Walter Maldonado Deleon, a/k/a Walter Higinio De Leon- Maldonado v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1764
WALTER MALDONADO DELEON, a/k/a Walter Higinio De Leon-
Maldonado,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 15, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Murray, THE LAW OFFICE OF BRIAN MURRAY PLLC, Fairfax,
Virginia, for Petitioner. Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Jamie M. Dowd, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Jeffery R. Leist, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Walter Maldonado DeLeon, a native and citizen of
Guatemala, petitions for review of the order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his motion to terminate
the removal proceedings. DeLeon contends that the notice to
appear (“NTA”) was signed by a person who did not have authority
to do so under 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2014). We deny the petition
for review.
Jurisdiction vests in the immigration court when a
charging document is filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2014); see 8
C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2014) (providing that, for removal cases
initiated after April 1, 1997, a notice to appear is a charging
document). Removal proceedings are commenced by the filing of
an NTA with the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 (2014). The officers
authorized to issue an NTA are listed in 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a).
The sufficiency of the NTA is a question of law, and as such is
entitled to de novo review. Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061,
1065 (9th Cir. 2007); see generally Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517
F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Board’s legal
determinations are reviewed de novo). Administrative agencies
are entitled to the presumption that they acted properly and
according to law, FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 296 (1965),
and public officers are presumed to have properly discharged

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their duties. Almy v. Sebelius, 679 F.3d 297, 309 (4th Cir.
2012).
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that DeLeon
failed to rebut the presumption that the person who signed his
NTA had the authority to do so. DeLeon offered no evidence that
the person who signed the NTA as an SDDO was not a Supervisory
Detention and Deportation Officer, an officer who is authorized
to issue an NTA. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a)(31). We reject
DeLeon’s argument that the presumption only comes into play
after determining the public officer’s duties. See, e.g.,
Kohli, 473 F.3d at 1067-68. Because DeLeon did not rebut the
presumption at issue, the Board did not err in finding that the
NTA was proper, and in affirming the IJ’s decision declining to
terminate the removal proceedings.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED

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