United States of America v. Marland Maynor

ON REHEARING
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4835
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARLAND MAYNOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:17-cr-00280-RDB-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2022 Decided: June 26, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brent Evan Newton, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron,
United States Attorney, Christina A. Hoffman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Marland Maynor of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced Maynor under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to the mandatory minimum term of 180
months’ imprisonment. Maynor appealed, challenging the propriety of the ACCA
enhancement. We affirmed.
Maynor then petitioned for rehearing, asserting in part that he was entitled to relief
under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195-97, 2200 (2019) (holding that § 922(g)
offense requires proof that defendant knew of his prohibited status). We granted the
petition and directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Rehaif’s impact on
Maynor’s conviction.
Before briefing commenced, the Supreme Court issued Greer v. United States, 141
S. Ct. 2090 (2021), which substantially clarified the Rehaif issue in this case. As a result,
Maynor’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
conceding that Greer forecloses Maynor’s Rehaif claim. Maynor disagrees, arguing in a
pro se supplemental brief that he can establish Rehaif error. Because we conclude that
Maynor cannot establish that the unpreserved Rehaif error affected his substantial rights,
we affirm.
“In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must prove not only that
the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when he
possessed the firearm.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021). Because
Maynor did not challenge the knowledge-of-status element in the district court, plain error

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review applies. Id. at 2096. For a defendant to prevail under this standard, we must find
that “(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights;
and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Comer, 5 F.4th 535, 548 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To satisfy the third plain error prong in the Rehaif context, the defendant
must “make[] a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have
presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” Greer, 141 S. Ct.
at 2100. “When a defendant advances such an argument or representation on appeal, the
[appellate] court must determine whether the defendant has carried the burden of showing
a ‘reasonable probability’ that the outcome of the district court proceeding would have
been different.” Id.
Though previously convicted of several felony offenses, Maynor contends that, at
the time he was arrested on the instant felon-in-possession charge, he believed he was no
longer a felon because he had fully served his prior sentences. And there is a modicum of
support for this claim: during his arrest, Maynor told a police officer that he was permitted
to carry a firearm since he was not on probation or parole. According to Maynor, this
statement demonstrates that he believed—albeit mistakenly—that he was not a felon.
But even assuming that Maynor’s statement is sufficient to satisfy his initial burden
under Greer, we discern no reasonable probability that the outcome of Maynor’s trial
would have been different. First, Maynor admitted at trial that he is not authorized to carry
a weapon. Further, he disavowed his claim that he thought he could possess a weapon
simply because he was not on probation or parole. This testimony clearly undercuts the

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statement Maynor made at his arrest. Moreover, Maynor has a long and serious criminal
history, including a conviction for attempted first degree murder, for which he received a
10-year prison sentence. In our view, Maynor’s many prior felony convictions, coupled
with his trial testimony, make it highly unlikely that Maynor could have convinced a jury
that he was ignorant of his felony status. See Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097 (“Felony status is
simply not the kind of thing that one forgets.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment.* This court requires that counsel inform Maynor, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Maynor requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Maynor.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
* Rehaif does not bear on the ACCA issue that initially prompted this appeal;
accordingly, we affirm the application of the ACCA enhancement for the reasons set forth
in our prior opinion. United States v. Maynor, 776 F. App’x 126, 126-27 (4th Cir. 2019),
reh’g granted, judgment vacated, 826 F. App’x 287 (4th Cir. 2020).

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