Lisa L. Hartman v. University of Maryland at Baltimore

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1229
LISA L. HARTMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND AT BALTIMORE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cv-02041-JFM)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: December 11, 2014
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John H. Morris, Jr., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Paul D.
Raschke, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lisa L. Hartman appeals from the district court’s
grant of summary judgment exercising supplemental jurisdiction
and denying Hartman’s state-law-based age discrimination claim
and other claims, including a separate claim of age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(ADEA). Hartman argues that the district court abused its
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over her
state law age discrimination claim, made under the Maryland Fair
Employment Practices Act, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-
606(a)(1)(i) (FEPA). She contends also that in considering her
claim, the district court did not ascertain the applicable
Maryland state law and apply it to her claim. She further
asserts that she presented sufficient evidence for her state
claim to survive summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Halpern v.
Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir.
2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is

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a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the
nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The district court properly exercised jurisdiction
over the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012),
which provides that district courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims that “are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The
state and federal claims “must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. . . . [I]f the plaintiff’s claims are such that
he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then . . . there is power in federal courts to hear
the whole.” Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co.,
Inc., 145 F.3d 660, 662 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Hartman contends that the district court abused

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its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the FEPA claim
because the standard of what is required to support a claim for
age-related discrimination under FEPA is not the same as under
the ADEA, and the district court treated the claims as the same.
Hartman contends that under Maryland law, the court could
theoretically decide to apply the mixed-motive approach, which a
federal court is not permitted to consider in an ADEA claim.
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2009).
The district court’s exercise of discretion as to
whether to remand a case to state court involves consideration
of “principles of economy, fairness, convenience and comity.”
Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). Here, the
federal and state claims were the subject of the same summary
judgment motion filed by the UMB, and they were decided at the
same time in the same opinion by the district court. The
district court correctly concluded that considerations of
judicial economy outweighed any concerns about comity, and
proceeded to decide the state claim, which was properly before
it. Given the posture of the case, and the issues to be decided
by the court, its retention of jurisdiction over Hartman’s claim
based on FEPA did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Hartman contends that the district court should have
remanded the state law claim because Maryland courts are not
“legally bound to following federal case law construing

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application of the ADEA, including relevant Supreme Court
authority.” She argues that the district court’s failure “to
ascertain the extent to which Maryland law, construing § 20-606
in the context of age discrimination, embraced the federal case
law applying the ADEA” requires reversal. However, she fails to
demonstrate that the district court’s approach in this case was
inconsistent with Maryland law interpreting FEPA or that this
case presented any novel issues under FEPA. Hartman contends
that the court should have applied a mixed-motive theory to
prove her case and that the court did not do so because it is
prohibited by federal law. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 175-78
(holding that ADEA does not permit mixed-motive discrimination
claims; rather, the plaintiff must prove that the employer would
not have taken the adverse action but for the protected ground).
However, a mixed-motive analysis only applies where there is
first some evidence that age discrimination played a role in
Hartman’s termination.
The ADEA forbids an employer from taking an adverse
employment action against an employee “because of” the
employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Similarly, it is
unlawful under Maryland law for an employer to “fail or refuse
to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to the individual’s compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of . . . age.”

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Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-606(a)(1); see also Md. Code
Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601(d)(2) (defining “employer” to include
the State). A plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment suit
pursuant to the ADEA must prove that age was not merely a
motivating factor of the challenged adverse employment action
but was in fact its “but-for” cause. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180;
see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523
(2013) (reaffirming Gross). To do so, the plaintiff may either
present direct evidence of the employer’s impermissible
motivation or proceed under the familiar burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (assuming that McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims);
Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims). In the absence of
direct evidence of discrimination, “Maryland Courts have
traditionally held that in employment discrimination actions,
parties must engage in the . . . burden-shifting paradigm
described by the . . . Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas.”
Dobkin v. Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law, 63 A.3d 692, 699-700
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (citing cases).
To prevail under the burden-shifting framework,
Hartman must show that: (1) she is “a member of a protected

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class”—that is, forty years or older; (2) she “suffered adverse
employment action;” (3) she “was performing her job duties at a
level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the
time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position
remained open” or she was replaced by a substantially younger
person. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d
277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
With these standards in mind and after reviewing the
record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on Hartman’s FEPA age discrimination
claim. We therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this Court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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