Van Horn, Metz & Co., Inc v. PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., properly denominated PNC BANK, N.A.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-1840
VAN HORN, METZ & CO., INC.,
Appellant
v.
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., properly denominated PNC BANK, N.A.
_____________________________
Appeal from U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Kai N. Scott, No. 2:23-cv-03596
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Mar. 17, 2026
Decided April 23, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
MATEY, Circuit Judge. Van Horn, Metz & Co. brought an aiding-and-abetting fraud
claim against PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. arising out of an embezzlement scheme
allegedly perpetrated by Van Horn’s longtime bookkeeper and controller, Antonino Cris-
afulli.1 Aiding-and-abetting fraud requires allegations of actual knowledge of fraud by a
third party and “substantial assistance or encouragement.” Marion v. Byrn Mawr Tr. Co.,
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de
novo, and we “take as true all the factual allegations” in the complaint “and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from them” while “disregard[ing] legal conclusions and ‘re-
citals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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2
288 A.3d 76, 87, 89 (Pa. 2023). Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient. Id. at 91–
92. Nor will conclusory allegations of knowledge suffice. See Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010). Van Horn rests on allegations that PNC’s compli-
ance protocols demonstrate actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, but “[a]n argument
that a bank should have recognized a fraud is insufficient to meet the actual knowledge
requirement.” Marion, 288 A.3d at 89 (quoting In re TelexFree Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp.
3d 70, 77 (D. Mass. 2019)); see also DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related
Servs. Co., 388 F.3d 886, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is not unusual for employers to pay
the credit card debts of their employees.”). As Van Horn failed to plead facts plausibly
alleging the bank’s actual knowledge of Crisafulli’s scheme, we will affirm the dismissal
of the Amended Complaint.

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