United States of America v. Robert Leon Lecraft

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT LEON LECRAFT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:10-cr-00021-FL-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2016 Decided: April 14, 2016
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Robert Leon LeCraft was convicted
of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012).1 The district court sentenced LeCraft
to 180 months’ imprisonment. LeCraft appeals his conviction,
claiming that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence seized following a traffic stop. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
“When considering a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review the [trial] court’s factual findings for
clear error and all legal conclusions de novo.” United States
v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 2015). Because the
Government prevailed on the suppression issue below, we construe
1 LeCraft initially pled guilty to the charge, pursuant to a
plea agreement under which he reserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. However, by
failing to file objections, LeCraft had waived appellate review
of the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to deny the motion to suppress. Because the
parties and the district court had mistakenly assumed that
LeCraft could appeal the suppression decision, LeCraft’s plea
could not be treated as a knowing and voluntary unconditional
guilty plea. Accordingly, this court vacated LeCraft’s original
criminal judgment and remanded for further proceedings, noting
that LeCraft “may be able to renew the suppression issue if he
proceeds to trial.” United States v. LeCraft, 544 F. App’x 185
(4th Cir. 2013). Upon remand, LeCraft once again moved to
suppress the evidence and, after an evidentiary hearing, the
district court denied the motion. LeCraft proceeded to trial
and was ultimately convicted.

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“the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
[G]overnment.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, but “‘there are a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to that
general rule.’” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241-42
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
760 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is the voluntary
consent given by an individual possessing the authority to do
so. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United
States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
In this case, the district court found that the search was
consensual.
“The [G]overnment has the burden of proving consent,” and
“[w]e review for clear error a district court’s determination
that a search [was] consensual . . . [and] apply a subjective
test to analyze whether consent was given, looking to the
totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Robertson, 736
F.3d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Courts
examine such factors as the officer’s conduct, the number of
officers present, the time of the encounter, and the

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characteristics of the individual who was searched. Lattimore,
87 F.3d at 650.
LeCraft argues that he only consented to a search of his
vehicle — not his person — and that his consent to the vehicle
search was invalid because of the manner in which his consent
was obtained and because he was detained beyond the completion
of the valid traffic stop.
The district court observed that LeCraft was in his 60’s
and had extensive experience — both as a defendant and as an
informant — in the criminal justice system. As to the
circumstances under which LeCraft gave consent, the record shows
that Detective Marquie Morrison-Brown stopped LeCraft’s vehicle
for failing to stop at a stop sign, advised him why she had
stopped him, issued a warning, handed back his driver’s license,
and briefly engaged in friendly conversation before requesting
his consent to search. Under the totality of the circumstances,
the district court did not clearly err in finding LeCraft’s
consent to be consensual.
Turning to LeCraft’s argument that the initially legal
detention for the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged, a
temporary detention of an automobile, even if only for a limited
time or purpose, constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Because a
routine traffic stop is more like an investigative detention

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than a custodial arrest, courts evaluate the legality of a
traffic stop by applying the two-prong test in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279
(4th Cir. 2014). Under this test, the police officer’s decision
to stop the vehicle must be both “justified at its inception”
and sufficiently “limited both in scope and duration.” United
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2011). A
routine traffic stop involves requesting the driver’s license
and registration, running a computer check, and issuing a
citation. Green, 740 F.3d at 280. A traffic stop “become[s]
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required
to complete th[e] mission of issuing a warning ticket.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct 1609, 1614-15 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original).
Therefore, to lawfully “extend the detention of a motorist
beyond the time necessary to accomplish a traffic stop’s
purpose, the authorities must either possess ‘reasonable
suspicion or receive the driver’s consent.’” United States v.
Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507).
In this case, as LeCraft concedes, Morrison-Brown was
justified in stopping him for a traffic violation. However, the
traffic stop ended when the officer issued the warning citation
and returned LeCraft’s driver’s license and registration.

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Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). Viewing the
evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
Government, no more than five minutes transpired between the
initial stop and LeCraft’s consent to search. Within this brief
time frame, after the traffic stop ended and before the officer
asked for permission to search, she and LeCraft engaged in
friendly conversation. We conclude that the continued
encounter, culminating in LeCraft’s consent to search, was
consensual and, therefore, was constitutionally permissible.
LeCraft also argues that the district court erred in
finding that he consented to a search of his person. LeCraft
points to the fact that the written police reports stated only
that Morrison-Brown requested permission to search LeCraft’s
vehicle and contends that this contradicts Morrison-Brown’s
testimony that she requested, and LeCraft gave, permission to
search both his vehicle and person. However, at the first
evidentiary hearing, Morrison-Brown explained that she had in
fact requested to search LeCraft’s person and simply omitted it
from her notes through an oversight.
In finding that LeCraft consented to the search, the
district court credited Morrison-Brown’s testimonial explanation
for the seeming discrepancy between her written report of the
traffic stop and her later account at the evidentiary hearing.
Credibility of witnesses is the sole province of the factfinder.

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Cf. United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“[I]t was for the jury, not this court, to decide which version
of the events - the [G]overnment’s or Moye’s - was more
credible.”); United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th
Cir. 1989) (recognizing that witness credibility is within the
sole province of the jury and the appellate court will not
reassess the credibility of testimony). We conclude that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that LeCraft
consented to the search of his person.
Even assuming arguendo that LeCraft’s valid consent to
search extended only to his vehicle and not to his person, upon
stepping out of his vehicle so that the two officers on the
scene could perform the consensual search, instead of following
Morrison-Brown’s instructions to go to the back of his vehicle,
LeCraft walked past his vehicle at an unusually quick pace.
Combined with LeCraft’s initial failure to immediately pull over
when the patrol car’s blue lights were activated and the
officers’ knowledge of his criminal history, which included
drugs and weapons, we conclude that the officers had reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and, therefore, were
legally permitted to search his person.
Finally, LeCraft appears to challenge the denial of the
motion to suppress his subsequent in-custody remark to an
officer that he only possessed the firearm for protection,

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arguing that the statement did not “purge the taint” of the
earlier alleged Fourth Amendment violation. As previously
stated, we conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. Furthermore, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in finding that LeCraft’s incriminating remark
at the police station was not made in response to law
enforcement interrogation and therefore did not violate his
Miranda2 rights. Rhodes v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-31 (1980).
Accordingly, we affirm LeCraft’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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