Van Horn, Metz & Co., Inc v. Jp Morgan Chase & Co., properly denominated JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-1838
VAN HORN, METZ & CO., INC.,
Appellant
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., properly denominated JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
_____________________________
Appeal from U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Kai N. Scott, No. 2:23-cv-01693
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Mar. 20, 2026
Decided April 23, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
MATEY, Circuit Judge. Van Horn, Metz & Co. brought an aiding-and-abetting fraud
claim against JP Morgan Chase arising out of an embezzlement scheme allegedly perpe-
trated by Van Horn’s longtime bookkeeper and controller, Antonino Crisafulli.1 Aiding-
and-abetting fraud requires allegations of actual knowledge of fraud by a third party and
“substantial assistance or encouragement.” Marion v. Byrn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76, 87,
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de
novo, and we “take as true all the factual allegations” in the complaint “and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them” while “disregard[ing] legal conclusions and ‘re-
citals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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89 (Pa. 2023). Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient. Id. at 91–92. Nor will con-
clusory allegations of knowledge suffice. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121,
128 (3d Cir. 2010). Van Horn rests on allegations that Chase’s compliance protocols
demonstrate actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, but “[a]n argument that a bank
should have recognized a fraud is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge requirement.”
Marion, 288 A.3d at 89 (quoting In re TelexFree Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 70, 77 (D.
Mass. 2019)). That Chase initiated, through automatic withdrawals, certain transfers from
Van Horn’s bank account to Crisafulli’s Chase credit card account is also insufficient to
show that Chase possessed actual knowledge of fraud. See DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am.
Express Travel-Related Servs. Co., 388 F.3d 886, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is not unusual
for employers to pay the credit card debts of their employees.”). As Van Horn failed to
plead facts plausibly alleging the bank’s actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, we will
affirm the dismissal of the Amended Complaint.

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