RNC Mot. to Expedite at
2; see id. (“Indeed, three Republican candidates since 2020
have lost elections solely because undated mail ballots were
counted.”). The RNC has not clarified which offices its
candidates lost due to undated ballots being counted.

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37
sufficient to affect the composition of elected governing
bodies.
Additionally, an individual Pennsylvania voter who fails to
comply with the date requirement potentially has no means to
correct the deficiency and cast a valid ballot. Pennsylvania
county election boards have no obligation under the Election
Code to notify voters if their ballots are rejected for failure to
comply with the date requirement. Boockvar, 238 A.3d at 374.
Pennsylvania law provides that a voter who received a mail-in
ballot cannot vote in person unless the voter brings his or her
mail-in ballot to the polling place and remits it. 25 P.S. §§
3146.2(i)(1), 3150.12(f). Millions of Pennsylvania voters
since 2019 have taken the time to apply for and receive mail-
in ballots.30 In submitting them to county election boards, they
surely believed they had completed those ballots correctly. But
despite these voters’ best efforts, their ballots may be rejected
for something as trivial as a stray mark on the date field. See
Chapman, 289 A.3d at 28. Voters who do not know that their
mail-in ballots have been rejected can hardly be expected to
find a way to cure a deficiency on the return envelope. And
they cannot vote in person because they cannot remit a mail-in
ballot they already mailed to county offices. 25 P.S. §§
3146.2(i)(1), 3150.12(f).
Because the date requirement causes thousands of ballots
to be discarded and can leave voters without a means to cast a
valid ballot, we conclude that the date requirement imposes a
30 See, e.g., Presidential Election (Official Returns), supra
(showing that almost two million people voted by mail in
Pennsylvania during the 2024 election alone).

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38
minimal burden on Pennsylvania voters’ rights protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Appellants marshal two arguments challenging this
conclusion. The first is that the date requirement imposes only
a de minimis burden—not a minimal burden—and hence
escapes Anderson-Burdick entirely, per Mazo. See Mazo, 54
F.4th at 138–39 (commenting that Anderson-Burdick “does not
apply . . . where the burden on a constitutional right is no more
than de minimis”). This argument fails because a de minimis
burden is one that has merely a speculative impact on and
connection to voting rights.31 The date requirement does not
31 Mazo cited three cases for the proposition that a voting law
that imposes only a de minimis burden is not subject to
Anderson-Burdick. 54 F.4th at 139 n.10 (citing Molinari v.
Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 606 (2d Cir. 2009), Rodriguez v.
Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 12 (1982), and
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 584 (2005)). Molinari and
Rodriguez both involved a speculative impact on
constitutionally protected rights. In Molinari v. Bloomberg, the
Second Circuit highlighted that litigants challenging a law
permitting the City Council and Mayor of New York City to
enact laws amending the City Charter and extending term
limits “are not in any way restricted from engaging in First
Amendment activity” by the challenged law. 564 F.3d at 599.
In Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, a case decided
before Anderson-Burdick, the Supreme Court upheld a law
permitting the Governor of Puerto Rico to make interim
appointments to Puerto Rico’s legislature. 457 U.S. at 3.
Crucially, no law provided a right to vote for interim

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39
impose a de minimis burden because its impact on and
connection to voting rights is not speculative: A Pennsylvania
mail-in voter who fails to comply with the date requirement
will not have his or her vote counted. Period.
Second, Appellants argue that our burden analysis may not
consider the impacts of the date requirement or the
consequences of a voter’s failure to comply with the date
requirement. Our focus should be on the “burden of
compliance” and not, they contend, “the consequence of
noncompliance.” RNC Reply Br. at 16. We disagree.
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
regularly looks to a law’s downstream consequences in
assessing its constitutionality. For example, an easy-to-
comply-with law faces heightened scrutiny if it has a “chilling
effect” on conduct protected by the First Amendment. NAACP
v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451, 460–62,
466 (1958) (invalidating a $100,000 fine against the NAACP
for failing to comply with an Alabama law requiring it to
disclose its members and agents because the law abridged
associational rights); see id. at 460–61 (“[S]tate action which
appointees, hence Puerto Rico’s decision to select interim
appointees without an election had only a speculative impact
on a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 8–9, 12. Mazo’s
cite to Clingman may have been in error because—as Mazo
itself recognized, 54 F.4th at 138—Clingman applied
Anderson-Burdick. See Clingman, 544 U.S. at 590, 593–94
(determining that a semi-closed primary system imposed a
minimal burden and rejecting a challenge to that system
because the State’s interests in the system justified its burden).

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40
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.”). Anderson-Burdick is no
different and requires a court to look to a law’s consequences
and downstream impacts in assessing a law’s burden. In
Anderson, for example, the Supreme Court determined that an
Ohio law imposing a March deadline for independents to
declare their candidacy for the presidency imposed a
substantial burden on associational rights. 460 U.S. at 786,
790–95. Crucial to that conclusion, the Supreme Court
highlighted that the deadline “may have a substantial impact
on independent-minded voters,” id. at 790 (emphasis added),
and would prevent independent-minded voters from rallying
around a newly emerged independent candidate later in the
campaign season, id. at 791; see also Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“In approaching candidate restrictions,
it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature
of their impact on voters.”).
Lastly, limiting our burden analysis to consider only the
burden of complying with a law’s requirements would lead us
to under-scrutinize laws that—while seemingly easy to adhere
to—nevertheless severely burden constitutional rights because
of their downstream effects.32 We thus reject Appellants’
32 Consider, for example, a law specifying that in any petition
to appear on a ballot there be no typos and that the presence of
a typo in a petition bars a candidate from appearing on a ballot
for two years. Anderson-Burdick would apply in a lawsuit
challenging the law. Cf. Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632,
643–47 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying Anderson-Burdick in
challenge to ballot access law). If a court applying Anderson-

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argument that at Anderson-Burdick’s first step we may
consider only the burden of complying with a law. We hold
that a court applying the first step of Anderson-Burdick may
look to a law’s impacts, including the consequences of
noncompliance with a voting law or regulation.33
Burdick’s first step could consider only the burden of
compliance, it could conclude that the law imposed a minimal
burden because it is easy to avoid typos. Nevertheless, barring
a candidate from appearing on a ballot for two years is a severe
consequence that a court applying Anderson-Burdick should be
able to consider.
33 Multiple other circuits applying Anderson-Burdick have
weighed the impacts of a voting law in assessing how a law
burdens constitutionally protected rights. For example, the
Sixth Circuit in Obama for America v. Husted credited that a
law requiring county election offices to close on weekends and
reducing the window during which voters could vote early
would prevent thousands of working-class, less-educated
Americans from voting, thereby burdening the right to vote.
697 F.3d 423, 430–32 (6th Cir. 2012); see also NEOH, 837
F.3d at 630–35 (assessing both the burden of providing
personal information on ballot envelopes and the “impact” on
voters whose ballots were not counted due to inaccuracies in
that information). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Lee
concluded that a signature matching law seriously burdened
the right to vote because the law would cause numerous
otherwise valid ballots to be rejected. 915 F.3d at 1319–21.
And the Tenth Circuit determined that a law requiring proof of
citizenship in order to register to vote burdened the right to vote

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In summary, we conclude that the date requirement
imposes a minimal burden on voting rights, and that it does so,
in part, due to its downstream consequences.
d. The Proffered State Interests Cannot Justify the
Date Requirement’s Burden
At the second step of Anderson-Burdick, we “must identify
and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Anderson,
460 U.S. at 789. This analysis requires us to “not only
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those
interests” but also “consider the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden [constitutional] rights.” Id. We
weigh those interests against the burden that a law imposes. A
law that imposes a severe burden must meet strict scrutiny
while laws imposing lesser burdens “trigger less exacting
review, and a State’s ‘important regulatory interests’ will
usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.’” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358 (quoting Burdick, 504
U.S. at 434). We apply that “less exacting review” here
because the date requirement imposes a minimal burden.
Before we proceed to that analysis, though, we address
Appellants’ contention that Anderson-Burdick equates to
rational basis review if a law imposes a minimal burden.
A comparison between the application of Anderson-
Burdick and rational basis review reveals that the two
necessarily differ. Anderson-Burdick operates by weighing a
because it prevented 31,089 applicants from registering to
vote. Fish, 957 F.3d at 1127–28.

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burden a law imposes on relevant constitutional rights against
a State’s interest in applying that law. This “balancing of
interests” lies “at the heart of the Anderson-Burdick
framework.” Mazo, 54 F.4th at 152; see also Norman v. Reed,
502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992) (Anderson-Burdick calls “for the
demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty
to justify the limitation”). Rational basis review, meanwhile,
does not call for the balancing that lies at the core of Anderson-
Burdick but merely requires a court to examine a law to
determine if that law is “rationally related to furthering a
legitimate state interest.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
minimally burdensome law may pass rational basis review
because its purpose relates rationally to a legitimate state
interest, while flunking Anderson-Burdick because the
legitimate state interest cannot justify the minimal burden.
That difference—that distinction—convinces us that
Anderson-Burdick is not simply another name for rational basis
review, even if a law imposes only a minimal burden.
Consistent with this conclusion, our precedent counsels that
we not “peg[]” Anderson-Burdick into the traditional tiers of
scrutiny. Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2006).
“Rather, following Anderson, our scrutiny is a weighing
process: We consider what burden is placed on the rights
which plaintiffs seek to assert and then we balance that burden
against the precise interests identified by the [S]tate.” Id. We
would contradict that precedent were we to hold that Anderson-

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Burdick equates to rational basis review if a voting law
imposes a minimal burden. 34
That said, we recognize that the Supreme Court has not
been hesitant about collapsing aspects of Anderson-Burdick
into the traditional tiers of scrutiny when it chooses to do so.
In Timmons, for example, the Supreme Court instructed that
“[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights
must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state
interest,” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added), which
is the language of strict scrutiny, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015). Most important for our
purposes, however, is that the Supreme Court has never stated
that minimally burdensome voting laws receive rational basis
34 This conclusion is also consistent with our own precedent
and that of our sister Circuits. See, e.g., Mazo, 54 F.4th at 153
(in a case involving a “minimal” burden, not using rational
basis review but rather declaring that “a [S]tate must show
relevant and legitimate interests that are sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation for the consent requirement to survive
lesser scrutiny” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 154
(“Because these interests are all important, they need only
outweigh the minimal burden imposed by the consent
requirement.”); Tedards v. Ducey, 951 F.3d 1041, 1045, 1066
(9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that “the burdening of the right to
vote always triggers a higher level of scrutiny than rational
basis review”); Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 935–36 (4th
Cir. 2014) (after concluding plaintiffs’ burden was “modest,”
engaging in Anderson-Burdick weighing instead of rational
basis review).

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review under Anderson-Burdick. Indeed, immediately
following Timmons’s articulation of what we recognize as
strict scrutiny language is the Court’s instruction that “[l]esser
burdens . . . trigger less exacting review, and a State’s
‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to
justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’” 520 U.S.
at 358 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). If that “less exacting
review” equates to rational basis review, the Supreme Court
would most likely have said so.35
In summary, Anderson-Burdick is not the identical twin of
rational basis review where a law has been determined to
impose only a minimal burden.36 Applying Anderson-
35 We note that some of our sister Circuits have applied rational
basis review, or something close to it, in minimal burden cases,
but we decline to adopt their approach. E.g., Ohio Council 8
Am. Fed. of State v. Husted, 814 F.3d 329, 335, 338 (6th Cir.
2016) (where the burden on plaintiffs’ rights to expression and
association was “minimal,” characterizing its review under
Anderson-Burdick as “a less-searching examination closer to
rational basis”); Libertarian Party of Ala. v. Merrill, No. 20-
13356, 2021 WL 5407456, at *10 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021)
(nonprecedential) (upholding a law that imposed a minimal
burden because it “rationally served . . . important state
interests”).
36 Appellants both argue that the District Court erred by
weighing a lack of evidence supporting the proffered State
interests because a court applying rational basis review may
not seek evidence from the State. It logically follows that their

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46
Burdick’s second step, we look to whether the proffered State
interests justify the burden the date requirement imposes, not
to whether the date requirement is just rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. We turn to that analysis now and
examine the three State interests Appellants offer to support
the date requirement: (1) facilitating election efficiency; (2)
promoting solemnity; and (3) detecting and deterring voter
fraud. Although each of these interests are legitimate (and
even strong), they do not support the date requirement.37
i.
The first proffered State interest is that the date requirement
facilitates the orderly administration of elections. But, as a
general proposition, the date requirement does not seem to
facilitate orderly election administration in any manner. The
argument must fail since Anderson-Burdick does not equate to
rational basis review.
37 For instance, in Burdick, Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting
was “a legitimate means” of protecting the articulated state
interest and “a reasonable way of accomplishing th[e] goal,”
and thus, on balance, outweighed the asserted burden. 504
U.S. at 439–40; see also id. at 441 (“[W]hen a State’s ballot
access laws pass constitutional muster as imposing only
reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights—as do Hawaii’s election laws—a prohibition on write-
in voting will be presumptively valid.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the date requirement is not a legitimate means or a
reasonable way of accomplishing the Commonwealth’s
interests, and thus, on balance, does not outweigh the burden
on voters.

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47
date on a return envelope does not inform whether a voter is
eligible to cast a ballot. It does not indicate when a voter
completed a ballot. And it has no bearing on whether a ballot
is timely. NAACP, 97 F.4th at 127. If anything, requiring
county election boards to check the date field on return
envelopes seems to hamper efficiency by foisting an additional
responsibility on the boards for no apparent purpose. See App.
28 n.9 (citing quote from a brief filed in a separate case by the
Secretary of the Commonwealth that “requiring officials to
review declaration dates impedes effective election
administration”); see also Counties Br. at 7 (asserting that the
date requirement “serves no purpose in the County Boards’ (or
any other election board’s) election administration”); Adams
Cnty. Br. at 52 (“Voiding undated or misdated ballots imposes
significant burdens on election staff who must scrutinize and
segregate them from the pre-canvass tallies.”).38
Appellants contend the date requirement can serve as a
“backstop” that county election boards may use to determine a
ballot’s timeliness in the event the SURE system were to fail.
But that argument betrays a misunderstanding of
38 Numerous court decisions have noted that the date
requirement serves no apparent purpose. See, e.g., NAACP, 97
F.4th at 125 (“The date requirement, it turns out, serves little
apparent purpose. It is not used to confirm timely receipt of
the ballot or to determine when the voter completed it.”);
Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F.4th 153, 164 (3d Cir. 2022), abrogated
in part on other grounds recognized by Ritter v. Migliori, 143
S. Ct. 297, 298 (2022) (describing the handwritten date on a
return envelope as “superfluous and meaningless”).

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Pennsylvania’s election laws. A ballot’s timeliness is a
function of when a county election board receives the ballot.
25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(c), 3150.16(c). A return envelope’s date
reflects when a voter completed the declaration. No
Pennsylvania law permits county election boards to use the
latter date as a proxy for the former. To the contrary, the
county election boards which have chosen to participate in this
appeal concede that they “do not—and indeed cannot—use the
handwritten date to verify a mail ballot’s timeliness in any
circumstance.” Counties Br. at 9 (emphasis added); Adams
Cnty. Br. at 51–52. Moreover, even if the SURE system were
to fail, county election boards could continue to date stamp
upon receipt and physically segregate timely and untimely
mail-in ballots, as is their current practice.
ii.
The second proffered interest is that the date requirement
promotes solemnity and marks “the casting of a vote as a
serious and solemn act.” RNC Opening Br. at 54. Appellants
contend that the date requirement also pushes voters to
contemplate their choices and make a considered decision
about their government. Id.39
39 The RNC argues that “[i]f States can require the formalities
of signing and dating for wills and property transactions, then
surely Pennsylvania can do the same for voting.” RNC
Opening Br. at 55. This is like arguing that the Commonwealth
can ban handguns because it bans lots of things, like owning a
polar bear. 58 PA. CODE § 137.1(a)(3). A dating requirement
for wills and property transactions does not implicate voting

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We by no means minimize the serious and thoughtful
approach that every citizen should take in filling out a ballot.
That voting is a solemn act is a truth that we ascribe to without
question. But the decisions as to what candidates one will vote
for and the deliberation that precedes the physical act necessary
for recording those decisions is not what is at stake in the
controversy that is before us. Appellants have cited no
precedent that dating a document—here, a return envelope—
carries a seriousness so portentous as do the actual decisions of
who to vote for.
Further, there are other aspects of the mail-in voting
process that promote solemnity, including the process to
acquire a mail-in ballot, e.g., 25 P.S. §§ 3146.2, 3150.2, the
steps required to submit a timely ballot, e.g., id. §§ 3146.6,
3150.16, and the fact that the return envelope that accompanies
a mail-in ballot features a declaration that a voter must sign.
Affixing one’s signature onto a legal document does indeed
constitute a solemn act. See Vote.Org v. Callanen, 39 F.4th
297, 308 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[S]igning a voter registration form
and thereby attesting, under penalty of perjury, that one
satisfies the requirements to vote carries a solemn weight.”).
And under Pennsylvania law, signing the return envelope has
legal import and could subject someone to criminal penalties.
25 P.S. § 3553. It is puzzling what incremental solemnity
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A
requirement that voters date their mail-in ballots does.

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dating a return envelope might possibly add that affixing one’s
signature to the document has not already accomplished.40
iii.
Finally, we confront the proffered State interest in fraud
detection and deterrence. That it is a legitimate interest is
beyond cavil. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196. But the date
requirement must reasonably further that interest for us to
weigh it. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; NEOH, 837 F.3d at 632
(“Combatting voter fraud perpetrated by mail is undeniably a
legitimate concern. Yet some level of specificity is necessary
to convert that abstraction into a definite interest for a court to
weigh.”) (Boggs, J.) (internal citation omitted).
At the outset, we are simply unable to discern any
connection between dating the declaration on return envelopes
and detecting and deterring voter fraud. County election
boards have no means of verifying the handwritten dates on
return envelopes. And the record shows that county election
boards did not view the absence of a date on a return envelope’s
declaration or the presence of an incorrect date as a reason to
40 Appellants cite numerous cases that purportedly show that
dating a document carries a solemn weight, but the cases either
do not support that proposition or refer to the solemnity of
“signing” a document. Appellants also contend that dating a
return envelope is part of the signature. But that argument
contradicts the text of Act 77, which states that a voter who
seeks to vote by mail shall “fill out, date and sign the
declaration.” 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a) (emphasis
added).

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51
suspect voter fraud. Similarly, the Department of State and
several county election boards—the only Pennsylvania entities
participating in this appeal that engage in administration of the
Commonwealth’s elections—have all written, in no uncertain
terms, that the date requirement does not meaningfully further
the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest in detecting voter
fraud.
Resisting this conclusion, Appellants argue that the date
requirement can assist in, and even lead to, an investigation of
voter fraud, which in itself contributes to deterrence.41 They
41 Separately, Appellants argue that the District Court
committed reversible error by weighing that the RNC had
adduced only a single example of the date requirement
assisting in fraud detection. They argue that Crawford
established that no evidence of fraud is needed because, in
Crawford, the Supreme Court accepted the State’s fraud-
prevention rationale despite the record’s lacking any evidence
of fraud. That argument fails because the Supreme Court in
Crawford credited examples of fraud around the nation that
Indiana’s voter-ID law would have prevented. Crawford, 553
U.S. at 194–96 & nn. 10, 11. Moreover, there is a logical and
obvious connection between a requirement that voters present
an ID at the polls and fraud detection, which reduced any need
for evidence in Crawford. By contrast, there is no intuitive
connection between a requirement that a voter date a
declaration such as that presented in this case and fraud
detection and deterrence. In fact, the Chief Clerk of the
Lancaster County Election Board stated flatly in a deposition
that a declaration with a missing or incorrect date was not an

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rely heavily on Commonwealth v. Mihaliak, No. MJ-2202-CR-
126-22 (Pa. Mag. Dist. Ct. 2022) and argue that it proves the
date requirement can prompt an investigation of voter fraud in
the rare instance in which a registered voter who had received
a mail-in ballot dies and a fraudster completes the ballot and
adds a date on the deceased voter’s return envelope postdating
her death.
The date requirement imposes a burden on Pennsylvanians’
constitutional right to vote. And it culminates in county
election boards discarding thousands of ballots each time an
election is held. The date requirement will not protect against
the vast majority of attempts at voter fraud. The Mihaliak case
demonstrates that the date requirement can narrowly advance
the Commonwealth’s interest in fraud detection and
deterrence—but only in the extremely rare instance involving
a hapless fraudster who obtains a recently deceased voter’s
mail-in ballot, completes the ballot, and adds a date on the
return envelope postdating the deceased voter’s death. Over
six years and across multiple elections in which thousands of
indicator of fraud. Hence, the District Court rightly considered
the dearth of evidence that would have established an
otherwise non-apparent connection between the date
requirement and fraud detection and deterrence, as a district
court would in any other context. As Anderson instructed,
when confronted with “[c]onstitutional challenges to specific
provisions of a State’s election laws . . . a court must resolve
such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work
in ordinary litigation.” 460 U.S. at 789 (internal citation
omitted).

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Pennsylvanians have voted by mail, this fact pattern has
apparently manifested itself only once.
Anderson-Burdick is a weighing test. Even where the law
imposes a minimal burden and thus invites less scrutiny in our
weighing of the interests, see Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, one
bizarre instance of the date requirement helping the
Commonwealth prosecute a criminal case of voter fraud—
fraud that had been detected by other means—cannot justify
the burden the date requirement imposes that affects thousands
of Pennsylvania voters every election, see League of Women
Voters of North Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246
(4th Cir. 2014) (“[S]tates cannot burden the right to vote in
order to address dangers that are remote . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
Finally, we note that the District Court’s order only
prevents county election boards from setting aside ballots
enclosed in return envelopes with missing or incorrect dates.
It does not affect what appears on the return envelopes or
prevent future return envelopes from including a date field.
The Commonwealth may continue printing return envelopes
with a date field—and it may continue to utilize the date field
in advancing its interest in fraud detection, however marginal
its utility in furthering that goal. That county election boards
no longer reject ballots in return envelopes with missing or
incorrect dates will have no effect on fraud detection. Recall
that this was the Commonwealth’s uninterrupted practice
regarding absentee ballots from 1968 to 2019. The return
envelopes of absentee ballots included a date field, but
absentee ballots in return envelopes with missing or incorrect

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dates were not discarded. Act of Dec. 11, 1968, Pub. L. 1183,
No. 375, § 8 (amending §§ 1306(a), 1308(a)).42
In summary, the proffered State interests in facilitating
election efficiency, promoting solemnity, and detecting and
deterring voter fraud cannot, individually or in combination,
bear the weight of the burden the date requirement imposes.
The date requirement seems to hamper rather than facilitate
election efficiency. By its nature, it fails to add solemnity to
the process of voting. And discarding thousands of ballots
every election is not a reasonable trade-off in view of the date
requirement’s extremely limited and unlikely capacity to detect
and deter fraud.
VI. Conclusion
In modern times, every election cycle is witness to
thousands of Pennsylvania citizens deciding that they will vote
by mail. They dutifully complete their mail-in ballots carefully
and to the best of their abilities. And they drop their ballots in
a mailbox, expecting their votes will be tallied and hopeful that
their desired candidates will emerge victorious. But as we have
discussed, those expectations are not always met. Because of
the Commonwealth’s date requirement, an inadvertent
typographical error or a flipped number or even a stray pen
42 See Pa. Dep’t of State Br. at 12–13 (“[D]irecting counties not
to reject ballots for date errors does not remove the date field
from the declaration . . . because the instruction that voters date
the declaration and the instructions to election officials about
which mail ballots to canvass are governed by different
sections of the Election Code.”).

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mark in the date field will remove the ballot contained within
the return envelope from consideration. And the voter may
never be the wiser.
Casting a ballot and having it counted are central to the
democratic process. And while we acknowledge a State’s
unique role in administering elections, courts are sometimes
called upon to make difficult decisions—decisions like the one
at hand that seek to weigh these interests with an eye towards
safeguarding the democratic process. This case is no
exception. While the Commonwealth has raised legitimate
interests related to voting, we see only tangential links, at best,
between these interests and the date requirement that
Pennsylvania imposes on mail-in voters. The date requirement
does not play a role in election administration, nor does it
contribute an added measure of solemnity beyond that created
by a signature. And only in the exceedingly rare circumstance
does it contribute to the prosecution of voter fraud.
Weighing these interests against the burden on voters, we
are unable to justify the Commonwealth’s practice of
discarding ballots contained in return envelopes with missing
or incorrect dates that has resulted in the disqualification of
thousands of presumably proper ballots. We will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.

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