in Re: Brent Webber v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 2010 per curiam alteration in original citation modified .…

HLD-024 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-2520
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IN RE: BRENT WEBBER,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:26-cv-03003)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
July 16, 2026
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2026)
_________
OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Pro se petitioner Brent Webber seeks a writ of mandamus. Because he has not
demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition.
In March 2026, Webber initiated a lawsuit in New Jersey state court against SAG-
AFTRA, Sean Astin, and various unidentified defendants. The named defendants
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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removed the case to federal court, after which Webber moved for remand. Webber also
filed a motion for injunctive relief in March 2026, which he withdrew less than two
weeks later. After a Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending the denial of
Webber’s motion to remand in May 2026, Webber filed objections, but they were not
entered on the docket until June 16, 2026. In the meantime, noting that it appeared that
no objections had been filed, the District Court issued an order adopting the Magistrate
Judge’s report on June 9, 2026. Webber filed another motion seeking injunctive relief,
which was docketed on June 8, 2026, and remains pending. Webber has since filed
numerous additional documents in the District Court.
On June 17, 2026, Webber filed a mandamus petition in this Court. He requests
that we: (1) grant his motion for injunctive relief that is pending in the District Court
regarding assets that he asserts are owed to him; (2) vacate the District Court’s order
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report, as he asserts that he timely filed objections that
the District Court failed to consider; (3) hold a trial regarding contract enforceability; (4)
remand the matter to state court; (5) direct the District Court to “remedy Petitioner’s
unequal electronic filing . . . access”; (6) stay District Court proceedings pending a
decision on his mandamus petition; (7) “enjoin[] the defendants, their counsel, and any
associated third parties from transferring, dissipating, or moving” the funds that are at
issue in this case; and (8) order the production of “an industry-standard clearance letter
and Notice of Compliance” from defendants. Mandamus Pet. at 26-28; Suppl.
Mandamus Pet. at ECF p. 11.

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The District Court has since entered an order regarding Webber’s motion to vacate
and his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation; it again adopted
the recommendation to deny Webber’s motion to remand after noting his objections.
Webber has supplemented his mandamus petition to request that we vacate that order.
A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may be granted “only in
extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of
power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted). “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) no other
adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of
the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam)
(alteration in original) (citation modified).
Because Webber has other means of obtaining the relief he seeks, we decline to
order the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief. First, Webber has filed motions in
the District Court requesting: (1) injunctive relief regarding the funds at issue; (2) a trial;
and (3) production of a clearance letter and notice of compliance from defendants.
Webber appears to ask that we rule directly on these requests rather than ordering the
District Court to issue rulings on them, but we have full confidence that the District Court
will promptly address Webber’s pending motions. Cf. Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79
(3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that a writ of mandamus may be warranted where a district
court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction”).

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Next, Webber makes several requests that he could pursue elsewhere. It does not
appear that he has moved for injunctive relief in the District Court to prevent defendants
from moving relevant funds during the litigation. Regarding his electronic filing access,
he has already moved for relief in the District Court, which was denied without prejudice
to Webber’s ability to make the appropriate application with the District Court Clerk’s
Office. However, Webber has not explained whether he has sought this assistance,
stating only that he has been unable to get PACER access because he needs to receive
physical mail to activate his account but does not have a physical address. Accordingly,
he has not shown that he lacks other means to obtain the relief he seeks in these two
requests.
Next, Webber may raise on appeal any issues regarding the District Court’s denial
of his motion to remand and his motion to vacate, making mandamus relief inappropriate.
See Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003) (reviewing the
denial of a motion to remand); see also In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”); Madden, 102 F.3d at
77 (explaining that mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal). Finally, we deny
Webber’s request for a stay of District Court proceedings pending the outcome of his
petition. We express no opinion on the merits of Webber’s requests.
Accordingly, we will deny Webber’s petition.

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