Felishatay Alvarado v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 25-2279
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FELISHATAY ALVARADO
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; DANIELLE OUTLAW,
Philadelphia Police Commissioner; P/O JAMES ASHFORD,
Police Officer - Badge No. 3802; P/O JOSHUA BURKITT,
Police Officer - Badge No. 2091; SGT. MICHAEL
CERRUTI, Badge No. 8649; ET. AL.
City of Philadelphia; Joshua Burkitt; Eric Clark; Jose
Hamoy; Kevin Mellody; Demetrius Monk; Brian Murray;
Patrick Saba; Edward Song,
Appellants
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2-22-cv-3763)
District Court Judge: Honorable John F. Murphy
_____________________________________
Argued July 1, 2026
(Filed: July 17, 2026)
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
Adam R. Zurbriggen [ARGUED]
City of Philadelphia
Law Department

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17th Floor
1515 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellant
Keith T. West [ARGUED]
Victims’ Recovery Law Center
3650 Winding Way
Suite 200
Newtown Square, PA 19073
Counsel for Appellees
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O P I N I O N*
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In this § 1983 action, the jury returned a verdict against the City of Philadelphia
finding it liable for its failure to train, and awarded over $1 million in compensatory
damages. The City appeals the District Court’s orders denying its motions for a judgment
as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur and granting Felishatay Alvarado’s motion for
fees and costs. Because there was insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could
find Monell liability, we will reverse the order denying judgment as a matter of law and
remand for consideration of the motion for fees and costs.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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I.
On June 4, 2021, Philadelphia Police Department SWAT unit officers were
attempting to execute a search warrant on a homicide suspect who resided in the second-
floor rear unit of a row house located at 4664 Torresdale Avenue in Philadelphia. Alvarado
lived on the first floor. Officers conducted reconnaissance, during which they noticed that
the street number was listed on the front door and two mailboxes marked “1” and “2” were
mounted on the wall to the left of the front door. There was also a back door located at the
rear. Officers knocked on the front door and announced their presence. After a few seconds
following the knock, Lieutenant Demetrius Monk ordered his team to breach the front door.
The front door led directly into Alvarado’s apartment. Officers encountered Alvarado and
one of Alvarado’s dogs, which Officer Edward Song shot and killed after it bit him. The
Officers cleared Alvarado’s first floor unit, and, believing there was no access to the second-
floor unit, left.
Alvarado brought § 1983 claims against the individual Philadelphia SWAT Officers
(Joshua Burkitt, Eric Clark, Jose Hamoy, Kevin Mellody, Demetrius Monk, Brian Murray,
Patrick Saba, and Edward Song (collectively “Officers”)) who were involved in the
execution of the warrant as well as the City of Philadelphia, alleging that the Officers
violated her Fourth Amendment right and that the City failed to adequately train its officers
in regards to carrying out a search warrant, specifically searches involving multi-unit
homes.
During the five-day jury trial, Officers testified that they believed that the front door
led into a common area beyond which there would be interior doors to the individual units,

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rather than leading directly into the first-floor unit. The Officers that conducted
reconnaissance testified that they believed the back door led to the first-floor unit. Alvarado
introduced evidence of the SWAT Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) which detailed
the City’s Knock-and-Announce Rule, stating that an officer must “give or make reasonable
effort to give, notice of their identity,” and “await a response for a reasonable period of
time after their announcement before gaining entry into the property.” App. 1238. Further,
the SOPs noted that while there was no exact period of time that is to be considered
reasonable, “recent court decisions have shown that 30 seconds should be the minimum
time police personnel should delay their entry into a property after announcing their
presence and purpose.” Id. Some of the Officers testified that they believed the execution
of the warrant was consistent with city training. Alvarado’s police practice expert opined
that the officers violated Philadelphia Police policies and procedures. Alvarado, her sister,
and her expert psychologist testified to Alvarado’s emotional distress after the incident.
The jury returned a verdict finding the individual officers violated Alvarado’s right
to be free from an unreasonable search and finding the City liable because it had “failed to
adequately train its SWAT Unit Officers in a specifically identified way that amounted to
deliberate indifference and that failure was the moving force behind a violation of her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” SApp. 6. The
jury awarded Alvarado $0 in compensatory damages against the Officers and
$1,000,143.50 in compensatory damages against the City.
The City moved for a judgment as a matter of law seeking judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur of damages. The District Court denied the City’s

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motions. The District Court granted Alvarado’s petition for attorney’s fees and costs,
awarding her $316,830 in attorney’s fees and $36,491.05 in costs.
II.1
The City argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and alternatively,
that even if the verdict stands as to liability, the compensatory damages award is grossly
excessive. Because we agree that the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we
will address only that argument.
A. § 1983 Claim
In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff can proceed by arguing that an unconstitutional policy
or custom of the municipality led to her injuries, or that her injuries were caused by a failure
or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice, e.g., the
failure to train, supervise, or discipline. See Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir.
2019). Alvarado brought a failure-to-train claim, which requires that she demonstrate “a
failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.”
Id. at 106. “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train,” as here. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–823 (1985) (plurality
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review for a motion for
judgment as a matter of law is plenary. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Entry of judgment as a matter of law is a “sparingly” invoked
remedy, CGB Occup. Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir.
2004), that should be “granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is
insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Lightning Lube, 4
F.3d at 1166.

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opinion) (“A policy of inadequate training” is “far more nebulous, and a good deal further
removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell.”). It requires that
the municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect amounts to “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into
contact.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault” that requires “proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “Thus, when city policymakers are on actual
or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes city
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately
indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. “A
less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities.” Id. at 62 (citation and quotations omitted).
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must show that “[a] pattern of similar constitutional
violations” put the city on notice that, by failing to act, it was being deliberately indifferent
to civilians’ rights. Id. at 62. “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a
particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. In unusual cases, a plaintiff
can show a city’s deliberate indifference even without a pattern of prior constitutional
violations, called “single-incident” liability. See id. at 63–64 (citing City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). “[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees,” Canton recognized, ‘‘it may happen that . . . the need for more or different

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training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need.” 489 U.S. at 390. The Supreme Court stated single-
incident liability would occur “in a narrow range of circumstances.” Connick, 563 U.S. at
63 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). It requires something like giving guns to the police
without training them when they may shoot fleeing felons, the hypothetical posed by the
Supreme Court in Canton. See 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. Because “city policymakers know to
a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,” if the
city arms the officers with firearms, “the need to train officers in the constitutional
limitations on the use of deadly force” is “so obvious” that a failure to provide such training
could provide a basis for single-incident municipal liability. Id.
But since Canton, the Supreme Court has never found the single-incident bar
satisfied. See Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, 130 F.4th 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2025). In
Connick, the Supreme Court concluded that the single-incident theory failed where the
alleged failed training was not “the utter lack of an ability to cope with constitutional
situations that underlies the Canton hypothetical,” but rather the “the specific scenario
related to the violation” in that case—namely, that prosecutors were not trained about
particular Brady evidence. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 67. Because that “sort of nuance
simply cannot support an inference of deliberate indifference,” the claim failed. Id. Put
simply, it is “vanishingly rare” to establish single-incident municipality liability. Miller v.
City of Philadelphia, 162 F.4th 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2025). In Thomas v. Cumberland County,
we found that a reasonable jury could conclude based on the frequency of fights and volatile

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nature of the prison that the need for de- escalation and intervention training is “so obvious”
that a single incident could support an inference of deliberate indifference. 749 F.3d 217,
225 (3d Cir. 2014). But Thomas involved dangerous prisoners and there was no training
regarding de-escalation at all.
The City argues that Alvarado’s claim must fail because she cannot prove deliberate
indifference, as she did not prove a pattern of similar incidents and the situation does not
satisfy the rare single-incident theory. We agree. First, Alvarado did not present a pattern
of similar constitutional violations. While she points to testimony that the officers were
responsible for enforcing nearly all of the search warrants in Philadelphia, this is
insufficient evidence for a pattern of similar constitutional violations to put the City on
notice. Moreover, her claim proceeded through trial and was presented to the jury as a
single-incident theory.
Second, while the District Court described Alvarado’s claim as alleging that the City
failed to train the officers on the Knock-and-Announce rule by affirmatively instructing
them to ignore the rule, the claim presented at trial was that the City failed to train the
officers on how to execute the Knock-and-Announce rule on multi-unit residences. See
App. 1156 (during closing argument, “But why didn’t the City of Philadelphia say, ‘This is
how you approach a supposed house with an outside door. This is what you do, folks’?
There was no training in that.”), App. 1160 (during closing argument, “How about training
them in multi-unit residences? . . . How about training them that so you’re not violating
some innocent person their rights when you’re going after this other person in some place
within maybe a group area, okay? You can’t just willy-nilly walk through everything. How

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about training them in that?”). But this “sort of nuance[d]” training deficiency cannot
support an inference of deliberate indifference. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 67 (concluding
that the nuance on how to train on specific Brady evidence cannot support inference of
deliberate indifference). There is no dispute that the SWAT Officers had training on the
general requirements of the Fourth Amendment, including the Knock-and-Announce rule,
as detailed in the SOPs.
Alvarado analogizes her case to Thomas, but instead of the complete lack of training
to handle a foreseeable situation in Thomas, 749 F.3d at 225, Alvarado’s claim centers on
the absence of nuanced training: how to execute search warrants in a multi-unit home.2 This
sort of nuanced training does not rise to the “so obvious” need that permits inference of the
City’s deliberate indifference. While Alvarado identifies testimony in which Officers stated
that the way they executed the warrant was consistent with their training, this does not
provide a sufficient basis from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the need for
training was so obvious that the City knew to a moral certainty that the failure to provide
such training would result in constitutional violations.
There is insufficient evidence from which the jury could find the City liable under a
single-incident theory. Given Canton and Connick, this liability is reserved for extreme
2 We note that the Officers testified that they thought they were entering a common area
when they breached Alvarado’s door. The significance of that is that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a multi-unit dwelling so the Fourth
Amendment and the Knock-and-Announce requirement that furthers its purpose are not
implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that residents did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in common hallway
behind unlocked door).

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cases, and Alvarado’s claim does not rise to that level to support an inference of deliberate
indifference.
III.
For these reasons, we will reverse the denial of the motion for judgment as a matter
of law and remand for the District Court to enter judgment for the City. We will vacate the
District Court’s June 9, 2025 order awarding attorney’s fees and costs and remand to the
District Court for further proceedings.3
3 We decline to reach the award of attorney’s fees and costs issue ourselves as it has not
been briefed in its now-current state. The jury found the Officers liable but awarded no
damages. The City will now have a judgment in its favor. The District Court should address
the prevailing party issue anew. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 110 (1992).

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