Jonathan Russo v. Katy Hileman, individual

CLD-157 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-3321
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JONATHAN RUSSO,
Appellant
v.
KATY HILEMAN, individual and official capacity;
KENNETH REISINGER, individual and official capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01419)
District Judge: Honorable Keli M. Neary
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 2, 2026
Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 21, 2026)
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OPINION*
_________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Jonathan Russo, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
case against two prison officials related to allegations of inadequate heat, and his
subsequent letter to one of the defendants expressing the desire to commit suicide. At the
time of the allegations, Russo was incarcerated at Adams County Adult Correctional
Complex (“ACACC”). Russo initially brought his claims in a larger lawsuit bringing
allegations of multiple incidents against the ACACC, which the District Court divided
into multiple cases, including this one.1
After Russo filed an amended complaint, the District Court screened his amended
complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The District Court also denied Russo’s motions to alter or amend the judgment and for
appointment of counsel. Russo appealed and moved for appointment of counsel.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the order denying the
motion to alter or amend for abuse of discretion.2 Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
1 We take judicial notice of Russo’s complaint filed in his previous case. Complaint,
Russo v. Hileman et al, No. 1:25-cv-0050 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2026) (No. 1). See Orabi v.
Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2014).
2 In his notice of appeal, Russo states that he appeals the October 2025 order, which
denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment. To bring up the underlying judgment,
Russo’s motion needed to be filed within 28 days after the entry of judgment (September
26, 2025). Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(. But, even applying the prison mailbox rule, the
motion missed the deadline. See Webb v. Dep’t of Just., 117 F.4th 560, 565–67 (3d Cir.
2024) (discussing the requirements for application of the prison mailbox rule). Russo
dated his enclosed cover letter September 28, 2025. Thus, the scope of our review is
limited to the denial of Russo’s Rule 59(e) motion.

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Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001). We review the District Court’s denial of his
motion for the appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993). Upon review, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment
because no substantial issue is raised on appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6.
A Rule 59(e) motion must rely on one of the following: “(1) an intervening change
in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d
Cir. 2010). In his brief in support of his motion to alter or amend the judgment, Russo
questioned whether the order should be amended so that he could amend his complaint
further. However, his briefing does not raise new legal or factual issues or suggest a need
to “prevent manifest injustice.” See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 669.
As the District Court explained, Russo failed to explain any legal error in its
reasoning or what additional allegations he sought to add. Nor did he provide a proposed
amended complaint. And, as the District Court also explained, it had already given
Russo opportunities to amend his complaint. As a result, the District Court’s denial was
not an abuse of its discretion. Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273. Nor did the District Court abuse
its discretion in denying Russo’s post-judgment motion for appointment of counsel. See
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Russo’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

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