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15-1872•Grace Uwamahoro v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General
15-1872Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitJul 6, 2016
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1872
GRACE UWAMAHORO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 29, 2016 Decided: July 6, 2016
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Goldstein, GOLDSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Anthony P. Nicastro, Acting
Assistant Director, Andrew N. O’Malley, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Grace Uwamahoro, a native and citizen of Rwanda, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ)
order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Uwamahoro contends that the IJ’s adverse credibility
finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that she
was denied due process because of the IJ’s extensive questioning
during the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we deny
the petition for review.
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the
[Board’s] interpretation of the [Immigration and Nationality
Act] and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). We will reverse the Board
only if “the evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
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persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84. Because the
Board adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, we review both
decisions. Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 948 (4th
Cir. 2015).
We review an adverse credibility determination for
substantial evidence and give “broad deference” to the IJ’s
credibility determination. Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 273
(4th Cir. 2011). The IJ “must provide specific, cogent reasons
for making an adverse credibility determination.” Id. “The
existence of only a few [] inconsistencies, omissions, or
contradictions can be sufficient” to support an adverse
credibility determination as to the alien’s testimony regarding
past persecution, even if not fundamental to the alien’s claim.
Id. at 273-74; Singh v. Holder, 699 F.3d 321, 328-29 (4th Cir.
2012). “An adverse credibility finding is generally fatal to an
asylum claim unless the alien proves [her] refugee status
through evidence independent of [her] own testimony.” Hui
Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 930 (4th Cir. 2013).
We conclude that the adverse credibility finding in this
case is based on specific and cogent reasons and supported by
substantial evidence. Several of the inconsistencies concern
the basis for Uwamahoro’s past persecution claim. We also
conclude that the record establishes that Uwamahoro did not
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submit sufficient corroborating evidence that could rehabilitate
her testimony.
Nor was Uwamahoro denied due process due to the IJ’s
questioning during the merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(1) (2012) (“The immigration judge shall . . .
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any
witnesses.”); see Sankoh v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir.
2008). Uwamahoro failed to show that the hearing was
fundamentally unfair and that the IJ’s questioning prejudiced
the outcome of the case. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256
(4th Cir. 2008). Finally, in light of the adverse credibility
finding, we conclude that the record does not compel a
conclusion that Uwamahoro demonstrated that she was eligible for
asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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