United States of America v. William Ronald Monroe

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4083
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM RONALD MONROE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00014-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: April 26, 2022 Decided: May 25, 2022
Before KING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Jenny R. Thoma, Research & Writing Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia,
Aaron D. Moss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, United States
Attorney, C. Lydia Lehman, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Robert H.
McWilliams, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In October 2019, William Ronald Monroe pled guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Prior to sentencing, Monroe
objected to the probation officer’s determination that Monroe qualified for an enhanced
base offense level of 26, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(1)
(2018), because, in relevant part, he had two prior convictions for felony controlled
substance offenses. Monroe’s argument hinged on his position that his 2005 District of
Columbia conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, which
yielded an 18-month sentence, did not qualify, categorically, as a “controlled substance
offense” under USSG § 4B1.2(b).1 The district court overruled the objection, ruling that
the prior conviction so qualified as a “controlled substance offense” under Application
Note 1 to USSG § 4B1.2(b).
Monroe appeals, challenging only this ruling. In light of our recent holding in
United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), we vacate Monroe’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.2
This court reviews all criminal sentences for reasonableness, employing an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “A sentence based on
an improperly calculated Guidelines range is procedurally unreasonable.” United States v.
Shephard, 892 F.3d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 2018). “In assessing whether a district court
1 The commentary to USSG § 2K2.1 provides that the term “controlled substance
offense” as used in that Guideline “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and
Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1.
2 Resolution of this appeal was deferred pending this court’s decision in Campbell.

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properly calculated the Guidelines range, including its application of any sentencing
enhancements, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Fluker, 891 F.3d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2018)
(cleaned up).
We recently considered the precise argument advanced by Monroe here and
resolved it favorably to Monroe’s position. The Campbell court, observing that the relevant
question was “whether USSG § 4B1.2(b)’s definition of ‘controlled substance offense’
includes an attempt to deliver a controlled substance,” Campbell, 22 F.4th at 442, held that
it does not, id. at 443-47. Critical to this conclusion is that the text of USSG § 4B1.2(b)
does not define “controlled substance offense” to include attempt offenses, while
Application Note 1 to USSG § 4B1.2 does. Id. at 442, 444. Relying in part on United
States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc), we ruled that the
commentary’s expanded definition is plainly inconsistent with the Guidelines’
unambiguous text and, thus, not entitled to deference, Campbell, 22 F.4th at 444-47.
In light of Campbell, which was decided after Monroe’s sentencing, it is now clear
that Monroe’s District of Columbia conviction for attempted possession with intent to
distribute cocaine does not qualify as a predicate “controlled substance offense” under
USSG § 4B1.2(b). As such and consistent with Campbell, we vacate Monroe’s sentence
and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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