Heidy Carolina Mejia Saquic De Julaj; E. S. J. M. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of the Board of…

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2031
HEIDY CAROLINA MEJIA SAQUIC DE JULAJ; E. S. J. M.,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_____________________________
On Petition for Review of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Judge Shanna W. Chen, Nos. A208-201-937 & A208-201-938
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, AND FISHER, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Apr. 20, 2026; Filed: July 27, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
Restrepo, Circuit Judge. Heidy Carolina Mejia Saquic de Julaj and her minor child
(collectively “Petitioners”) petition this Court for review of a final order of removal. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) dismissed Petitioners’ appeal of the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA
concluded, and we agree, that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
before the Agency. When the government raises this failure before this Court, as it does
here, we must enforce the exhaustion requirement pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). Given
the bar to judicial review, we will dismiss the petition for review.
* This is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 is not binding
precedent.

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I.
Petitioners, natives and citizens of Guatemala, entered the United States without
entry documents and applied for admission on December 29, 2015. On the same day,
Petitioners were served with notices to appear and charged with removability under
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Petitioners
timely applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection on September 8,
2016, less than nine months after entering the United States. With the assistance of
counsel, Petitioners submitted written pleadings in support of their applications on May
2, 2019. Following a merits hearing on September 14, 2020, where Petitioners were again
represented by counsel, the IJ denied the applications for relief and found Petitioners
removable.
In denying asylum relief, the IJ found that Petitioners had not experienced past
persecution or established a well-founded fear of future persecution, and their proposed
particular social group was not cognizable under the INA.1 It correspondingly found that
Petitioners failed to meet the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal. The IJ
also denied CAT protection based on its finding that Petitioners failed to show it was
more likely than not that they would be tortured if returned to Guatemala.
1 The IJ found that the proposed particular social group, “Guatemalan women and
mothers unable to escape gang threats and extortion,” lacked particularity as it was
“overbroad, amorphous, and subjective.” A.R. 32. The IJ also questioned whether, even if
the particular social group was cognizable, Mejia Saquic de Julaj could be considered a
member of the group given that she and her minor son had arguably escaped.

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Still represented by counsel, Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal on
September 28, 2020, which provided:
The [IJ] erred in denying [Petitioners’] timely filed application for Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and Protection under the Convention Against
Torture. Specifically the [IJ] erred in finding that although the [Petitioner]
was credible, the [Petitioner] had not met her burden in establishing that she
is a member of a particular and cognizable social group.
A.R. 20. Petitioners declined the opportunity to submit written briefing or request oral
arguments before the BIA. On April 28, 2025, the BIA decided that Petitioners—whose
pleadings consisted solely of the notice of appeal—had not meaningfully challenged the
IJ’s determination that they had not established past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution, or that their proposed social group was not cognizable. The Board also
decided that Petitioners failed to raise a viable challenge to the IJ’s finding that they were
not entitled to CAT protection. The BIA did not address the merits underlying the denial
of relief, instead dismissing the appeal because the claims were waived.
Petitioners timely filed a petition to review the BIA’s decision in this Court.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(1). Prior to judicial review, a non-citizen must “exhaust[] all administrative
remedies available to [them] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). While not jurisdictional,
the exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to judicial review that this Court “must
enforce” if raised by the government. Gomez-Gabriel v. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 327, 330
(3d Cir. 2025); see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023). Petitioners
may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by submitting the notice of appeal to the BIA,

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“provided that the description of [the issues raised] in the notice sufficiently apprises the
BIA of the basis for the appeal.” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009). The
regulation governing the sufficiency of the notice of appeal specifies that:
The party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the
appeal in the Notice of Appeal . . . or in any attachments
thereto, in order to avoid summary dismissal . . . . The
statement must specifically identify the findings of fact, the
conclusions of law, or both, that are being challenged. If a
question of law is presented, supporting authority must be
cited. If the dispute is over the findings of fact, the specific
facts contested must be identified.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b). We recognize that this Court does not “apply this [exhaustion]
principle in a draconian fashion.” Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. 411. Thus, “so long as
an immigration petitioner makes some effort, however insufficient, to place the Board on
notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have
exhausted her administrative remedies.” Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d
Cir. 2005).
Here, Petitioners’ efforts to give notice fell short. We review the BIA’s
determinations of waiver for abuse of discretion, and find no abuse if a petitioner fails to
provide sufficient grounds for review. See Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir.
2017) (holding the Board did not abuse its discretion in ruling claim waived where
petitioner provided “no basis for ruling on his vague objection to the IJ’s CAT denial”);
Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 147 F.4th 348, 352–53 (3d Cir. 2025) (holding no abuse of
discretion where BIA deemed claim not raised in notice of appeal or briefing waived).

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Here, the notice of appeal did not mention past persecution or an objective fear of future
persecution, much less provide a basis for a ruling by the BIA. The notice stated that the
IJ erred by finding that Petitioners failed to allege a particular and cognizable social
group but did not develop the claim, providing no references to the record or controlling
law to support the assertion. Upon review, we conclude the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in finding Petitioners’ claims for relief waived.2
In their petition for review before this Court, Petitioners ignore the BIA’s waiver
determinations, choosing instead to challenge the merits underlying the IJ’s decision to
deny asylum relief.3 But we cannot address the merits of claims not exhausted before the
BIA, once the government raises this prerequisite to judicial review. Gomez-Gabriel, 146
F.4th at 330; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because the government raised the prerequisite here,
we will dismiss the petition for review.
2 We recognize that, had the BIA instead reached the merits of the IJ’s
determinations despite the insufficiencies of Petitioners’ claims, the issues would have
been exhausted. Lin, 543 F.3d at 125–126 (holding that the issue had been exhausted
where the BIA sua sponte reached the merits rather than dismiss the claim for lack of
specificity).
3 The government argues that by failing to address the BIAs waiver-based denial
of their claims in their opening brief, Petitioners have waived “all arguments regarding
the Board’s waiver-based denial of their asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
claims” before this Court. Gov’t Br. 11. Given that Petitioners’ failure to meet the
exhaustion requirement resolves this matter, we need not address the government’s
layered waiver argument.

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