John Clinton McClain, Iii v. Lynchburg City Schools / Lynchburg City School Board

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-1512
JOHN CLINTON MCCLAIN, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LYNCHBURG CITY SCHOOLS / LYNCHBURG CITY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (6:19-cv-00011-NKM-RSB)
Submitted: May 30, 2023 Decided: June 23, 2023
Before NIEMEYER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Strelka, Monica L. Mroz, STRELKA EMPLOYMENT LAW,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Micah B. Schwartz, Robert C. Wood, Charlottesville,
Virginia, Katherine E. Lehnen, M CGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
John Clinton McClain, III, appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to his former employer, Lynchburg City Schools (“LCS”), on his claim that LCS
retaliated against him for opposing racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII), and
42 U.S.C. § 1981. We “review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standards as the district court and viewing the facts and inferences
drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Perkins v. Int’l
Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
Absent direct evidence of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove his claim through the
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (recognizing Title VII and § 1981 claims are governed by the same standard).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a
plaintiff must show that “(1) [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer acted
adversely against [him], and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the asserted adverse action.” Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 177 (4th Cir.
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case,
the burden shifts to his “employer to demonstrate that its purportedly retaliatory action was
in fact the result of a legitimate non-retaliatory reason.” Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech.,
Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 653-54 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the
employer meets this burden, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

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employer’s purported nonretaliatory reasons were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination.” Id. at 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these standards, we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. McClain v. Lynchburg City Schs.,
No. 6:19-cv-00011-NKM-RSB (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2021). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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