Kevin D. Marlowe v. ISABELLA CASILLAS GUZMAN, SBA Administrator

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 26-1166
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KEVIN D. MARLOWE,
Appellant
v.
ISABELLA CASILLAS GUZMAN, SBA Administrator; LTG ROBERT SKINNER,
USAF Disa Director; PATRICK JOSEPH TOOMEY, JR.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01003)
District Judge: Honorable Keli M. Neary
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
August 18, 2026
Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2026)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
In 2022, pro se litigant Kevin Marlowe filed a complaint in the District Court
against the Administrator of the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), the Director of
the Defense Information Systems Agency (“DISA”), and United States Senator Patrick J.
Toomey, Jr. The complaint revolved around Marlowe’s claim that the SBA had
wrongfully refused to forgive his loan. It appears that the SBA’s decision was based on
DISA’s having debarred Marlowe for his 2005 federal conviction for various offenses
stemming from his role in a defense-procurement-fraud scheme. Marlowe alleged, inter
alia, that DISA had failed to provide information about the debarments, and that Senator
Toomey had failed to sufficiently investigate the matter. In view of the complaint’s
allegations, Marlowe sought (1) forgiveness of his loan and the “return [of] all monies
paid [with respect to that loan],” (2) removal of his debarments from DISA’s website,
(3) court costs, and (4) a letter from Senator Toomey “stating why he just tangentially
supported [Marlowe].” Compl. 19.
In 2023, the District Court granted Senator Toomey’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that his dismissal was warranted for several reasons.1 Meanwhile, the other
two defendants “voluntarily addressed Marlowe’s grievances,” forgiving Marlowe’s loan,
returning any monies paid (with interest), and removing his debarments from DISA’s
website. See Mag. J. Report entered May 8, 2025, at 3. Thereafter, in January 2026, the
1 The District Court concluded, inter alia, that Marlowe had not sufficiently alleged an
injury-in-fact as to Senator Toomey. See Dist. Ct. Order entered Mar. 22, 2023 (adopting
Magistrate Judge’s report entered Mar. 2, 2023).

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District Court dismissed as moot Marlowe’s claims against the SBA’s Administrator and
DISA’s Director, ordered that each party bear his/her own costs, and directed the District
Court Clerk to close the case. This timely appeal followed.2
Marlowe’s opening appellate brief does not challenge the bases for the District
Court’s dismissal of Senator Toomey or the District Court’s subsequent determination
that the remainder of the case was subject to dismissal as moot. Accordingly, Marlowe
has forfeited those challenges. See In re LTC Holdings, Inc., 10 F.4th 177, 181 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2021) (noting that “arguments not developed in an appellant’s opening brief are
forfeited” (citing In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016))); see also Emerson v.
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (applying this rule to a pro
se appeal).
To the extent that Marlowe’s opening brief raises various arguments about his
criminal proceedings from many years ago or any other matters that were not before the
District Court in this civil action, we do not consider those arguments here. See, e.g.,
Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp, 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021) (“It is well-established that
arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not properly preserved for appellate
review.”). To the extent that Marlowe faults the District Court for not awarding him
costs, we see no error in that ruling. See Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Jan. 14, 2026, at 2
(“[Marlowe] cites no authority allowing this court to award him costs.”); see also Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 914 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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American Rule, grounded in longstanding common law tradition, requires parties to pay
their own legal costs win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Templin v. Indep. Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861, 864 (3d
Cir. 2015) (reviewing District Court’s decision on costs for abuse of discretion). And
Marlowe has failed to demonstrate that any of the other arguments that he raises on
appeal entitle him to relief.
In view of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Marlowe’s
motions on appeal, which seek, inter alia, leave to amend his complaint, the production of
various documents, and the “reinstate[ment] [of] Senator Toomey as intervenor/amicus
participant,” 3d Cir. Dkt. No. 17, at 1 (certain capitalization omitted), are denied. To the
extent that Marlowe seeks any other relief from us, that relief is denied, too.

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