United States of America v. Wendell Wilkins

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4309
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WENDELL WILKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:18-cr-01017-DCN-1)
Submitted: December 29, 2022 Decided: June 12, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Cameron J. Blazer, BLAZER LAW FIRM, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Michael Rhett DeHart, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Wendell Wilkins pled guilty, pursuant to a verbal plea agreement, to money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (h), and the district court
sentenced him to 66 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questioning whether Wilkins’ guilty plea is valid and whether his sentence
is reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Wilkins has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy during
which it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the
rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the
maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The
court also must ensure that the plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or
promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that a factual
basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Because Wilkins did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the adequacy
of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th
Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1)
an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “In the Rule 11 context, this inquiry means that [the defendant] must demonstrate

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a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” United
States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the record reveals that the district court substantially complied with the Rule 11
requirements, and any omissions did not affect Wilkins’ substantial rights. Further, we
conclude that Wilkins entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis
supported the plea. Accordingly, we conclude that Wilkins’ guilty plea is valid.
With respect to Wilkins’ sentence, “[w]e review the reasonableness of a sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard. . . .” United States v.
Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). We must first “evaluate procedural
reasonableness, determining whether the district court committed any procedural error,
such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If “the district court has not committed procedural
error,” we then assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive
reasonableness review “takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose
satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any
sentence that is within . . . a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).

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Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. The district court properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors—particularly,
Wilkins’ criminal history and the seriousness of Wilkins’ current offense—and indicated
that it had considered Wilkins’ health concerns and his mitigation arguments. We further
conclude that Wilkins fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that we afford his
within-Guidelines sentence. Thus, Wilkins’ sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Wilkins, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Wilkins requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Wilkins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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