United States of America v. Nathaniel Graham, a/k/a Nasty

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-6613
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL GRAHAM, a/k/a Nasty,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:12-cr-00188-FDW-DSC-13)
Submitted: April 1, 2022 Decided: April 20, 2022
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nathaniel Graham, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Nathaniel Graham appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act
of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. We vacate the district
court’s order and remand for further consideration.
We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate release motion for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
383 (2021). “In doing so, we ensure that the district court has not acted arbitrarily or
irrationally, has followed the statutory requirements, and has conducted the necessary
analysis for exercising its discretion.” United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir.
2021).
When deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a
district court generally proceeds in three steps. Id. at 185-86. First, the court determines
whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” support a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); High, 997 F.3d at 185. Second, the court considers whether “a
[sentence] reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); High, 997 F.3d at 186. Third, if the
court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant relief, the court must
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors “in deciding whether to exercise its
discretion to reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment.” High, 997 F.3d at 186; 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

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“As of now, there is no Sentencing Commission policy statement ‘applicable’ to [a
defendant’s] compassionate-release motion[],” as opposed to such a motion brought by the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP). United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 283 (4th Cir. 2020). In
denying Graham’s motion for compassionate release, the district court concluded that
Graham failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13, p.s. (2018). To be sure, USSG § 1B1.13, p.s.,
which applies to compassionate release motions filed by the BOP, “‘remains helpful
guidance even when motions are filed by defendants.’” High, 997 F.3d at 186 (quoting
McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7). However, because district courts are presently
“empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a
defendant might raise,” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284 (cleaned up), we conclude that the district
court’s narrow reliance on USSG § 1B1.13, p.s., improperly restricted its assessment of
whether Graham’s arguments presented extraordinary and compelling reasons.*
The district court also found that a balance of the § 3553(a) factors did not warrant
granting relief. While there is no “categorical . . . requirement” that a district court
explicitly address each of the defendant’s arguments in support of his compassionate
release motion, a court must nonetheless sufficiently explain the reasons for its decision in
light of the circumstances of the particular case. High, 997 F.3d at 187-90 (internal
quotation marks omitted). At bottom, the district court’s explanation must “satisfy [this]
* We recognize that the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in
McCoy.

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court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising
its own legal decisionmaking authority, so as to allow for meaningful appellate review.”
Id. at 190 (cleaned up).
Here, although the district court addressed Graham’s concerns regarding contracting
COVID-19, the court failed to consider Graham’s other arguments, including the poor
prison conditions in which he lived, his relative youth when he was first incarcerated, his
various rehabilitative efforts in prison, his family and community support, the alleged
sentencing disparity between him and his codefendants, and his having had only one minor
nonviolent infraction in prison. Indeed, in discussing the § 3553(a) factors, the district
court failed to mention any postsentencing conduct. Instead, the district court discussed
Graham’s offense conduct and criminal history and the § 3553(a) factors that the court had
emphasized during Graham’s 2014 sentencing. We are therefore unable to conclude that
the district court “considered” Graham’s arguments in favor of compassionate release and
had “a reasoned basis for” its decision to deny relief. Id. (cleaned up).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings. We express no view as to the merits of Graham’s compassionate release
motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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