United States of America v. William Jamal McCauley

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4515
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM JAMAL MCCAULEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00413-LCB-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023
Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Sandra Barrett, Hendersonville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jacob Darriel
Pryor, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
William McCauley pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
The district court sentenced him to 160 months’ imprisonment, below the applicable
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal,
but questioning whether (1) McCauley’s guilty plea is valid, (2) his sentence is reasonable,
and (3) the special conditions of supervised release contained in the written judgment are
consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. Although notified of
his right to do so, McCauley has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, and the Government
has declined to file a brief. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Because McCauley did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea,
we review the validity of his guilty plea for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d
621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the district court, through a
colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, the charge to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces upon conviction, and the various rights he
is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The district court also must
ensure that the defendant’s plea was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis,
and did not result from force or threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). In reviewing the adequacy of the court’s compliance with
Rule 11, we “accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how best to conduct the

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mandated colloquy with the defendant.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 295
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the Rule 11
colloquy and, discerning no plain error, we conclude that McCauley’s guilty plea is valid.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,
or significantly outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957
F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (first alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In performing that review, we must first determine whether the
district court “committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the
Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” Id. If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we
then assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Our substantive
reasonableness review “takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose
satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any
sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
We are satisfied that McCauley's sentence of imprisonment is procedurally
reasonable. Our review of the record confirms that the district properly calculated the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, heard argument

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on McCauley’s request for a downward variance and granted his request, and sufficiently
explained the reasons for the sentence it imposed. We also conclude that nothing in the
record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to McCauley’s 160-
month sentence.
Finally, we conclude that the special conditions of supervised release contained in
the written judgment are consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the
sentence. Each special condition imposed in the judgment was explicitly announced by
the district court judge at the sentencing hearing, to no objections. See United States v.
Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform McCauley, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If McCauley requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on McCauley.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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