United States of America v. Bradley Tyrone Spratt

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4478
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRADLEY TYRONE SPRATT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00044-CCE-1)
Submitted: August 23, 2022 Decided: August 25, 2022
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, HEYTENS, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Terry
M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
PER CURIAM:
Bradley Tyrone Spratt pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district
court sentenced Spratt within the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range to 108 months’
imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, Spratt argues that his sentence
is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). We affirm.
We review Spratt’s sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). In doing so, we first
examine the sentence for procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. We then review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence; that is, we “examine[ ] the totality of the circumstances to
see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-
Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). Moreover, we presume that a sentence
within or below a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 930 (4th Cir. 2018). “Such a presumption can only
be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

-- 2 of 3 --

3
Although Spratt only challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, we
have reviewed the record and conclude that his sentence is procedurally reasonable. See
United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). Spratt argues that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the
goals of § 3553(a). However, the district court thoroughly discussed the relevant § 3553(a)
factors, including the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, Spratt’s history and
characteristics, and the need to protect the public from further crimes. The district court
also engaged with Spratt’s counsel over her request for a downward variance, but
ultimately rejected the request in light of the dangerous nature of the offense conduct—
which involved Spratt firing his then-girlfriend’s gun from the window of a vehicle, then
pointing the gun at her head, and threatening to kill her—and Spratt’s robust criminal
history, including prior firearm convictions. Our review convinces us that the district court
carefully evaluated the § 3553(a) factors and appropriately weighed Spratt’s mitigating
arguments when imposing a sentence within the Guidelines range. Thus, Spratt has failed
to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his sentence.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --