United States of America v. Fredrika Antonio Hallamon

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4493
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FREDRIKA ANTONIO HALLAMON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00524-SAL-1)
Submitted: July 12, 2023 Decided: July 19, 2023
Before WYNN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Justin M. Kata, JUSTIN M. KATA – ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Winston David Holliday, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Fredrika Antonio Hallamon appeals his conviction and the six-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea, without a plea agreement, to destruction and delay of
the mail by a postal employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a). Hallamon’s counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are
no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Hallamon’s guilty plea is valid
and whether his within-Sentencing-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Although he was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Hallamon has not done so. The
Government has declined to file a response. Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Hallamon did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we
review the validity of his plea for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622
(4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if
(1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes that an error
affected his substantial rights by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 608
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
which it informs the defendant of, and determines the defendant understands, the rights he
is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charge to which he is pleading, and the applicable

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maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court also must ensure
that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises, Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
Here, although the district court failed to explicitly advise Hallamon that his right
to appointed counsel extended to every stage of the criminal proceedings, that the court
was obligated to impose a special assessment, and of potentially adverse immigration
consequences, cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D), (L), (O), nothing in the record suggests
that these minor errors affected Hallamon’s substantial rights. Moreover, there is no
indication that, but for the court’s minor omissions, Hallamon would not have entered his
guilty plea. See Davila, 569 U.S. at 608. We therefore conclude that Hallamon entered
his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis supported the plea.
Turning to Hallamon’s sentence, we review “all sentences—whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “First, we ‘ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668
(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “If the sentence
‘is procedurally sound, [we] should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the

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sentence,’ taking into account the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Provance,
944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Any sentence within a
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, and the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 230 (4th Cir. 2016).
We conclude that Hallamon’s sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable. The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, to which Hallamon
did not object, and adequately explained why it imposed Hallamon’s custodial sentence
and term of supervised release. In addition, Hallamon fails to overcome the presumption
of reasonableness that we afford his within-Guidelines sentence.
We have reviewed the record in accordance with Anders and have found no
meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Hallamon, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Hallamon requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Hallamon.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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