Jasir Massey-Campbell v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corp.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 26-1026
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JASIR MASSEY-CAMPBELL,
Appellant
v.
BRIDGECREST ACCEPTANCE CORP.;
DANIEL GAUDREAU, in his official capacity
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-04146)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 19, 2026)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Before the Court is an appeal from pro se appellant Jasir Massey-Campbell, who
brought suit against Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation (“Bridgecrest”)1 and its CFO,
Daniel Gaudreau. After the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
Massey-Campbell’s amended complaint, Massey-Campbell filed several post-judgment
motions, all of which were denied. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Massey-Campbell’s amended complaint asserted claims for violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as well as a claim for
breach of contract. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Massey-Campbell moved for
summary judgment; the defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for a judgment
on the pleadings. After briefing, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, explaining that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction
over Gaudreau, and that Massey-Campbell failed to state a claim for relief against
Bridgecrest.2 The District Court entered its judgment by separate document on October 2,
2025.
1 Appellees aver that Massey-Campbell improperly named Bridgecrest Credit Company,
LLC as “Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation.” For simplicity, we will refer to the entity
as “Bridgecrest.”
2 The District Court’s dismissal of the amended complaint mooted Massey-Campbell’s
motion for summary judgment and the defendants’ cross-motion for a judgment on the
pleadings. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996).

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Twenty-eight days later, on October 30, Massey-Campbell moved pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, amend his
complaint, and strike the defendants’ prior allegations and submitted exhibit.3 The
District Court denied the motions on November 3. Then, on December 1,
Massey-Campbell moved to vacate or reconsider per Rules 59(e) and 60(b) the District
Court’s order denying his post-judgment motions and its dismissal of his amended
complaint. The District Court denied that motion on December 9, and Massey-Campbell
filed a notice of appeal on January 6, 2026.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but the scope of this appeal is
limited to the denial of Massey’s motion to reconsider. Massey-Campbell’s opening brief
mostly takes issue with the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to
dismiss his amended complaint. But we lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that
decision because Massey-Campbell’s notice of appeal was untimely as to the District
Court’s dismissal order. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (citation
omitted) (explaining that the time requirements to file a notice of appeal in a civil case
are “mandatory and jurisdictional”).
3 We liberally construe all of these requests as filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2002)
(explaining that, once judgment is entered, Rules 59 and 60 govern the opening of that
judgment); Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 520 n.9 (2020) (explaining that a motion for
relief from judgment made within 28 days of the entry of that judgment is properly
construed as a motion under Rule 59(e)).

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When, like here, the United States is not a party, a notice of appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the order that the party seeks to appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The
District Court entered its order dismissing the amended complaint in October, but
Massey-Campbell did not appeal until January. While Massey-Campbell’s initial Rule
59(e) motions tolled the time to appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), his subsequent
motion to vacate or reconsider did not, see Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir.
1984). Massey-Campbell did not file his notice of appeal within 30 days of either the
District Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or its order denying his
first round of Rule 59(e) motions. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over the District
Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the scope of the appeal is
limited to the denial of reconsideration.
With regard to his motion for reconsideration, Massey-Campbell does not address
the Rules 59(e) or 60(b) standards and confines his argument to one sentence asserting
that we should vacate the orders denying post-judgment relief for the same reasons that
we should vacate the dismissal order. Even with the liberal construction afforded to pro
se litigants, this statement is not sufficient to raise an issue on appeal. See Laborers’ Int’l
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted) (explaining that “a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to
bring that issue before this court”); see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that
apply to all other litigants”). In any event, Massey-Campbell could not use his

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post-judgment motions to relitigate the same arguments that he had advanced in his
previous filings. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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