Tessa R R G Cchildress, a/k/a Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson Carlisle Childress, filed… v. City of Charleston Police Department

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2084
TESSA R R G C CHILDRESS, a/k/a Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson
Carlisle Childress, filed as Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson
Carlisle Childress,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; LIEUTENANT CHITO T.
WALKER; OFFICER SANDERS; OFFICER KOEGLER; SERGEANT RATLIFF;
D-O WILSON; D-O DALLAS; D-O GANT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:13-cv-01225-DCN)
Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: July 29, 2016
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Tessa R R G C Childress, Appellant Pro Se. Christopher Thomas
Dorsel, Sandra J. Senn, SENN LEGAL, LLC, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Tessa Rani Raybourne Gibson Carlisle Childress appeals the
district court’s order adopting in part and rejecting in part
the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting summary
judgment to Defendants in her civil rights action. Childress
asserts on appeal that the district court reversibly erred in
granting summary judgment to Defendants on her claim challenging
her placement in emergency protective custody and in granting
summary judgment to Defendant Ratliff on her claim against him
in his personal capacity for excessive force.
We review de novo a district court’s award of summary
judgment, “viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320
(4th Cir. 2014). “A summary judgment award is appropriate only
when the record shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

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After review of the record and Childress’ brief, we find no
reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Childress’ claim challenging her placement in
emergency protective custody. Accordingly, we affirm that
ruling for the reasons stated by the district court.
Childress v. City of Charleston Police Dep’t, No. 2:13-cv-01225-
DCN (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2015).
With respect to the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendant Ratliff on Childress’ claim against him
for excessive force, we have reviewed the record and Childress’
brief and conclude that the district court made an improper
credibility finding in determining that Ratliff was entitled to
qualified immunity. The record contains Childress’ description
in her deposition testimony of Ratliff’s actions and demeanor in
connection with her placement in an ambulance. The district
court’s conclusion that Ratliff was entitled to summary judgment
was based on its determinations that the record evidence
“reveal[ed] a much different account of the events that took
place” than were proffered in Childress’ deposition testimony
and was “entirely void” of any evidence from which a reasonable
jury could determine that Ratliff employed excessive force
against Childress. In reaching these determinations, however,
the district court failed to view the evidence at the summary
judgment stage in the light most favorable to non-movant

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Childress. By failing to credit evidence that contradicted some
of its determinations, the district court improperly “weigh[ed]
the evidence” and resolved a disputed matter in favor of
Ratliff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
“By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences
contrary to [Childress’] competent evidence, the [district
court] neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at
the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Tolan v. Cotton,
134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014). Applying that principle here, the
district court should have credited Childress’ testimony about
Ratliff’s demeanor and actions in connection with her placement
in the ambulance and considered that evidence along with all
other facts and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to Childress to determine whether Ratliff
acted unreasonably. Vacatur of this portion of the district
court’s judgment and a remand is thus necessary so that the
court can make such a determination and further can determine
whether Ratliff’s actions — viewed properly at the summary
judgment stage — violated clearly established law. Id.;
see Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty., 154 F.3d 173, 179-80
(4th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment where disputed facts
existed as to events surrounding use of force).

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Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s
order finding Ratliff was entitled to qualified immunity and
remand for further proceedings in the district court. We affirm
the remainder of the district court’s judgment. We deny
Childress’ motion to appoint counsel and dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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