United States of America v. Vincent Roland Kring

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4378
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VINCENT ROLAND KRING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:05-cr-00134-RMG-1)
Submitted: June 24, 2022 Decided: July 1, 2022
Before MOTZ and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST, P.C.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Corey F. Ellis, United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, Martin L. Holmes, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Vincent Roland Kring appeals the 36-month sentence imposed on revocation of
supervised release, challenging the reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We
“will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. “To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
[we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable.” Id. If a revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable, we do not consider whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 437.
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” United
States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1252 (2021); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors),
and meaningfully responds to the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments for a different sentence,
Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437-40. “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in
light of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Kring asserts that the district court erred by imposing a sentence above the policy
statement range, despite Kring’s arguments at sentencing that his supervised release

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violations were relatively unserious and that his violation conduct would be better
addressed by Kring remaining on supervised release, rather than imprisonment. Our
review of the record confirms that the district court adequately addressed the mitigating
arguments Kring raised at sentencing and sufficiently explained why a sentence within the
policy statement range was insufficient to satisfy the goals of sentencing. Based on the
nature of Kring’s violations, the fact that they began shortly after his release from
incarceration, and his refusal to cease the violations despite repeated warnings, the district
court determined that an upward variance was necessary to provide adequate deterrence
and to protect the public. Moreover, although Kring argues that he would benefit more
from continued supervision than from incarceration, we do not consider whether there was
some better alternative to the chosen sentence. Rather, our review is limited to whether
the sentence is within the statutory maximum and whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable. See Patterson, 957 F.3d at 436. Under that standard, we discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s finding that Kring was unlikely to comply with
continued supervision and that a sentence within the policy statement range was
insufficient. We therefore conclude that Kring’s upward variance sentence is not
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, much less plainly so.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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