United States of America v. Jamal Mohammad Eleidy

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4140
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAL MOHAMMAD ELEIDY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00133-FL-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2023 Decided: March 1, 2023
Before KING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON, STYERS & MAY, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jamal Mohammad Eleidy pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(1), (2), 1349. The
district court sentenced Eleidy to 109 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised
release with various conditions. On appeal, Eleidy’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal that are not precluded by the appeal waiver in Eleidy’s plea agreement, but
questioning whether the magistrate judge erred in accepting Eleidy’s guilty plea∗ and
whether Eleidy’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Eleidy has filed a pro se brief, as
supplemented, also challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence and
contesting the procedural reasonableness of his sentence based on the district court’s
application of certain sentencing enhancements. The Government has moved to dismiss
the appeal pursuant to the appeal waiver in Eleidy’s plea agreement. We deny the
Government’s motion to dismiss, affirm Eleidy’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and
remand for resentencing.
“When the government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and has not breached the
plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls
within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the validity of an appeal waiver de
novo. See id. “A waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to
∗ Eleidy consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for the plea hearing.

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waive the right to appeal.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, if the district court fully questions a
defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy that complies
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and the record shows that the defendant understood the waiver’s
significance, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d
358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018). Eleidy’s appeal waiver does not preclude our review of the
validity of his guilty plea. Id. at 364. Our review of the record confirms that the magistrate
judge conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, that Eleidy’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal. We therefore
affirm Eleidy’s conviction.
Our review pursuant to Anders revealed a meritorious ground for appeal that falls
outside the scope of Eleidy’s appeal waiver. While the district court announced some
conditions of supervised release at sentencing, the amended written judgment contained
multiple discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not announced at
sentencing, including 13 standard conditions and two additional standard conditions. Thus,
the district court violated the rule that “all non-mandatory conditions of supervised release
must be announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing.” United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d
291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020). This is reversible error under de novo review, id. at 295-96, and
the appeal waiver in Eleidy’s plea agreement does not bar our review, United States v.
Singletary, 984 F.3d 342, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2021).
When the district court fails to announce discretionary conditions of supervised
release that are later included in the written judgment, the defendant’s sentence must be

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vacated in its entirety and remanded for resentencing. See id. at 346 & n.4. Thus, we have
no occasion to consider any additional challenges to Eleidy’s sentence, including those
raised in counsel’s Anders brief and Eleidy’s pro se brief, or whether such challenges are
barred by the appeal waiver.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal other than the Rogers error. Therefore, we deny
the Government’s motion to dismiss, affirm Eleidy’s conviction, vacate his sentence
pursuant to Rogers and Singletary, and remand for resentencing. This court requires that
counsel inform Eleidy, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Eleidy requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served
on Eleidy.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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