Ryan Castaneira v. C. JAMES FOX, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 25-3446
__________
RYAN CASTANEIRA,
Appellant
v.
C. JAMES FOX, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole; DEVIN
BOLTON; BRENT SMILEY; MIKE DAUB; LUKE KNOX; ANNETTE GANTZ
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00361)
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 3, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2026)
___________
OPINION*
___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
PER CURIAM
In this civil-rights case, Ryan Castaneira appeals pro se from the District Court’s
decision denying, on the merits, his motion for a preliminary injunction.1 For the reasons
that follow, we will vacate that decision and remand with instructions to deny that motion
as moot.
I.
In 2009, Castaneira was convicted in Georgia state court of attempted child
molestation and other offenses. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, to be
followed by 20 years of probation. Castaneira’s probation term began in 2019. That
year, the supervision of his probation was transferred from the State of Georgia to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision. In 2022, after Castaneira was charged with summary harassment, one or
more Commonwealth officials added a no-contact condition to Castaneira’s probation
supervision. That condition prohibited Castaneira from having “any contact with anyone
under the age of 18 years old without the prior written approval of probation/parole
supervision staff and if applicable, in agreement with [his] treatment provider.” Dist. Ct.
Mem. entered Oct. 15, 2025, at 4 (quoting Second Am. Compl.).
1 To the extent that the District Court’s decision also denied a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”), that part of the decision is not before us. See Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar
Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that, as a general matter, the
denial of a TRO is unappealable).

-- 2 of 5 --

3
Castaneira subsequently initiated this pro se civil-rights action in the District Court
against the chairperson of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (formerly the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole) and several Pennsylvania state parole agents, raising
several claims under the United States Constitution. In June 2025, Castaneira moved for
a preliminary injunction with respect to two claims, both of which alleged violations of
his due-process rights. In doing so, Castaneira sought to enjoin the defendants
(hereinafter “Appellees”) from enforcing the no-contact provision and certain other
conditions of his probation. In October 2025, the District Court denied Castaneira’s
motion, concluding that he had failed to show that the two claims in question were likely
to succeed. Castaneira then filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging that decision.2
II.
On appeal, Appellees have submitted extra-record evidence about material events
that took place while Castaneira’s motion for a preliminary injunction was pending
before the District Court. See 3d Cir. Dkt. No. 11. This unrefuted evidence establishes
the following. In July 2025, the Georgia state court that had sentenced Castaneira
modified the terms of his probation, placing him on non-reporting status. See id. at ECF
p. 6. Later that month, the Commonwealth, in response to that modification order,
“close[d] interest” in Castaneira’s probation. Id. at ECF p. 4; see id. at ECF pp. 3-4. In
2 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review a district court’s
denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858
F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017).

-- 3 of 5 --

4
other words, in view of the modification order, the Commonwealth’s supervision of
Castaneira’s probation was terminated. See id. at ECF p. 8. And with the
Commonwealth’s supervision terminated, there was no longer a need to preliminarily
enjoin Appellees (all Commonwealth officials) from enforcing any probation conditions.
It appears that the parties did not provide this evidence to the District Court or
otherwise apprise the District Court of the material developments reflected by this
evidence. It is unclear why the parties failed to do so. In any event, we may consider this
evidence for the first time on appeal. See In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 388
n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (indicating that we may consider new evidence on appeal in
exceptional circumstances, “such as those that render the case moot or alter the
appropriateness of injunctive relief”), abrogated on other grounds by Golan v. Saada,
596 U.S. 666 (2022).3 So considered, it is clear that Castaneira’s motion for a
preliminary injunction was rendered moot before the District Court ruled on it. See
generally Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If
developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being
able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”).4 Accordingly,
3 To the extent that Appellees move to add this evidence to the record pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2), that motion is denied because Rule 10(e)(2) is
inapplicable here. See In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 388 n.3 (“Rule 10(e)(2)
allows amendment of the record on appeal only to correct inadvertent omissions, not to
introduce new evidence.”).
4 Castaneira contends that his case falls under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception to the mootness doctrine. We disagree. That exception applies only if

-- 4 of 5 --

5
we will (1) vacate the District Court’s decision denying Castaneira’s motion for a
preliminary injunction on the merits, and (2) remand the matter so that the District Court
can deny that motion as moot.5 Castaneira’s request for oral argument is denied.
“the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or
expiration.” Lara v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 446 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation
to quoted case omitted). But that situation is not present here. As Castaneira
acknowledges, his probation term does not end until 2039. So even if, in the near future,
(1) the Georgia state court were to reimpose a supervision requirement, (2) the
Commonwealth were to recommence supervision over his probation, and (3) Appellees
were to once again enforce the conditions that have been the subject of this case, there
would be ample time to fully litigate any injunctive-based challenges to those conditions.
We also note that the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine does
not apply here either, for the cessation of Castaneira’s probation-supervision conditions
stemmed from the Georgia state court’s modification order, not some unilateral act on the
part of Appellees. See Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir.
2020) (explaining that this exception’s “focus is on whether the defendant made th[e]
change unilaterally”); cf. United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 2008)
(indicating that this exception applies if the defendant “may resume [the allegedly
offending action] at any time”).
5 To the extent that Appellees argues that Castaneira’s entire, ongoing case in the District
Court should be dismissed because the District Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that argument transcends the scope of this
limited, interlocutory appeal, and we leave that argument for the District Court to
consider in the first instance. See generally Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc.,
613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided
by a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider them in the first
instance.”). Accordingly, Castaneira’s motion asking us to take judicial notice of certain
docket sheets, which he filed in response to Appellees’ Rooker-Feldman argument, is
denied as moot.

-- 5 of 5 --