United States of America v. William Dexter Finkley

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4492
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM DEXTER FINKLEY,
Defendant - Appellant,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (4:18-cr-01079-RBH-1)
Submitted: April 25, 2023 Decided: May 17, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: William W. Watkins, Sr., WILLIAM W. WATKINS, PA, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Andrew R. de Holl,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William Dexter Finkley appeals his 144-month sentence imposed pursuant to his
guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On appeal, he asserts that the sentencing judge erred by not reviewing
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (ACCA) enhancement at the
sentencing hearing; that he was improperly categorized as an armed career criminal; and
that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to his enhancement
under the ACCA. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
In a plea agreement, Finkley waived the right to contest his conviction or sentence
other than for claims based on “ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct,
or future changes in the law that affect the defendant’s sentence.” Finkley contends that
the waiver was involuntary because he “did not know he could object to the calculation of
his being classified as an [a]rmed [c]areer [c]riminal” and that claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are not within the scope of the waiver.
We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo and “will enforce the waiver
if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.” United
States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021). A waiver is valid if it is “entered by
the defendant knowingly and intelligently.” Id. To make that determination, we “consider
the totality of the circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the defendant,
his educational background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement and its terms.”
United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver

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of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant
understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Contrary to Finkley’s contentions, the record reveals that Finkley waived his
appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. After Finkley acknowledged that he had not
been forced or threatened to plead guilty, the district court determined that Finkley was
competent to enter his guilty plea. The court questioned Finkley about the waiver, and
Finkley stated that he understood its significance. Our review of the record reveals that the
waiver is valid and enforceable. Regarding the scope of the waiver, Finkley argues only
that his claims of ineffective assistance explicitly fall outside the scope of his waiver.
Finkley correctly notes that his claims of ineffective assistance are not waived. But by
failing to contend that any of his other claims fall outside the scope of the waiver, he has
waived any challenge to the application of the waiver to them.
Turning to Finkley’s ineffective assistance claim, we have previously held that such
claims are cognizable on direct appeal “only where the record conclusively establishes
ineffective assistance.” United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).
“Otherwise, the proper avenue for such claims is a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed with the
district court.” Id. Here, Finkley asserts that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
object on several grounds to his ACCA status. The record does not conclusively show
ineffective assistance and so these claims are not cognizable on direct appeal.

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Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

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