Kenneth E. Thornton v. Beaver County

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2840
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KENNETH E. THORNTON,
Appellant
v.
BEAVER COUNTY, in her official capacity; DAYNA REVAY, in her individual and
official capacity; JULIE FRANZAGLIO, in her individual and official capacity;
NICOLE DICICCIO; DAVID REESE, in his individual and official capacity; ROBIN
BERTUCCI; TONI WHITELEATHER, in her individual and official capacity; VICTOR
COLONNA, in his individual and official capacity; ALIQUIPPA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
in her official capacity; PETER CARBONE, in his individual and official capacity;
MARLENE EVERETTE, in her individual and official capacity; CHRISTINA WHITE,
in her individual and official capacity; DAVID WYTIAZ, in his individual and official
capacity; LISA JONES, in her individual capacity; SHARON BUCKLEY; THERESA
MATTEO; LUCILLE WYTIAZ, in her individual and official capacity; MIDLAND
SCHOOL DISTRICT, in her official capacity; SEAN TANNER, in his individual and
official capacity; BRENDA MILITELLO, in her individual and official capacity;
BOROUGH OF MIDLAND, in her official capacity; KEITH MCCARTHY, in his
individual and official capacity; MITCHELL HIMES, in her individual and official
capacity; ANTHONY QUINN, in his individual and official capacity; CHARLES
GALERENZO, in her individual and official capacity; MARCUS LITTLE, in his
individual and official capacity; CITY OF ALIQUIPPA, in her official capacity; DWAN
WALKER, in his individual and official capacity; BOROUGH OF OHIOVILLE,
in her official capacity; DOUGLAS EDGELL, in his individual and official capacity;
BONNIE SEDLACEK, in her individual and official capacity; COUNTY OF
LAWRENCE, in her official capacity; JOHN BOUT, in his individual and official
capacity; WILLIAM BETZ, JR., in his individual and official capacity; FRANK
MERLINO, in his individual and official capacity; ALEXANDER KWIAT, in his
individual and official capacity; COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, in her official capacity;
SUSAN MARCONE, in her individual and official capacity; CHRISTINE
MONTAGUE, in her individual and official capacity; ROBERT MASTERS, in his

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individual and official capacity; REBECCA PANTALL, in her individual and official
capacity; DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; VALERIE ARKOOSH, Secretary
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00198)
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 1, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 30, 2026)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Kenneth Thornton filed a complaint in the District Court against
fifty-eight local agencies and actors, alleging that they conspired against him for
approximately fifteen years by falsely accusing him of child abuse. He claimed that the
defendants were liable for civil conspiracy, substantive and procedural due process
violations, false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. He sought $40 billion in damages.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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The District Court dismissed several claims in the original complaint with
prejudice and provided Thornton leave to amend others. Thornton filed three more
complaints. The defendants, in various groupings, then moved to dismiss the operative
third amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
District Court granted their motions and dismissed the third amended complaint with
prejudice. Thornton appealed.1
We will affirm. We agree with the District Court’s analysis of Thornton’s claims
and need not repeat its reasoning here. We address only the arguments that Thornton
developed in his opening brief and deem all other potential challenges forfeited. See In
re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that any issue that an appellant
fails to develop in an opening brief is forfeited).
Thornton devotes the bulk of his brief to arguing that his rights under the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause were violated when, based on the alleged child
abuse, he was both criminally prosecuted and placed on the Pennsylvania ChildLine
Registry. But Thornton did not present a Fifth Amendment claim in the District Court.
Therefore, we will not consider it here. See Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a District Court’s decision
to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is plenary. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d
Cir. 2016). We recognize that the District Court dismissed Thornton’s claims against the
two non-moving defendants without prejudice because they had not been properly served,
and they had not entered appearances in the case. The dismissal of these claims without
prejudice does not affect the finality of the District Court’s order. See Gomez v. Gov’t of
the V.I., 882 F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] named defendant who has not been
served is not a ‘party’ within the meaning of Rule 54(b).”).

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(3d Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal are not properly
preserved for appellate review.”). In any event, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
implicated in this case because Children & Youth Services’s act of placing him on the
registry was not punitive in nature. Cf. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that community notification under Megan’s Law does not constitute
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
Thornton also argues that his procedural due process rights were violated when he
was listed as a child abuser in the Pennsylvania ChildLine Registry. According to
Thornton, he was entitled to a “pre-deprivation” hearing before being identified as an
“indicated” and then “founded” abuser. Thorton Br. at 7. As the District Court
explained, however, he was able to challenge those listings when he successfully
appealed and received a hearing. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)
(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”); Cf. Mulholland v. Gov't Cnty. of Berks,
Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 240 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs’ inability to challenge the
county agency’s child-abuse findings until after its report was submitted to ChildLine did
not deprive him of due process because he was able to challenge it through the appeals
process).
Next, Thornton challenges the District Court’s determination that he failed to state
conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. He contends that, contrary
to the District Court’s determination, he repeatedly stated throughout the operative

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complaint that there was an agreement among the alleged conspirators. But he had to set
forth facts to support his allegation that an affirmative agreement was made, “in other
words, plausible grounds to infer an agreement.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
Because the District Court correctly concluded that Thornton failed to state
plausible claims for these causes of action, we need not consider his objections to the
District Court’s findings concerning service of process. See Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108
F.3d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that while courts usually assess service-of-process
before turning to the Rule 12(b)(6) determination, departures from this sequence may be
sanctioned when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim). Accordingly, we will affirm.

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