United States of America v. Antoine Clack

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4476
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTOINE CLACK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:16-cr-00233-FL-1)
Submitted: February 15, 2018 Decided: February 16, 2018
Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON, STYERS & MAY, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Donald R. Pender, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Antoine Clack pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012), distribution of
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm by a
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). The district court found
Clack’s Sentencing Guidelines range to be 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment, and
sentenced Clack to 71 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Clack argues that his sentence
is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We turn first to Clack’s allegation of procedural sentencing error. Clack argues
that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range because, when determining
Clack’s total offense level, the court included a 2-level enhancement for the use,
threatened use, or directed use of violence. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1(b)(2). Clack contends that the evidence on which the district court relied to
support this enhancement did not have sufficient indicia of reliability.
“The district court’s determination that evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
considered at sentencing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings are
reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted). “In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” USSG
§ 6A1.3(a), p.s. Applying these principles to the record before us, we discern no

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reversible error. Based on testimony provided at the sentencing hearing, the district court
concluded that the original source of the relevant information was credible and reliable.
The court then listed several corroborating factors it relied on to conclude that the
Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the enhancement
was appropriate.
We turn next to Clack’s allegation of substantive unreasonableness. We examine
substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, considering the totality
of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Any sentence that
is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)]
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Clack posits that his sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We disagree. First, despite Clack’s suggestion to the contrary, the
district court clearly explained that it was giving Clack credit for the 16 months he spent
in state custody by reducing his sentence from 87 months to 71 months. Second, the
district court meaningfully explained its chosen sentence and provided an individualized
analysis as to why this sentence was appropriate for Clack. Finally, Clack presents no
evidence to rebut the presumption of reasonableness applicable to his sentence.

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We therefore affirm Clack’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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