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21-4379•United States of America v. Ernie Martin Brinn
21-4379Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitFeb 22, 2022
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERNIE MARTIN BRINN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00413-WO-1)
Submitted: February 17, 2022 Decided: February 22, 2022
Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. JoAnna Gibson McFadden, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ernie Martin Brinn pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to access with
intent to view child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). The
district court sentenced Brinn to 54 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised
release. On appeal, Brinn’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether Brinn’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Although notified of his right to do
so, Brinn has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 687 (2020). We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness,
determining whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly
calculating the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then
assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness
review “takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the
standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence
that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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“Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Our review of the record reflects that Brinn’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
The district court properly calculated the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, to which
Brinn did not object. The district court addressed the parties’ arguments at length and
provided a thorough explanation for the chosen sentence—a below-Guidelines custodial
sentence and the mandatory minimum term of supervised release. We further conclude
that Brinn fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his below-Guidelines
sentence. Thus, Brinn’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Brinn, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Brinn requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Brinn. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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