Juan Leonardo Largo Serrano ; Jessica Valeria Contreras Contreras ; A.l.c.; S.l.c. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES , On Petition for Review from a Decision of…

*
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding prec-
edent.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2530
J UAN LEONARDO L ARGO SERRANO ; JESSICA VALERIA CONTRERAS CONTRERAS ;
A.L.C.; S.L.C.,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY G ENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ,
_____________________________
On Petition for Review from a
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
A220-502-225, A220-971-432, A220-971-433, A220-971-434
Immigration Judge: Pallavi S. Shirole
Before: C HAGARES , Chief Judge; RESTREPO , and MONTGOMERY -REEVES , Circuit Judges
Submitted Jun. 10, 2026; Decided Jun. 29, 2026
_____________________________
N ONPRECEDENTIAL O PINION*
MONTGOMERY -REEVES , Circuit Judge.
Juan Leonardo Largo Serrano, Jessica Valeria Contreras Contreras, and their two
children (“Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (the “BIA”) de-
nial of their motion to reopen.1 Petitioners argue the BIA erred in denying their motion
after finding that Petitioners’ changed-country-conditions evidence was immaterial or oth-
erwise insufficient. We disagree and will deny the petition.
Petitioners unlawfully entered the United States from Ecuador in 2021. They left
Ecuador after they learned that local gangs were extorting small business owners like them,

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and after unknown men started visiting their store and making intimidating comments.
Concerned with eventual extortion and doubtful of the police’s ability to help, Petitioners
fled to the United States.
On arrival, Petitioners applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Pe-
titioners’ applications. The BIA agreed and dismissed a later appeal.
More than a year later, Petitioners moved to reopen their removal proceedings,
claiming changed country conditions. Petitioners submitted evidence identifying Ecuador
as a dangerous place to live due to a high risk of gang violence. The BIA denied the motion,
holding that Petitioners’ newly submitted evidence was immaterial to their asylum and
withholding-of-removal applications and insufficient to save their CAT application. Peti-
tioners claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying their motion. We disagree.2
The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the applicant’s motion introduces material
evidence of changed-country conditions that was not available during the previous removal
proceeding and was otherwise undiscoverable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Arckange
Saint Ford v. Att’y Gen., 51 F.4th 90, 97 (3d Cir. 2022). “The requirement to present ma-
terial evidence is a ‘heavy burden.’” Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 160 (3d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012)). To meet that burden, a
2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, and we exercise jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s decision to deny a motion to reopen for abuse of
discretion. Gen Lin v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 2012). We will disturb the
BIA’s decision only if its decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. (quoting
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006)).

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petitioner must offer evidence rebutting an IJ’s findings “that provided the basis for deny-
ing relief” in the first instance. Id. (citation modified). If an applicant presents material
evidence, the BIA then assesses the sufficiency of that evidence. Id. at 162. Changed-
country-conditions evidence is sufficient if it establishes prima facie eligibility for relief
under the appropriate standard. Id. at 161–62.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen. For
asylum and withholding of removal, applicants must establish that they “suffered past per-
secution” or have “a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). An
applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution must be “on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners’
newly submitted evidence was immaterial to whether Petitioners were at risk of future per-
secution. Petitioners’ evidence shows only general human-rights violations in Ecuador and
not a “nexus between the alleged protected grounds and the feared or past persecution.”
Hernandez Garmendia v. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 483–84 (3d Cir. 2022). Even assuming
Ecuadorian shop owners enjoy protected status, Petitioners submitted no new evidence to
suggest that Ecuadorian shop owners are at an increased risk of persecution—which the IJ
previously held. Darby, 1 F.4th at 160 (holding that a petitioner must offer evidence re-
butting an IJ’s or the BIA’s findings “that provided the basis for denying relief” (citation
modified)).
For CAT relief, an applicant must provide “objective evidence showing a ‘reasona-
ble likelihood’ that [the applicant] can establish that he is more likely than not to be

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tortured.’” Id. at 161 (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002)).
“Torture” is defined under the relevant regulations as acts done, consented to, or acquiesced
to by public officials acting in their official capacities in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners’ newly
submitted evidence was insufficient to establish that Ecuadorian government officials
would acquiesce to Petitioners’ torture at the hands of gangs. Petitioners’ failure to ask the
Ecuadorian police for help when they were still in Ecuador coupled with evidence that the
Ecuadorian government is prosecuting increasing gang violence renders the BIA’s decision
a sound exercise of discretion.
For these reasons, we will DENY the petition.

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