United States of America v. Lambros Katsipis

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4122
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LAMBROS KATSIPIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:13-cr-00070-MSD-TEM-3)
Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: February 4, 2015
Before SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Alan H. Yamamoto, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Sam
Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth Nelson, J.
David Gunter, II, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lambros Katsipis was the Chief Engineer of the M/V
Antonis G. Pappadakis (“the Pappadakis”), an ocean-going bulk
cargo carrier. During an investigation of the Pappadakis by the
United States Coast Guard, four of Katsipis’s fellow crewmembers
alleged that he ordered them to set up a bypass system whereby
bilge water would be pumped from the Pappadakis’s holding tank,
through the ship’s Marine Sanitation Device (rather than
filtered thorough the ship’s oily water separator), and into the
sea. These crewmembers also informed the Coast Guard that
Katsipis urged them to lie to the investigators about the
system.
The Pappadakis’s Oil Record Book, maintained by
Katsipis, did not reflect a bypass system.* Lieutenant Junior
Grade Crystal Tucker closely examined the Pappadakis’s Oil
* Pursuant to MARPOL, an international treaty governing
ocean-going vessels, “Congress enacted the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (‘APPS’).” Angelex Ltd. v. United States,
723 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-15
(2012)). “Regulations attendant to APPS” require that each
vessel maintain an Oil Record Book recording all “ballasting or
cleaning of fuel oil tanks;” the “discharge of [dirty] ballast
or cleaning water from fuel oil tanks;” the “[d]isposal of oil
residue;” and the “[d]ischarge overboard or disposal otherwise
of [accumulated] bilge water[.]” Id. at 502 (quoting 33 C.F.R.
§ 151.25(a), (d) (2015)). All such entries must “be signed by
the officer or officers in charge of the operations concerned.”
§ 151.25(h). It is unlawful to fail to maintain an accurate Oil
Record Book. 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2012).

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Record Book. Tucker prepared a summary chart, which showed that
Katsipis’s predecessor ran the Oily Water Separator sixteen
times, processing 325 cubic meters of bilge water, in
eleven-and-a-half months. It also showed that Katsipis ran the
Oily Water Separator only seven times, processing 25 cubic
meters of bilge water, over the same amount of time. Tucker
acknowledged, however, that the chart was of limited usefulness,
as it accounted for no potentially confounding variables over
the aggregate twenty-three month period.
Kristy Juaire, a chemist at the Coast Guard’s Marine
Safety Laboratory, conducted gas chromatography and mass
spectrometry tests on the Pappadakis. Her tests revealed fuel
oil, lubricating oil, or petroleum oil in the Marine Sanitation
Device’s sewage tank and discharge hose. She noted that this
oil’s hydrocarbon “fingerprint” was not the same as samples
taken from elsewhere on the Pappadakis. Even so, she explained
that this is to be expected where mixing and weathering might,
over time, result in a different combination of hydrocarbon
“fingerprints” at different locations.
Following a trial, a jury convicted Katsipis of
falsification of records, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519
(2012), knowing failure to maintain an accurate oil record book,
in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2012), and obstruction of
justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). The court

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sentenced him to one year’s probation, including four months of
community confinement.
On appeal, Katsipis contends that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine and
admitting (1) Juaire’s expert testimony, and (2) Tucker’s
summary chart. We affirm.
First, we review the admission of expert testimony
under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403 for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 273 (4th
Cir. 2007) (Rule 702); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 79
(4th Cir. 2005) (Rule 403). Expert testimony is admissible if
it is reliable and relevant. PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). Reliable expert
testimony is “based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge and not on belief or speculation, and
[any] inferences must be derived using scientific or other valid
methods.” Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 200
(4th Cir. 2001). Relevant expert testimony “will assist the
trier of fact[.]” United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815
(4th Cir. 2000). Such assistance exists where the evidence
“tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence to an
issue in the case more probable or less probable[.]” United
States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,

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Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (instructing courts to look to
Fed. R. Evid. 401 when analyzing relevance under 702).
Even so, relevant evidence may be excluded if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In regard to experts, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful
and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.
Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice
against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. That being said, prohibition is
required “only in those instances where the trial judge believes
that there is a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will
be excited to irrational behavior, and that this risk is
disproportionate to the probative value of the offered
evidence.” United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir.
2003).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
Juaire’s testimony. Katsipis did not question Juaire’s
reliability, and her testimony was relevant because it
corroborated the crewmembers’ assertions that the bypass system
existed.

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Second, as stated above, we review objections to the
admissibility of evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of
discretion. Forrest, 429 F.3d at 79. While Fed. R. Evid. 1006
typically governs the admission of summary charts, Katsipis only
claims that the chart presented a danger of prejudice that
outweighed its probative value, not that it failed to meet the
standard for admission under Rule 1006. Accordingly, we review
Katsipis’s claim under Rule 403. Cf. United States v. Lemire,
720 F.2d 1327, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
Tucker’s chart. The chart provided the jury with a big-picture
look at the use of the Oily Water Separator over the course of
two years. While it did not account for all of the confounding
variables, Tucker’s acknowledgment of that fact ameliorates the
potential for prejudice. Katsipis also had ample opportunity,
on cross examination, to highlight the limitations of the chart.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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